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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CRP abbreviations 
A4NH CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture for Nutrition and Health 
AAS CGIAR Research Program on Aquatic Agricultural Systems 
CCAFS CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food 
Security 
Dryland Cereals CGIAR Research Program on Dryland Cereals 
Dryland Systems CGIAR Research Program on Dryland Systems 
FTA CGIAR Research Program on Forests, Trees and Agroforestry 
Genebanks CGIAR Research Program for Managing and Sustaining Crop Collections 
Grain Legumes CGIAR Research Program on Grain Legumes 
GRiSP CGIAR Research Program on Rice 
Humidtropics CGIAR Research Program on Integrated Systems for the Humidtropics 
L&F CGIAR Research Program on Livestock and Fish 
MAIZE CGIAR Research Program on Maize 
PIM CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions and Markets 
RTB CGIAR Research Program on Roots, Tubers and Bananas 
WHEAT CGIAR Research Program on Wheat 
WLE CGIAR Research Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems 
Center abbreviations
CIAT Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (International Center for 
Tropical Agriculture) 
CIFOR Center for International Forestry Research 
CIMMYT International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center 
CIP Centro Internacional de la Papa (International Potato Center) 
ICARDA International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas  
ICRAF World Agroforestry Centre  
ICRISAT International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute  
IITA International Institute for Tropical Agriculture 
ILRI International Livestock Research Institute  
IRRI International Rice Research Institute  
IWMI International Water Management Institute 
Other
CGIAR 
Fund 
Consortium 
CGIAR centers 
Global research partnership for a food secure future 
Multi-donor trust fund that finances CGIAR research 
Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers 
CGIAR Research Centers 
CRP  CGIAR Research Program 
CP  Challenge Program 
5 
Review of CRP Governance and Management 
Independent  
Evaluation 
Arrangement 
iea.cgiar.org 
CPA Consortium Performance Agreements 
DDG Deputy Director General 
DG Director General 
HR Human Resources 
IEA Independent Evaluation Arrangement (of the CGIAR) 
IAC Independent Advisory Committee  
(Humidtropics, Grain Legumes, Dryland Cereals, A4NH) 
ISAC Independent Scientific Advisory Committee (Dryland Systems) 
ISPC Independent Science and Partnership Council (of the CGIAR) 
LC Lead center 
M&E Monitoring and evaluation 
OCS One Common System (of the CGIAR) 
PIA Program Implementation Agreements 
PMC Planning and Management Committee (A4NH) 
POP Program Oversight Panel (AAS) 
PPMC 
PPMT 
Program Planning and Management Committee (L&F) 
Program Planning and Management Team (GRiSP) 
RQ Review Question 
SAC Stakeholder Advisory Committee (MAIZE) 
SPAC Science and Partnership Advisory Committee (L&F) 
SRF Strategy and Results Framework (of the CGIAR) 
ToR Terms of Reference 
$ 
W1, 2 & 3 
US-Dollar 
CGIAR funding windows 1, 2 & 31 
1 The different funding modalities of the CGIAR are explained in more detail under 3.2. Funding of CRPs 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Review of CRP Governance and Management was requested by the Consortium and 
approved by the Fund Council in November 2012.  The Independent Evaluation 
Arrangement (IEA) is responsible for the review, which was carried out between June 2013 
and January 2014.   
At the time the review was initiated, CRP governance and management structures were in 
place or approved for each CRP.  This enabled the review to “take stock of experience so far, 
identify issues and provide lessons from existing CRPs and elsewhere which can be 
applicable to other CRPs” (Annex 1, Review Terms of Reference).  The timing of the review 
was intended to provide an early informative assessment useful to the next program 
proposal cycle. 
Data collection and analysis took place from July through October 2013.  Initial findings 
were shared in November in a series of webinars with center DGs, CRP leaders and staff.  A 
draft of the review report was circulated to key stakeholders for comment in late January.  
The final report was communicated to the Consortium on March 10, 2014. 
The focus of the review is on CRP-specific governance and management, including the 
intersection of these functions with CGIAR center management and boards, Consortium and 
Fund Council.  It covers 16 CGIAR Research Programs (CRPs) including the program 
established for “Managing and Sustaining Crop Collections” (Genebanks CRP) (Table 6).  
The objectives of the review are: 
• to develop an accurate and nuanced understanding of governance and
management across the CRPs; 
• to identify existing structures and practices that support program and system-
level goals; 
• to highlight structures and practices that impede or undermine performance;
• to recommend principles and practices for CRP governance and management
that enhance performance and accountability.
Sources and definitions 
The review relied on four principal sources for assessing CRP governance and management: 
• Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional Partnership Programs: Indicative
Principles and Standards (IEG/World Bank 2007), from which the majority of the 
main criteria were drawn; 
• guidance in the Strategy and Results Framework (SRF) concerning oversight,
planning, management and implementation of CRPs; 
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• CGIAR guidelines for center boards adopted in 1996 and updated in 2007, which
reflect agreed upon principles and practices for effective governance; and
• Governance Principles for Challenge Programs (2008), which offered precedents
for the governance and management of CGIAR multi-stakeholder programs.
The review references the general definition of governance that appears in the Sourcebook 
to differentiate CRP governance from management (pg. 23).  At the conclusion of the 
review, in connection with a recommendation with respect to CRP governance, the review 
suggests a set of responsibilities for a CRP governance body developed from the review’s 
findings and conclusions (Table 12).  
The ToR for the review and the Sourcebook employ “governance” in its common usage.  The 
review team understood that in assessing CRP governance it would be important to 
distinguish between the roles and responsibilities of center boards, particularly lead center 
boards which have legal accountability for CRP performance, and the roles, responsibilities 
and more limited authority of CRP governance bodies.  With that in mind, the review 
consistently refers to “center boards,” “lead center boards,” and “CRP governance bodies” 
throughout the review to differentiate between each group.  “CRP governance body” also 
provides a useful collective description for the number of CRP governance bodies (23 active 
bodies at the time of the review) and also the variety of names (steering committee, 
oversight committee, stakeholder advisory committee, independent science panel).  
Criteria and principal review questions 
In assessing CRP governance and management, the review addresses the following criteria: 
• Legitimacy: The extent to which governance and management structures
facilitate the participation and voice of stakeholders
• Accountability: The extent to which accountability is defined, accepted, and
exercised from the system-level to centers to CRPs
• Fairness: The extent to which partners and participants, similarly situated, have
an opportunity to influence or benefit from a CRP
• Transparency: The extent to which the programs’ decision-making, reporting,
and evaluation processes are open and freely available to the general public
• Efficiency: The extent to which the governance and management structures
enhance efficiency or cost-efficiency in the allocation and use of the resources
• Effectiveness: The extent to which results are achieved
• Independence: The extent to which decision making and oversight remain
unconstrained by conflicts of interest
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To achieve its objectives, the review responds to the following seven review questions (RQs) 
divided into those addressing primarily governance and those addressing primarily 
management.  
Governance Review Questions 
RQ 1: To what extent are roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for CRP governance 
 clearly defined and exercised? 
RQ 2: To what extent is governance of CRPs sufficiently independent and inclusive? 
RQ 3: To what extent do resource mobilization and resource allocation support effective 
 planning and implementation? 
RQ 4: Are CRP governance structures and processes efficient? 
Management Review Questions 
RQ 5: To what extent do CRPs have adequate resources to manage for results? 
RQ 6: To what extent does CRP management have the authority to manage for 
 results? 
RQ 7: Is CRP management efficient? 
Background and context 
The CGIAR has undergone a transformation, driven by a new strategy that responds to 21st 
century realities.  No part of the CGIAR is untouched by the changes that have taken place—
centers, donors, partners, and all levels of leadership and management.  Centers aligned 
their research activities, institutional capacities, financial resources and partnerships to 15 
research programs (CRPs).  Two new system-level pillars were created—the Fund Council 
and the Consortium.  Donors committed to a new funding strategy and investment in the 
CGIAR as a whole has grown to $1 billion. 
The CRPs that emerged from the change process, including a program supporting center 
gene banks, occupy a complex organizational space within the CGIAR system.  They reflect a 
programmatic strategy designed to accomplish the CGIAR’s overarching goals of less rural 
poverty, better food security, better nutrition and health, and sustainably managed 
resources.  Developed and delivered by centers and partners, the CRPs are characterized by: 
• a focus on development outcomes,
• explicit expectations about the role of partners in shaping strategy and delivering
results,
• their scale when compared to the CGIAR’s earlier programmatic initiatives, such as
Challenge Programs, and
• the complexity of the relationships between CRPs and centers.
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CRP governance and management were designed to make use of existing structures and 
capacities in order to provide the CGIAR with the flexibility to change and adapt the 
portfolio of research programs as results are achieved and new opportunities and 
challenges emerge.  In this respect, CRPs function as time-limited joint ventures that can 
mobilize resources and partners as effectively as possible.  Centers provide an institutional 
framework for the CRPs and a critical mass of human and physical research capacity; lead 
centers also provide accountability for CRP performance under program agreements with 
the Consortium.  Existing partnerships and collaborations provide a foundation and starting 
point for a more extensive and inclusive partnership strategy.  Funding for the CRPs as a 
whole is almost equally divided between resources allocated by the Fund (W1, 2, 3) and 
bilateral resources raised by the centers (45% and 55%, respectively).  As a result, the 16 
CRPs and 15 centers are interlocked and interdependent for access to and control of 
resources and results, with functions that overlap, co-exist, complement and compete. 
Key Findings:  Governance 
In the course of developing the CRP proposals a wide range of governance and management 
mechanisms was established.  The review identified a total of 23 active governance bodies, 
not including lead center boards.  Some CRPs have a single governance body; others have 
the functional equivalent of two or more.   
Although the SRF provided guidance on CRP governance and management structures, the 
structures were developed to reflect specific programs, and reviewed and approved over a 
two-year period.  The approved structures varied over time and from CRP to CRP and some 
have since evolved.   Only a few CRP governance structures match precisely the structures 
that appeared in the SRF.  As a consequence, for this review, CRP governance bodies are 
assessed using the review criteria and in comparison to each other rather than for 
compliance with the SRF.   
The review considered the extent to which CRP governance bodies balanced independent 
and external members with those representing lead and participating centers.  It also 
considered whether CRP governance bodies reported directly to lead center boards.  Of 23 
active CRP governance bodies, eight are wholly composed of members serving in an 
independent capacity.  Five of these report directly to lead center boards.  Five other CRP 
governance bodies report in writing to lead centers boards.  The balance report through the 
lead center DG.  An increasing number of CRP governance bodies link directly with center 
boards through dual appointments.  
CRP governance overall is heavily influenced by lead and participating centers.  External 
partners have limited roles at the governance level, and women and individuals from target 
regions are significantly under represented. 
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At the system level, the Fund Council and the Consortium are in the course of clarifying their 
relationship and relative authority in the dual pillar structure that is a central feature of the 
new CGIAR.  Although intended to play separate and equal roles as “donors and doers,” the 
Fund Council has not demonstrated that the Consortium is a partner with equal standing. 
The centers and the Consortium are also clarifying their relationship within a new structure, 
negotiating the balance of representation, alliance and independence.  This lack of system-
level common understanding about roles and relative authority was also noted in the Phase 
2 CGIAR Governance Review, and contributes to concern among centers that their role is 
marginalized and undervalued in the CGIAR’s new strategy and institutional arrangements. 
Lead center boards confront an increased potential for conflicts of interest between their 
duty to centers and their accountability to the Consortium for CRPs.  For all but a handful of 
CRPs, centers are heavily invested in the CRPs they lead, allocating substantial research 
capacity and bilateral resources to them.  Many lead centers also have substantial influence 
and decision-making authority in CRP governance and management.  In programs that rely 
on substantive engagement with partners and other stakeholders, confidence in decision 
making is contingent on assuring a level playing field and instituting mechanisms that guard 
against conflicts of interest.  With some exceptions, lead center boards do not have 
sufficient safeguards in place to mitigate conflicts of interest and assure the independence 
of their oversight and accountability for the CRPs they lead. 
Resource mobilization and resource allocation feature in the review in multiple contexts.  
While overall investment in the CGIAR has increased at a substantial rate, doubling in five 
years to $1 billion, W1&2 funding, the most flexible of the resources available to CRPs, 
represented just 37% of funding in 2012.  The extent to which CRPs are reliant on bilateral 
support either through the Fund or through centers has the potential to distort priority 
setting within the CRPs and limits the flexibility to allocate resources.  For five CRPs bilateral 
funding ranges from 70 to 80 percent.  The lack of a system-wide resource mobilization 
strategy that complements the centers’ substantial capacity to raise funds perpetuates a 
distinction between the resources raised and allocated through the Fund and those raised 
by the centers.  As a result, even as overall investment in the CGIAR has risen at an 
impressive rate, the internal discourse about roles and responsibilities for resource 
mobilization drains good will and erodes a sense of common purpose.  
Key Findings:  Management 
CRP management draws heavily upon existing center research and administrative capacity.  
The review found that this provided the CRPs with adequate access to these management 
resources.  CRP management costs averaged 3-4 percent.  Although the percentage was 
similar across the CRPs, the underlying expenses that comprised the management budgets 
varied across CRPs to such an extent that it was impossible to make comparisons or to form 
an opinion about the relative cost-effectiveness of current management structures.  The 
ways in which lead centers budgeted for their responsibilities for CRP management also 
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varied widely, from a calculation based on all or part of a CRP’s management budget to a fee 
for services. 
Transaction costs were also routinely cited as being too high.  The use of “transaction costs” 
covered a wide array of activities, including the convening and interaction that has attended 
the implementation of the new strategy. The review notes the ongoing streamlining and 
harmonization underway with respect to reporting that helps to address a significant 
contributor to transaction costs, and considers that convening multiple new governance and 
management structures has added to overall costs.   
The reviewed considered the reporting line for CRP leaders, which for most is through the 
lead center DG, does not provide the CRP leader with the authority to manage for results.  
In addition, at present, the majority of CRP leaders also work with steering committees and 
program planning and management committees that are duplicative in their representation 
and sometimes distinct from management teams.  These bodies populated primarily by 
senior leaders from lead and participating centers further shape planning and decision 
making and put additional limitations on the CRP leader’s authority.  
Conclusions 
The review validated broad support for the underlying intent and strategy of the new CGIAR 
and a positive sense that new and more collaborative research was underway.   
CRP governance and management were intentionally designed to make use of existing 
structures and capacity rather than duplicate them unnecessarily.  The benefits of this 
strategy were evident for mobilizing research and management resources.  In general, the 
review found the basic accountability framework for CRPs to be functional.  The flow of 
accountability from the Fund Council to the Consortium to the Centers makes good use of 
the CGIAR’s corporate structure, allowing the research portfolio to change and evolve as 
results are achieved and new opportunities or challenges emerge.  The constellation of 
governance bodies closest to the CRPs was less functional.   
Nevertheless, the carefully delineated legal framework laying out accountability for CRPs 
and their performance has given rise to an acute awareness of boundaries—between the 
Consortium and centers, and between centers and CRPs.  The shift in investment from 
centers to programs as well as uncertainty about the level and flow of W1&2 funds have 
heightened the sense of risk on the part of centers and raised concerns about a loss of 
standing within the system as a whole.  Many people made the point that CRPs cannot be 
seen in isolation; they are programs being implemented by institutions to achieve results.  
The review concluded that there were a number of opportunities to improve the 
effectiveness of CRP governance and management, but that a stronger analysis of the 
management side of the issue depended on standardizing the categories of expense that 
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describe CRP management costs.  Although in the aggregate, CRPs appeared to have access 
to the management resources they need, the management budgets as presented did not 
present equally clear or comparable descriptions of underlying management costs.  Overall 
sensitivity to overhead expenses requires more consistency and transparency in their 
calculation.  Similarly, the personnel costs associated with CRP management need to be 
presented in a more straightforward fashion.  Leveraging existing management resources 
should not make the cost of management invisible.   
Although there was a consensus that progress had been made in streamlining and 
standardizing reporting, these improvements did not fully address concerns with transaction 
costs, which meant different things to different people.  For most of those interviewed, the 
level and intensity of interactions and meetings among CGIARs leaders, managers and 
scientists, donors and partners constitute the biggest contribution to higher transaction 
costs after reporting.  This level of intensity may naturally decline as systems and processes 
are institutionalized but the increase in collaboration and consultation required by the 
CGIAR SRF comes with higher demands on time and resources.  Given new, inherent costs 
associated with the strategy, there is an ongoing need to manage the costs of doing 
business.  The effective engagement of partners will rest in part on making sure these costs 
are not prohibitive. 
The review concluded that CRP governance can be simplified to clarify roles and increase 
efficiency and effectiveness.  There are too many CRP governance bodies, many of them 
duplicative.  Although evolving, too few of the existing CRP governance bodies brought 
independence and legitimacy to the governance function.  This deprived the CRPs of a 
single, balanced and independent body to provide oversight and a clear line of authority 
that supports effective decision-making.   Additionally, without such structures in place, 
center boards lack a mechanism that both addresses the potential conflicts of interest they 
face and supports their accountability for CRP performance. 
The dominant role of centers in CRP governance and management may be attributable to 
the level of center resources committed to CRPs, but it negatively affects the legitimacy of 
decision making by raising issues of conflicts of interest, and by failing to include the 
sufficient participation and perspectives of key stakeholders, including external partners, 
women and individuals from target regions. 
The existing management structures can also be simplified and clarified.  Accountability for 
the performance of a CRP should clearly rest with CRP management.  Many things will 
contribute to a CRP’s successful performance, but the CRP leader should have the authority 
to manage for results, and the accountability for that performance should be to a CRP 
governance body designed to fulfill that role, rather than through the lead center DG.  In 
considering how best to achieve both effective and efficient CRP governance and 
management, the review looked at the structures and practices that had been endorsed for 
the Challenge Program, which included an independent governance body with oversight of 
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the program leader, and considered this a better arrangement for CRP governance and 
management than what is now in place in most CRPs.  Particularly, if CRPs are intended to 
build and leverage partnerships at many different levels, the CRP leader should not be 
accountable to a single partner for performance or operate in a structure where some 
partners more than others influence decision making.   
As CRPs move further into implementation and outcomes are more clearly defined, the 
various committees that currently encircle CRPs also add complexity to the management 
process, crowding CRP management and tending to reinforce the status quo.  Even in the 
most collaborative settings, CRP management needs the clarity as well as the flexibility to 
engage effectively in priority setting, resource allocation and evaluation.  A part of this 
flexibility is linked to the capacity to build management and advisory structures that fulfill 
management needs with respect to planning and implementation.  
Recommendations 
Eight recommendations emerged from the review.  These are informed by the need to: 
• streamline structures,
• strengthen the independence and legitimacy of decision making,
• provide CRP leaders with the authority to manage for results,
• strengthen accountability and transparency, and
• recognize the need to sustain the institutional capacity of centers.
The review also looked at the underlying diversity of the CRPs and how this diversity should 
inform governance and management structures.  The recommendations are intended to 
highlight a core group of principles that support good governance and effective 
management rather than a rigid set of structures. 
The recommendations also reflect a conscious effort to recognize effective structures and 
practices already in place or emerging that can be adopted more broadly without significant 
disruption to centers, partners and the CRPs at this stage in the development of the 
programs.  The pace and magnitude of change within the CGIAR has been deeply disruptive, 
but CRPs are actively moving past their start-up phase and beginning to work as intended.  
Both the programs and the centers need a period of operational stability in which to 
implement plans, build partnerships and experience results.  The review recommends 
retaining the current accountability structure, in which lead centers are accountable for CRP 
performance, and building on evidence of effectiveness, it argues for a more balanced role 
for lead center boards and DGs in the governance and management of the programs. 
The recommendations and the basis for them are discussed in full in the Conclusions and 
Recommendations sections of the report. 
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Governance Recommendations 
1. Create a single, balanced governing body for each CRP that reports directly to the
lead center board on the performance of the program.  The CRP governance body
should bring together appropriate expertise, include a majority of independent
expert members, and accommodate lead center and partner representation.
The recommendation creates a more effective and efficient structure for providing
immediate accountability and support for priority setting, resource allocation and
evaluation of the CRPs.  A CRP leader would be directly accountable to this body for
performance.  A single, balanced, expert and independent body assures donors,
partners and stakeholders that no interests but the best interests of the program will
shape deliberations.  It assures lead center boards of an independent mechanism for
assuring program performance and maintains their accountability function in the
current program agreements.  The recommendation eliminates duplicative
structures and contributes to more efficient decision-making.
Responsibility for action:  Consortium Board
Timing:  2015 renewal of program plans
2. Assure transparency in the work of CRP governance bodies by making available on
CRP websites the names of members and their qualifications, posting meeting
agendas and minutes, and otherwise sharing information that builds confidence in
the basis and quality of decision making.
Because a balanced and independent governing body cannot reasonably include the
full representation of partners and stakeholders, it is important to conduct business
in a transparent fashion in order to maintain confidence in the legitimacy and
fairness of decision making.  A number of CRPs currently include this information on
their websites.
Responsibility for action:  CRP governance bodies, CRP leaders
Timing:  Immediately with endorsement of the recommendation
3. Institute policy and decision-making mechanisms for managing conflicts of interest
at the governance and management levels of CRPs.
Such mechanisms are considered good practice and reflected in the guidelines and
policies of center boards.  A number of CRPs have adopted policies and decision-
making mechanisms of this kind.  Broader implementation offers the opportunity for
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CRPs to compare their policies and practices in this area and identify which have 
been effective and offer a model to other CRPs.  
Responsibility for action:  Consortium Board 
Timing:  2015 renewal of program plans  
Management Recommendations 
4. Strengthen the authority of the CRP leader to manage for results:
• place the reporting line and accountability for performance with the CRP
governing body included in Recommendation 1,
• give CRP leaders the authority to establish appropriate management and
program advisory arrangements,
• institute a formal role in the performance evaluation of CRP program
managers and coordinators employed by centers.
The recommendation creates a line of authority for a CRP starting with the lead 
center board and continuing through the CRP governance body to the CRP’s 
leadership.  It strengthens and clarifies the role of the CRP leader and the authority 
needed to manage for results.  CRP leaders would have the flexibility to put 
management and program advisory structures in place that are responsive to 
program and partnership needs.   A component of the authority to manage for 
results is a role in the evaluation of management team members.  The 
recommendation has been revised from the initial draft to reflect the current 
diversity of senior research leaders involved in CRP management, principally DDGs, 
and the accountability for hiring and staff performance that rests with a center DG to 
whom these positions are direct reports.  (An equivalent situation occurs when CRP 
research managers are employed by organizations outside the CGIAR.)  The revised 
recommendation includes the CRP leader as an important input to performance 
evaluation in these circumstances as this input supports the overall quality of 
management for which the CRP leader is accountable.  
Responsibility for action:  Consortium Board 
Timing: Guidance for CRP Second Call (2015) 
5. Establish uniform guidelines that harmonize CRP management budgets, including
staff costs attributed to program administration, coordination of key functions,
and research management, to reflect the legitimate costs of program management
and to better assess management efficiency and effectiveness.
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The CRP proposal process contained limited instructions for preparation of 
management budgets.  Consequently, some CRPs outlined comprehensive staffing 
plans with associated costs, and others relied on a percentage calculation of the total 
projected CRP budget to estimate the cost of managing the programs.  Budget 
development and accounting systems should provide sufficient uniformity to make 
useful comparisons across CRPs and centers, and to benchmark CGIAR expenses 
against comparable research or multi-stakeholder programs. 
Responsibility for action:  Consortium Board 
Timing: Guidance for CRP Second Call (2015) 
Center and CGIAR System 
6. Resolve the outstanding issue of maintaining center financial reserves through a
prudent and equitable system-level agreement between the Fund Council and the
Consortium on the use of W 1&2 funds with respect to reserves.
It is in the long-term interests of the CGIAR to assure that the centers as the
institutional framework for the CRPs have the resiliency and financial stability to
deliver results at the level and within the timeframes projected.  Although the
uncertainty about the levels and timing of W1&2 funding are being resolved, this
does not wholly address the broader need for the CGIAR’s own funding to play a role
in assuring the financial stability of the institutional framework that underlies the
CRPs.  The recommendation does not address the issue of a CRP reserve for W1
funds or relate in any way to the idea of centralizing the management of existing
center reserves.
Responsibility for action:  Fund Council/Consortium Board
Timing:  Coincident with the renewal of CRPs through 2017
7. Create guidelines that increase transparency and encourage the alignment of
resource mobilization on the part of centers for activities that strengthen centers’
capacity to achieve the SRF, or for purposes consistent with center mandates but
outside CRPs.
While there remains a strong rationale and motivation to bring as many donors as
possible into the Fund, there are likely to be limits to the resources available to the
centers through the Fund as well as donors who elect to fund centers directly.  Some
centers currently pursue bilateral support for the purposes suggested by the
recommendation; others do not.  The recommendation brings forward the idea that
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centers can be partners and major investors in CRPs and committed to achieving the 
SRF, while also maintaining their institutional stability, and the flexibility to invest in 
and renew facilities and infrastructure as part of long term planning.  Similarly, 
centers, consistent with their mandates, should be able to contribute to regional 
priorities outside the SRF as well as center-specific opportunities or needs.  To avoid 
conflicts between these activities and broader efforts to increase the size of the 
CGIAR Fund and the number of donors to it, clear guidelines as well as transparency 
about these transactions are needed.  
Responsibility for action:  Fund Council/Consortium Board 
Timing: immediately, with endorsement of the recommendation 
8. Evaluate the Genebanks CRP for lessons learned on investing in system-wide
research assets.
The review generated limited findings, conclusions and a recommendation for the
governance and management of the Genebanks CRP, noting its differences from the
research CRPs.  Over the course of the review, the CRP was consistently viewed by
stakeholders as an example of a critical system-level investment.  The
recommendation is intended to generate lessons learned about the value of such
investments, and how best to structure them.
Responsibility for action:  Fund Council/Consortium Board
Timing: 2016, prior to the CGIAR system-level evaluation
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1.INTRODUCTION
1.1. Review purpose 
Beginning in 2014, the agreements under which the CGIAR Research Programs (CRPs) 
operate will be updated and extended through 2016.  The second call for proposals is 
planned to begin in mid-2015.   With this in mind, the Review of CRP Governance and 
Management was requested by the CGIAR Consortium and approved by the CGIAR Fund 
Council at its 8th Session in November 2012. The review is an input into this process and 
informative to primary stakeholders in the CRPs: 
• CGIAR research centers
• CRP leaders and research managers
• CRP partners
• CGIAR Fund Council
• CGIAR Consortium
CRPs have many additional stakeholders who contribute to and benefit from the work they 
do. The review is also of potential value to this larger group. 
1.2.  Review objectives 
The CGIAR Independent Evaluation Arrangement (IEA) developed the review’s Terms of 
Reference (ToR) in consultation with the Consortium, Fund Council and CGIAR center and 
CRP leadership (Annex 1). The objectives of the review are: 
• to develop an accurate and nuanced understanding of governance and
management across the CRPs; 
• to identify existing structures and practices that support program and system-
level goals; 
• to highlight structures and practices that impede or undermine performance;
• to recommend principles and practices for CRP governance and management
that enhance performance and accountability.
1.3. Review focus 
The focus of the review is on CRP-specific governance and management, including the 
intersection of these functions with CGIAR lead center management and boards, the 
Consortium and Fund Council (Figure 1). It covers 16 CGIAR Research Programs including the 
program established for “Managing and Sustaining Crop Collections” (Genebanks CRP) 
(Table 6). The latter supports the management of the collections of plant genetic resources 
held by 11 centers through a partnership with the Global Crop Diversity Trust.  
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Figure 1: Main Focus of the Review 
Source: Review team. 
1.4. Review criteria and questions 
Based on the criteria suggested in the “Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional 
Partnership Programs: Indicative Principles and Standards” (IEG/World Bank 2007) for 
assessing governance and management, and taking into consideration the CGIAR’s own 
work in defining good governance and best practices, the review addresses the following 
criteria: 
• Legitimacy: The extent to which governance and management structures
facilitate the participation and voice of stakeholders
• Accountability: The extent to which accountability is defined, accepted, and
exercised from the system-level to centers to CRPs
• Fairness: The extent to which partners and participants, similarly situated, have
an opportunity to influence or benefit from a CRP
• Transparency: The extent to which the programs’ decision-making, reporting,
and evaluation processes are open and freely available to the general public
• Efficiency: The extent to which the governance and management structures
enhance efficiency or cost-efficiency in the allocation and use of the resources
• Effectiveness: The extent to which results are achieved
• Independence: The extent to which decision making and oversight remain
unconstrained by conflicts of interest
Independence in the context of the review refers to a characteristic or quality of behavior; it 
is not used in the review to designate an entity apart from or separate from another body. 
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Efficiency, as defined in OECD-DAC and in the IEA Glossary of Evaluation Terms, refers to 
how economically resources/inputs are converted to results.  Many CRPs are just 
operationalizing, making it difficult to evaluate governance and management efficiency in 
those terms, and it was beyond the scope of the review to look at results achieved by 
individual CRPs.  Consequently, the review uses this criterion in a narrower sense, and bases 
the assessment on a more qualitative analysis and perception of structures and processes 
rather than CRP outputs. 
Seven review questions have been identified (below). The review questions have been 
distilled from the initial questions in the review ToR and from research conducted during 
the first phase of the review based on a broad list of potential issue areas identified in the 
review ToR. The review questions are informed by the Sourcebook’s criteria, good 
governance principles and the SRF and thus the Review does not assess the CRP governance 
bodies solely against the guidance provided in the SRF, which was very limited.  
The questions are divided into those addressing primarily governance and those addressing 
primarily management. With 15 centers and 16 CRPs, each with its own constellation of 
governance and management structures, as well as two system-level entities, dividing the 
questions into governance and management clarified within each area the most relevant 
questions that needed to be addressed. By organizing and focusing the review questions in 
this way, the review could target the gathering and analysis of data as the basis for the 
findings. In order to further specify the questions, sub-questions have been developed 
(Annex 2: Review Framework). 
Governance Review Questions 
RQ 1: To what extent are roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for CRP governance 
 clearly defined and exercised? 
RQ 2: To what extent is governance of CRPs sufficiently independent and inclusive? 
RQ 3: To what extent do resource mobilization and resource allocation support effective 
 planning and implementation? 
RQ 4: Are CRP governance structures and processes efficient? 
Management Review Questions 
RQ 5: To what extent do CRPs have adequate resources to manage for results? 
RQ 6: To what extent does CRP management have the authority to manage for results? 
RQ 7:  Is CRP management efficient? 
The relation between the review questions and the review criteria is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Relation between Review Questions and Criteria 
Review Questions Review Criteria 
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1. To what extent are roles, responsibilities and
accountabilities for CRP governance clearly 
defined and exercised? 
2. To what extent is governance of CRPs
sufficiently independent and inclusive? 
3. To what extent do resource mobilization and
resource allocation support effective planning 
and implementation? 
4. Are CRP governance structures and processes
efficient? 
5. To what extent do CRPs have adequate
resources to manage for results? 
6. To what extent does CRP management have
the authority to manage for results? 
7. Is CRP management efficient?
Source: Review Team 
2. REVIEW APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
2.1. Defining CRP governance and management 
Governance 
CRPs are intended to function as time-bound joint programs that engage with a broad range 
of partners to achieve defined results.  Legal accountability for CRP performance resides 
with lead center boards under Program Implementation Agreements (PIAs) with the 
Consortium.  The structure avoids the creation of new institutional entities in favor of using 
an existing network of incorporated and internationally chartered centers to serve as hosts 
and fiduciaries of the CRPs.   
While the CRPs share a common footprint for accountability, they show substantial 
variability in the governance arrangements in place.  In addition to center boards, which 
have the legal governing authority for the CRPs they lead, an array of CRP-specific 
governance bodies have also been established.  These range from steering and stakeholder 
committees to science and program oversight and advisory bodies, and, depending on their 
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composition and ToR, a number of management committees.  Originating from guidance in 
the 2011 CGIAR Strategy and Results Framework (SRF), many of these bodies approximate 
the governance functions defined in the Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional 
Partnership Programs (Sourcebook) and elsewhere.  While the review acknowledges the 
role and legal standing of lead center boards, it looks closely at the ToR, composition, 
performance and relationship to decision making of the full range of bodies linked to 
individual CRPs that play a role in their governance.  
Definition and Use of Governance in the Review 
The review ToR, the Sourcebook and other sources employ “governance” in its common 
usage.  In assessing CRP governance, the review distinguishes between the roles and 
responsibilities of center boards, particularly lead center boards, which have legal 
accountability for CRP performance, and the roles, responsibilities and more limited 
authority of CRP governance bodies.  With that in mind, the review consistently refers to 
“center boards,” “lead center boards,” and “CRP governance bodies” throughout the review 
to differentiate between each group.  “CRP governance body” also provides a useful 
collective description for the number of CRP bodies active at the time of the review (23), 
and also the variety of names and functions assigned to them (steering committee, 
oversight committee, stakeholder advisory committee, independent science panel, etc.).  
The Sourcebook defines governance broadly to encompass those bodies in a global 
partnership responsible for: 
• strategic direction
• management oversight
• stakeholder participation
• risk management
• conflict management
• audit and evaluation
In addition to the definition offered in the Sourcebook, the review draws on three additional 
and relevant sources to define CRP governance as well as frame the principles and practices 
that inform the review: 
• the guidance in the SRF that recommended that CRPs include mechanisms that
would oversee the planning, management and implementation of the CRP and 
provide expertise and insights on strategy, performance, resource allocation and 
partners; 
• the CGIAR guidelines for center boards adopted in 1996 and updated in 2007,
which reflect agreed upon principles and practices for effective governance; and 
• Governance Principles for Challenge Programs (2008), which as multi-stakeholder
programs that relied on CGIAR centers to serve as the legal entity for program 
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accountability, provide precedents for the governance (and management) 
structures of CRPs (see box below). 
CGIAR Challenge Programs 
Challenge Programs (CP) were created as time-bound programs focused on issues of 
“overwhelming significance” that aligned with the CGIAR’s system priorities.  They were 
intended to engage centers and partners and be collaborative in nature.  From the 
beginning, the programs were discouraged from having a single institution dominate the 
venture.  Over time, this principal was institutionalized through guidance, endorsed by 
the CGIAR Executive Committee, on the preferred governance and management 
structures—including a balanced and independent governance body with clear authority 
to oversee the performance of the programs, and a program manager who reported 
directly to the CP governing body and had the authority to manage staff and resources 
for results.  
Like CRPs, Challenge Programs functioned as unincorporated partnerships, hosted by 
centers.  They were also intended to mobilize new resources.  In this regard they are 
unlike CRPs.  CRPs rely heavily on the centers’ existing research capacity to achieve 
results and reflect a new programmatic funding model that channels resources to 
centers for research activities covered under CRP performance agreements.  
Furthermore, CRPs are considered the main vehicles for achieving the CGIAR’s and 
centers’ mandates, while Challenge Programs only represented a small part of the 
CGIAR’s research programs.   
Among the principles and practices recommended for center governance and the 
governance of the Challenge Programs was the need for individuals on these bodies to 
“exercise objective, independent judgment,” acting in their individual rather than 
representative capacities. The principles for Challenge Programs also emphasized the need 
to “avoid unnecessary institutional representation in Challenge Program governance but 
respect legitimate host interests.” 
Management 
Defining management for the purpose of the review is more straightforward.  The seven 
general functions outlined in the Sourcebook are relevant for the different settings in which 
CRP management by program leaders/directors, management teams and management 
committees occurs: 
• Program implementation
• Regulatory compliance
• Reviewing and reporting
• Administrative efficiency
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• Communication and knowledge sharing
• Learning
• Performance assessment
With respect to management, the review also references the Governance Principles for 
Challenge Programs, which included the need both to clarify responsibilities between the 
program and the host on the operational level, and “establish an effective vertical chain of 
command” to address the potential problem for program directors of “two masters.” 
2.2. Inception phase 
During the inception phase (May-July 2013), the following work was done and captured in 
an inception report: 
• Desk review of background and context
• Identification of emerging issues and questions
• Initial interviews with stakeholders
• Design of review framework and data collection approach
• Agreement on detailed time line and work plan
2.3. Data sources and data collection methods 
The review framework provides an overview of data sources and methods used to collect 
evidence along the review questions and sub-questions (Annex 2). 
The following data sources and data collection methods were used to gather information: 
• Review of background documentation (Annex 3)
• Collection and analysis of CRP financial information
• Collection and analysis of CRP governance and management committee ToRs and
membership information
• Mapping of current CRP governance and management structures (Chapter 5:
Overview of Governance and Management)
• 71 interviews with Consortium and Fund Council staff, donors to the Fund, CRP
leaders, center board chairs and Directors General (DGs), and center finance
staff/heads of corporate services.  Most interviews were conducted via
phone/Voice over the Internet Protocol (Table 2 and Annex 4)
• Two web-based surveys of participants in CRP governance and CRP management
(excluding the Genebanks CRP); yielding high response rates of 76 respondents
(48% of survey participants) and 146 respondents (60% of survey participants),
respectively (Table 3 and Annexes 5 and 6)
Interviews included the universe of center DGs and CRP leaders, center finance staff, as well 
as key informants in both the Fund and Consortium offices.  Donors, a number of center 
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DDGs and others were interviewed in person in connection with a meeting with CRP leaders, 
donors and partners at the Consortium offices in June 2013.  Center board chairs were 
invited to comment directly to the review team leader on the draft review report.   
Because of the variability of “time on task” among the CRP governance bodies, the review 
relied on sources of information that were common to all of the programs—program 
proposals, original and revised ToRs, reporting structures, leadership and composition of the 
CRP governance and management bodies, and information on practices from DGs and CRP 
leaders.  Minutes of CRP governance bodies were referenced as background if available on 
websites; they were not considered to be a consistent or reliable source of data for a cross-
sectional analysis, particularly given the limited history of meetings for a significant number 
of CRP governance bodies at the time of the review.      
Table 2: Persons interviewed 
Number of persons interviewed 
Consortium leadership team 5 
Donors/Fund Council staff 9 
Center DGs (or Deputy DGs on their behalf) 15 
Center finance staff 20 
CRP leaders 18 
Center Board Chairs 42 
Total 71 
Source: Review Team, Annex 4. 
For the purpose of distributing the governance and management surveys, CRPs were asked 
to provide the names and contact information for four categories of 
management/coordination staff (Chapter 5.2) and the individuals serving on all of the 
respective CRP governance bodies (Table 8).  Some people received both a governance 
survey and a management survey because of roles in CRP management as well as on one or 
more CRP governance bodies. 
2 Three center board chairs were interviewed after the first draft report was shared. 
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Table 3: Surveys – Participants and Response Rates 
Participants Response 
Rates 
Governance 
Survey 
157 individuals invited to participate in survey 
76 of which responded  
48.4% 
Management 
Survey 
243 individuals invited to participate in survey 
146 of which responded 
60.1% 
Source: Review Team, Annex 5 and 6. 
2.4. Data analysis 
Data collected were analyzed and validated in three steps (Figure 2). 
A first level analysis was conducted of CRP governance and management structures, and 
financial and human resources based on the CRP documents and interviews, and of the 
survey responses.  
Figure 2: Data collection and analysis process 
A second level analysis brought together all evidence and early findings from all data 
sources into data analysis templates. This allowed for a triangulation of evidence. Based on 
the data analysis templates, initial findings and conclusions were developed. 
CRP 
documents 
Interviews 
CRP 
stakeholders 
Survey CRP 
Governance 
Survey CRP 
Manageme
 
Data 
source and 
collection 
Data analysis templates 
3 Webinars - discussion of initial findings and 
  Validation 
First level 
analysis 
Second level 
analysis 
(triangulation) 
Initial findings and conclusions
Survey results analysis G&M Structures 
Financial and human 
resources analysis 
Draft review report and 
Final review report
27 
Review of CRP Governance and Management 
Independent  
Evaluation 
Arrangement 
iea.cgiar.org 
The analysis phase was followed by two validation steps: first, three webinars were 
conducted (November 2013) in order to present initial findings and conclusions to 
stakeholders. The webinars enabled leaders of CRPs and centers to engage with the review 
team and discuss the review’s initial findings and conclusions. In total, at least 34 
stakeholders participated in the webinars3.  
After the webinars, the draft review report was written. The draft review report was 
circulated to stakeholders for validation.  Stakeholders were invited to provide factual 
corrections and comments on the review’s findings, conclusions and recommendations.  All 
of the centers submitted comments and indicated that the report had been shared with 
center board chairs and with members of the centers’ management staff.  Most feedback 
from CRP leaders was incorporated in center feedback, but a number of CRP leaders 
responded separately.  Comments and corrections were also provided by the Consortium 
Office. 
Comments on substantive issues were organized into a matrix according to themes and 
common issues.  The team leader and the Head, CGIAR-IEA, carefully reviewed all the 
comments and discussed any implications for the report, bearing in mind the independence 
of the reviewers and that the ultimate responsibility for the content of the report rests with 
the review team leader. The matrix with responses was provided to stakeholders in 
conjunction with the distribution of the final review report. 
Factual corrections (mostly on the composition of the CRP governance bodies and financial 
data) were reviewed by the Evaluation Analyst (IEA) with reference to the information 
received at the time of data collection.  The information was either validated or updated 
and incorporated into the report. Any further clarification that was necessary was sought 
bilaterally with the respective center or CRP staff.  The analysis and findings based on data 
was revisited and revised if necessary. 
2.5. Quality assurance 
During the entire process, quality has been assured by close interaction with the IEA. During 
the inception phase, a peer review team4 provided additional advice. After the inception 
phase, the review team was reinforced by the inclusion of methodological support from an 
external evaluation consultancy.  
2.6. Main limitations of the review 
The distribution of the two web-based surveys of participants in CRP governance and CRP 
management (excluding the Genebanks CRP) was based on information supplied by the 
3 Participants represented 13 different CRPs and included seven CRP leaders.  
4 Composed of Douglas Horton and John Markie, members of the IEA Quality Assurance Advisory Panel 
(QAAP). 
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CRPs.  The management survey yielded a high 60% response rate, including responses from 
15 CRP leaders.  Some CRPs had a higher response rate than others.  Data collected through 
the governance survey, with a 48% response rate and a bias toward the views of center 
management (serving on CRP governance bodies), is used cautiously.  Care has been taken 
not to generalize to the whole population.  Both surveys benefit, but at the same time, are 
limited by the extent to which they rely on “insiders.”  Future CGIAR reviews and 
evaluations may consider expanding data gathering to include individuals not so personally 
involved in the CRPs governance and management.  
The review found that many CRP governance bodies are still at the start-up phase and only 
beginning to convene, making it too early to address the transparency criteria with respect 
to CRP governance.  Transparency as a best practice in governance and management is 
discussed in the findings on CRP management costs, and also in the conclusions and 
recommendations with respect to governance. 
There is a lack of detailed budget and expenditure data for CRPs, which prohibited 
comparisons of management costs across programs.  This is discussed at length in the 
findings and is addressed in a recommendation.   
Feedback from partners or members of CRP governance bodies was solicited through the 
surveys; additional information was developed by analyzing the composition of CRP 
governance and management bodies. Aspects of the review, including the applicability of 
review questions, were not always relevant to the Genebanks CRP; when an analysis 
excludes the Genebanks CRP, this is noted, as are findings, conclusions and 
recommendations relevant only to this CRP. 
In spite of the limitations, the review team is confident that, after the validation process of the 
preliminary findings and conclusions, the final findings and conclusions are sufficiently 
supported by evidence.  
2.7. Team composition/roles and responsibilities 
Table 4: Team Composition/Roles and Responsibilities 
Team member Roles and responsibilities 
Maureen Robinson Team leader - inception report, desk review, interviews, data 
analysis, webinar presentation of preliminary findings and 
conclusions, lead author of review report.  
Sophie Zimm IEA Evaluation Analyst - desk review, interviews, survey 
management, data analysis, drafting of parts of review report. 
Alison King &  
Urs Zollinger  
(joined in August 2013) 
Evaluation experts - methodological support, survey design 
and analysis, advice on report drafting, quality control, 
webinar moderation.  
Source: Review team. 
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2.8. Timeline 
Table 5: CRP Governance and Management Review—Milestones and Timeline 
Milestones Timeline 
Inception phase May – July 2013 
Data collection and analysis July – October 2013 
Initial findings and conclusions 4 November 2013 
Webinars 13/14 November 2013 
Draft review report 9 January 2014 
Consultation on draft review report 22 January 2014 
Final review report March 10, 2014 
Report presentation w/Consortium/Fund Council 
leaders  March-May, 2014 
Source: Review team. 
3. CGIAR RESEARCH PROGRAMMES
3.1. Overview of CRPs 
As the review began, all of the CRPs have been approved for funding and CRP leaders have 
been identified. Although the majority of the CRPs are in approximately the same stage of 
development, two of the CRPs – Global Rice Science Partnership (GRiSP) and Climate 
Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS)—were placed on a fast track for approval, 
and consequently, their governance and management structures have been operational 
longer. Additionally, CCAFS originated as a Challenge Program, and in the course of the 
transition to a CRP, retained certain Challenge Program governance and management 
features. At the other end of the continuum, Dryland Systems, Humidtropics, Grains 
Legumes, and Dryland Cereals only hired program leaders in 2013, and their governance and 
management structures, although outlined in the program proposals, are nascent. 
This span of organizational development enables the review to straddle an important point 
in the implementation of the CRPs.  There is a sufficient record of activity with respect to 
CRP governance and management within the larger CGIAR context to perceive the 
structures, practices and principles that contribute to effectiveness and efficiency. At the 
same time, the start-up nature of the CRPs enables the review to contribute to learning and 
adaptation at a formative stage. 
Table 6 provides an overview of the research focus of each CRP, the center that serves as 
the legal entity and “lead” for the CRP, and the dates of approval.  The table also indicates 
the general categories into which the CRPs are commonly grouped:  systems CRPs; 
commodity; policy; and natural resource management CRPs.  It also includes the CRP on 
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gene banks, which supports the management of the collections of plant genetic resources 
held by 11 centers through a partnership with the Global Crop Diversity Trust. 
Table 6: CRPs Date of Approval and CGIAR Lead Center5 
CRP Lead Center Date of Approval 
Dryland Systems ICARDA Mar-20126 
Humidtropics IITA Mar-2012 
AAS WorldFish Jul-2011 
PIM IFPRI Dec-2011 
WHEAT CIMMYT Dec-2011 
MAIZE CIMMYT Apr-2011 
GRiSP IRRI Nov-2010 
RTB CIP Nov-2011 
Grain Legumes ICRISAT Mar 2012 
Dryland Cereals ICRISAT Mar 2012 
L&F ILRI Jul-2011 
A4NH IFPRI Dec-2011 
WLE IWMI Nov-2011 
FTA CIFOR Apr 2011 
CCAFS CIAT Nov-2010 
Genebanks Global Crop Diversity Trust Mar 2012 
Source: Review team. System CRPs in green, Commodity CRPs in orange, Policy and other CRPs in 
blue. 
The SRF provided guidance on the key features of the CRPs governance and management 
structures:  
• Each CRP will be managed by one lead center, which will have fiduciary and
operational responsibilities for its implementation.
• Each CRP will have a PIA signed between the Consortium and the lead center that
specifies milestones and outputs against funding on a multi-year basis for the
proposed life span of the CRP. Rolling annual contracts will adjust future funding,
contingent on the CRP´s performance of the contract. The Consortium Board will
develop the appropriate framework for evaluation of performance.
• The lead center, in consultation with other participating centers, will appoint a
Director for the CRP who will be responsible for the quality and relevance of the
outputs produced under the CRP.
• The lead center, in consultation with other participating centers will establish:
◦ a Planning and Management Committee composed of a representative of
the lead center, a representative of each participating center, and a
representative of other partners that have substantial responsibilities in
5 CRPs in this table and throughout the report are listed in conformity with the earlier CRP numbering system 
(e.g. CRP 1.1. on Dryland Systems, CRP 4 on A4NH). 
6 Inception phase was approved in November 2011 (6th Fund Council Meeting) 
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the implementation of the CRP. This Committee will oversee the planning, 
management and implementation of the CRP; 
◦ a mechanism to ensure that the work in the CRP is of the highest quality;
this will usually include a Scientific Advisory Committee composed of 
individuals who can bring together state-of-the-art scientific expertise 
and insights on strategy, partners, etc.  This Committee will advise, 
report, and be accountable to the Planning and Management Committee. 
Because of the Consortium Board’s ultimate accountability for the performance of the CRPs, 
it reserved the approval of the most appropriate governance arrangement for each CRP.   
In addition to proposing the features of CRP governance and management, including the 
role of the lead center, the plan for implementing the programs relied on utilizing existing 
management functions within centers, such as finance and human resources (HR), rather 
than duplicate these within CRPs.  As a result, CRPs were expected to require only small, 
cost-efficient management units. 
The timing and process for review and approval of program proposals over a two-year 
period resulted in CRP governance and management arrangements that frequently varied 
from the guidance in the SRF.  The overview of existing CRP governance bodies illustrates 
the variability of current arrangements (Annex 7, also Table 8 for the list of governance and 
management bodies reviewed).  
Table 7 illustrates the complexity of the relationships of the centers to the CRPs and by 
implication the CRPs to the centers.  In addition to the lead centers, which have fiduciary 
responsibilities for a particular CRP, a small to large number of other centers participate in 
the same CRP.  For example, 15 centers contribute to the research activities in CCAFS; 12 
centers participate in Policies, Institutions and Markets (PIM) and Water Land and 
Ecosystems (WLE); whereas only two centers are involved in the Wheat, Maize, and Dryland 
Cereal CRPs.  Adding to the complexity, while all of a center’s research activity may be 
conducted within CRPs, the number of CRPs in which centers participate varies greatly, with 
the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) participating in the greatest number 
(a total of 10 CRPs).  
Finally, although there are 16 CRPs and 15 centers, not all centers serve as lead centers.  
Three centers (IFPRI, CIMMYT and ICRISAT) lead two CRPs and three centers (Africa Rice, 
Bioversity and ICRAF) lead none.  The Genebanks CRP is managed by the Global Crop 
Diversity Trust, an organization outside the CGIAR, but closely allied with it.    
Just as the centers and their boards develop strategies, allocate resources, and manage for 
results consistent with institutional mandates, CRPs and their governance bodies engage in 
a parallel set of activities to fulfill programmatic goals.  Both sets of entities base these 
activities on the same set of research activities.  As a result, lead centers are both governing 
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CRPs and partnering with them to achieve results.  Centers, whose research activities within 
a CRP are subject to evaluation, are effectively tasked with evaluating themselves as the 
principal actors on CRP management and steering committees.  The resultant complexity of 
relationships between CRPs and centers has created a matrix system of governance and 
management where center functions and CRP functions overlap, co-exist, complement and 
compete. 
Table 7: Center Participation in CRPs 
Source: Review team, based on information provided in CRP Annual Reports 2012. 
3.2. Funding of CRPs 
CRPs are funded through the CGIAR Fund, which comprises three channels or “windows,” 
and through bilateral funding raised by centers based on their participation in specific CRPs.  
The following describes each category of support. 
• Window 1 (W1) ‑ Donor funds are co-mingled and allocated by the Fund Council
to CRPs within the scope of the SRF. In addition to allocations to the CRPs, W1
funds cover approved system costs, including the Consortium Office and Board,
Fund Office and Fund Council, the ISPC and independent evaluation and audit
functions.
• Window 2 (W2) – W2 comprises sub-accounts for each of the CRPs into which
donors may designate funds to specific CRPs.  Within each sub-account, donor
funds are co-mingled.
• Window 3 (W3) – W3 enables donors to channel funds directly to centers to
implement aspects of the SRF.  Donors can designate specific amounts for use at
the discretion of the centers, consistent with the SRF. Although channeled
through the Fund, neither the Fund Council nor the Consortium makes decisions
about the allocation or use of W3 funds.
• Bilateral funds – These funds support center research activities included in the
CRPs. They result from resource mobilization on the part of the centers and are
CRP Africa  Bio CIAT CIFOR CIMMYT CIP ICARDA ICRISAT IFPRI IITA ILRI IRRI IWMI ICRAF World TOTAL
Dryland Systems    LC     8
Humidtropics Systems    LC    7
AAS   LC 3
PIM       LC      12
WHEAT LC  2
MAIZE LC  2
GRiSP   LC 3
RTB   LC  4
Grain Legumes   LC  4
Dryland Cereals  LC 2
L&F   LC  4
A4NH     LC     9
WLE         LC   11
FTA   LC  4
CCAFS   LC             15
Gene Banks            11
TOTAL CRPS 3 10 12 2 5 8 9 8 4 9 8 3 6 8 6
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restricted to specific research activities, or activities within certain regions. They 
are not channeled through the Fund but allocated directly by centers to CRPs. 
W1 represents the least restricted of CRP funding, both for the CRPs and for the Fund in 
terms of the flexibility to invest resources strategically.  Beyond the designation to a 
particular CRP, W2 funds provide the CRPs with comparable flexibility to invest strategically.  
W3 and bilateral funding are the most restricted types of funding.  In 2012, the Fund (W1, 2, 
3) represented 45% of CRP funding, with the balance generated by centers through bilateral
funds.  Total bilateral funding, when W3 is combined with funds raised by centers, is 63%. 
The Fund was established with the goal of increasing both the level and coherence of 
investment in a system-level strategy focused on the goals of less rural poverty, better food 
security, better nutrition and health, and sustainably managed resources.  The availability of 
three windows through which funds flow facilitates the transition of donors to 
programmatic funding and accommodates donor preferences as well as limitations placed 
on donor agencies by their governments. 
From 2011 to 2012, its first two years of operation, the Fund grew from $384 million to 
$513 million, an increase of 34%. Responsibility for resource mobilization for the Fund has 
been viewed as the responsibility of the Fund Office, although the Consortium’s 
Constitution includes a role in resource development.  Efforts are ongoing to increase the 
level of funds and to gain multi-year commitments from donors. 
Shortly before the end of 2013, the CGIAR announced that it had achieved the goal of 
raising $1 billion, a doubling of investment in the system over a five-year period.    
4. OVERVIEW OF CRP GOVERNANCE AND
MANAGEMENT
4.1. Overview of CRP governance structures 
Drawing on the structures included in the CRP proposals, updated to reflect current ToR for 
them, the review identified 26 bodies with a role in CRP governance.  This is in addition to 
the lead center boards and the Consortium Board, all of which, because of their 
accountabilities for CRP performance, are part of the overall governance structure for the 
CRPs. 
At the outset, it should be noted that the name of a particular body is not a predictor of its 
role or composition.  While most steering committees, for instance, are small and populated 
primarily by center DGs, there are a number (e.g. WLE and Dryland Systems) that are larger, 
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with external members.  Similarly, five variously named program planning and management 
committees, despite their names are considered by the review to play a governance role at 
present based on the substantial inclusion of representatives of centers and partners in 
addition to managers of the CRP’s research program (i.e. theme leaders, regional leaders).  
Additionally, in some CRPs (e.g. WHEAT, MAIZE, and RTB), these committees are very like 
the steering and stakeholder committees also in place. 
Only a handful of the CRP governing bodies are well established (CCAFS, GRiSP, WLE and 
AAS). Most are still in the early stages of convening, clarifying their ToR, and beginning to 
define a plan of work. At the time of the review, three of the identified 26 bodies had not 
been activated, involving Dryland Systems, RTB and FTA.   While each of these CRPs has a 
steering committee in place, additional proposed governance bodies were placed on hold 
while research and management structures were established.   
Table 8 lists the governance bodies that were the universe for the review and that were the 
basis for analysis.  As the table makes clear, some CRPs have multiple governance and 
advisory entities.  
Table 8: The Universe of CRP Governance Bodies 
CRP Name of Body Governance/Advisory 
Role 
Dryland Systems Steering Committee ✓ 
Independent Scientific Advisory Committee (ISAC) ✓ 
Research Management Committee Not activated7 
Humidtropics Independent Advisory Committee (IAC) ✓ 
AAS Program Oversight Panel (POP) ✓ 
PIM Science and Policy Advisory Panel (SPAP) ✓ 
WHEAT Stakeholder Committee ✓ 
Management Committee ✓ 
MAIZE Stakeholder Advisory Committee  (SAC) ✓ 
Management Committee ✓ 
GRiSP Oversight Committee ✓ 
RTB Steering Committee ✓ 
Program Advisory Committee Not activated8 
Management Committee ✓ 
Grain Legumes Steering Committee ✓ 
Independent Advisory Committee (IAC) ✓ 
Dryland Cereals Steering Committee ✓ 
Independent Advisory Committee (IAC) ✓ 
L&F Science and Partnership Advisory Committee (SPAC) ✓ 
Program Planning and Management Committee 
(PPMC) 
✓ 
7 Dryland Systems Research Management Committee activated in November 2013, after data collection was 
completed.  
8 RTB Program Advisory Committee activated subsequent to review period. 
35 
Review of CRP Governance and Management 
Independent  
Evaluation 
Arrangement 
iea.cgiar.org 
A4NH Independent Advisory Committee (IAC) ✓ 
Planning and Management Committee (PMC) ✓ 
WLE Steering Committee ✓ 
FTA Steering Committee ✓ 
Scientific and Stakeholder Advisory Committee Not activated 
CCAFS Independent Scientific Panel (ISP) ✓ 
TOTAL: 26 bodies, 23 active at the time of the review 
Source: Review team. 
4.2. Overview of CRP management structures 
The Review looked at several levels of CRP management: 
• CRP management and coordinating units, including the CRP leader
• CRP management teams and committees (sometimes overlapping with PPMCs)
• CRP research managers/theme leaders
• CRP focal points in participating centers
Most management staff are employed or hosted by centers; and not all management staff 
are members of management teams. Individuals can play management roles in more than a 
single CRP and because of this, management survey respondents were asked to select one 
CRP for the purposes of responding. Of a total of 146 respondents, 74 indicated that they 
spent 40% or less of their time on the selected CRP; 39 reported that more than 80% of their 
time was spent in CRP management. 
Each CRP has a leader, usually referred to as CRP or Program Director.  As of mid-2013, all 
CRPs have leadership in place.  The CRP leader for both the Wheat and Maize CRPs is the 
CIMMYT DDG for Research and Partnership; each of these CRPs also has a Program 
Manager.  The leader of AAS is a DDG at WorldFish.   
74% of management survey respondents, including 9 of 15 CRP leaders, were employed by a 
center at the time of their recruitment.  The high “draw” from within the existing pool of 
CGIAR personnel is indicative of both the depth and quality of existing capacity and the 
initial strategy of leveraging that capacity to launch the CRPs.  There are indications that as 
CRPs operationalize, managers and coordinators are being drawn from outside the centers, 
particularly for new expertise and to broaden partnerships.   
Although center focal points are not members of management teams or committees to any 
significant degree, their role, particularly with CRPs with 4 or more participating centers, 
was regularly noted in interviews with CRP leaders and others.  The center focal point is a 
front-line position for communications between the CRP and the center as well as for pulling 
together work plans and reporting documents.    
CRP management units are typically small, averaging 3.5 full time staff and 1 half time staff.  
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Table 9: Overview of CRP Management Structures 
CRP 
Management 
Unit 
Full 
Time 
Part 
Time 
Management Committee 
Dryland Systems Management Team 3 0 Research Management Committee 
Humidtropics Executive Office 2 0 Management Committee 
AAS Program Support Unit 3 0 Program Leadership Team 
PIM PMU 5 1 Management Committee 
WHEAT 
Program Management 
Team 2 2 
Management Committee 
Reviewed as governance body 
MAIZE Management Team 3 2 
Management Committee 
Reviewed as governance body 
GRiSP PMU 3 0 
Prog. Planning and Management 
Team  
RTB PMU 4 0 
Management Committee 
Reviewed as governance body 
Grain Legumes Program Director 2.5 0 Research Management Committee 
Dryland Cereals PMU 2.5 0 Research Management Committee 
L&F Management Unit 4 0 
PPMC 
Reviewed as governance body 
A4NH PMU 5 2 
PMC 
Reviewed as governance body 
WLE Operations team: 8 3 Management Committee 
FTA 
Management 
Support/Program 
Coordination Unit 2 1 Senior management team 
CCAFS Coordinating Unit 79 5 
Programme Management 
Committee 
Genebanks Management Team 1 3 Management Committee 
Source: Review team, based on information received from CRP management. 
5. GOVERNANCE FINDINGS
5.1. Introduction 
The review addressed the following four main questions with respect to CRP governance: 
RQ 1: Are roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for CRP governance clearly defined 
and exercised? 
9 CCAFS Coordinating Unit includes also 4.5 staff who are paid by bilateral funding but are dedicated CRP staff. 
That is why the review considers them as CRP management and coordination staff.  
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RQ 2: Is governance of CRPs sufficiently independent, inclusive and transparent? 
RQ 3: Do resource mobilization and resource allocation support effective planning and 
 implementation? 
RQ 4: Are CRP governance structures and processes efficient? 
In framing these questions, the review relied on the definition of governance drawn from 
the Sourcebook that appears in Chapter 3 (Review approach and methodology) along with 
other CGIAR-specific resources.  Governance is broadly defined to encompass those bodies 
in a global partnership responsible for: 
• strategic direction
• management oversight
• stakeholder participation
• risk management
• conflict management
• audit and evaluation
In analyzing information and developing findings, the review distinguishes the roles and 
responsibilities of lead center boards and their accountability for CRP performance, from 
the roles, responsibilities and levels of authority of CRP governance bodies.  The review uses 
“center board,” “lead center board” and “CRP governance body” to further clarify meaning.   
To develop findings, the review looked at CGIAR founding documents, CRP program 
proposals, updated ToR for CRP governing bodies where available, and minutes, reports and 
communications from the Fund Council and Consortium.  Governance structures were 
explored in interviews with Consortium and Fund Council senior management, DGs and CRP 
leaders.  Additionally, a governance survey was distributed to 157 individuals identified as 
members of CRP governance bodies. 
Only a few of the CRPs strictly conform to the proposed management and advisory structure 
in the SRF, and the review is not intended to evaluate CRP governance and management 
structures for their compliance with it.  The review is to “take stock of experience so far, 
identify issues and provide lessons from existing CRPs and elsewhere which can be 
applicable in other CRPs (Annex 1: Review ToR). 
In addition to looking at clarity of roles and accountabilities at the system and center levels, 
the review examined the governance and advisory arrangements that were outlined in each 
of the CRP proposals.  The review solicited information from each CRP with respect to the 
current composition and frequency of meetings.  This information was updated based on 
corrections and additional information submitted during the comment period for the draft 
report.  The review attempts to incorporate the information available from CRPs as of 
February 24, 2014.  Table 8 provides an overview of these structures. [Annex 7 provides 
more detailed information on their composition, leadership and reporting lines.]   
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RQ1: Clarity of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for CRP 
governance 
RQ 1.1. System-level roles and accountabilities for CRP governance 
FINDINGS: 
• The Fund Council and the Consortium do not operate as partners with equal
standing in the CGIAR dual pillar governance structure, rather the relationship
implies a hierarchy in which the Fund Council has a superior role.
• Centers perceive their role to be marginalized and undervalued in the CGIAR’s new
strategy and institutional arrangements.
• The lack of system-level consensus about roles and relative authority creates
complexity and contributes to a loss of confidence.
System-level roles and accountabilities—for the Fund Council, Consortium and centers—
have been defined in corporate documents and program performance contracts that govern 
CRP implementation. However, the experience of operating in a new structure where 
familiar actors play new roles and new actors bring challenging perspectives reveals a 
complexity not evident in the organizational chart for the new CGIAR.  More broadly, and 
indicative of the ways in which accountabilities are clear but not straightforward, is the 
steady scrutiny of the boundaries between the centers, the Consortium and the Fund that 
functioned as subtext to governance and management issues covered in the review. 
Consortium and Fund Council Roles 
The role clarification underway at the Consortium vis a vis both the Fund Council and the 
centers that make up the Consortium, demonstrate where roles—actual or assumed—are in 
flux or unclear.  Minutes of Fund Council meetings show donors and the Consortium 
grappling with their roles vis a vis each other, but also by extension, the role of centers 
within the new research investment structure. For example, the last year saw difficult 
discussions between the Fund Council and Consortium about the Consortium’s role in 
resource mobilization, its ability to receive bilateral funding, and pushback on the 
Consortium’s recommendations about process and timing for the second round of program 
proposal development.   
More generally speaking, as the Consortium moves well past its own start-up phase, its 
interactions with the Fund Council put into relief basic governance and management 
questions about accountability and authority as well as the balance of influence in the 
CGIAR’s present dual-pillared structure.  The Consortium is accountable to the Fund Council 
for delivering system-level research results through CRPs and, as a system-level entity, is 
itself funded by the Fund.  While the organizational chart indicates separate spheres of 
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action but equal standing in the structure, the minutes of Fund Council meetings suggest a 
body that considers it has higher standing in the structure and can direct the Consortium 
and its CEO.  The Phase 2 Review of CGIAR Governance noted the challenges of the dual-
pillar structure, and the lack of clarity in roles and standing.  At a more practical level, the 
Phase 2 review also noted the absence of joint committees and other collaborative 
governance mechanisms involving the Fund Council and Consortium that might span the 
distance between “donors and do-ers.”  The CRP review found that, in the absence of 
collaborative governance mechanisms that build consensus around issues and 
recommendations, a dynamic emerges in which the Consortium is a petitioner and the Fund 
Council exercises veto power.  
From the review of minutes and reports as well as interviews, an additional sorting out of 
roles and relative standing is evident between the centers and the Fund Council as the 
Council defines what it will and will not support.  The review discusses its findings on 
resource mobilization and allocation later in the chapter, but notes here in the context of 
the clarity of roles and accountability the concerns among center DGs over the apparent 
marginalization of the centers in the new CRP-focused CGIAR.  This trickles down to the 
ways lead centers narrowly construe their fiduciary role with respect to CRPs and accounts, 
in part, for the dominance of lead and participating centers in the governance of CRPs. 
Consortium and Center Roles 
The Consortium is a new feature of the CGIAR structure.  In the former structure, the 
equivalent body was not a legal entity and, in this respect, embodied the “consultative” 
nature of the CGIAR.  In the new structure, the Consortium is a legal entity, comprising the 
centers as its members.  It plays multiple roles, representing and articulating the collective 
value and contributions of the centers to both external audiences and the Fund Council, and 
building compliance and collaboration on center and CRP policy and practice.  It is the body 
to which lead centers are accountable for CRP performance.   
Governance of the Consortium as outlined in the Consortium’s constitution anticipates the 
complexity of this role by providing for a board that wholly comprises independent 
directors.  In this way, the Consortium’s actions, like those of a center board, are to be 
guided by the CGIAR’s mandate and the best interests of the system as a whole.  The first 
years of the Consortium’s organizational life have put pressure on this conception of the 
Consortium.  In interviews with DGs and notes from a retreat with DGs and center board 
chairs, there is a sense among some that the representative function of the Consortium has 
not been sufficiently robust, the Consortium is too independent in its actions, and that 
centers are being marginalized.    
Further to this issue, an ad hoc Governance, Risk and Compliance Committee, convened to 
address governance matters arising from the IITA financial fraud, pointed out “the need to 
develop a common understanding of what it means to be a member of the Consortium.”  
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Couched within a broader examination of how to maintain financial accountability and 
improve governance within the new CGIAR governance structure, the Committee proposed 
an adjustment in the role of centers and center boards in the adoption of Consortium policy 
recommendations.  One result is an erosion of the Consortium Board’s authority to act on 
policy matters without first gaining approval from three-quarters of centers, a high 
threshold of agreement.  
RQ 1.2. CRP governance bodies’ roles and responsibilities 
FINDING: 
• The governance structures of CRPs are unnecessarily complex and duplicative.
The review identified 23 active CRP governance bodies currently in place for 15 CRPs (not 
including the Genebank CRP).  Seven of the CRPs had steering committees or stakeholder 
committees, and four of those also had in place variously named program planning and 
management committees with identical or overlapping roles. Two of the CRPs had a 
combination of steering committees (or their equivalents) and an independent oversight or 
advisory body. 
The ToR and accountabilities vary among the CRP governance bodies. Five bodies report 
directly to lead center boards. Five report to boards via written reports. Three report to 
steering committees. 
In the governance survey, criticism was leveled at the establishment of multiple governance 
bodies for individual CRPs.  More respondents were critical than supportive when asked 
whether the establishment of more than one body was justified by higher quality or more 
effective oversight.  The survey also indicated that of 74 respondents representing 14 CRPs, 
55 considered their role to be principally advisory to CRP management, 8 advisory to the 
lead center DG, and 11 advisory to the lead center board.  
It is clear from comparing the originally proposed ToR with the current ToR that roles and 
responsibilities for CRP governance bodies are evolving even as they get underway.  The 
Independent Science Panel of the CCAFS CRP, which drew on its earlier life as a Challenge 
Program Advisory Committee for its ToR, clarified relative roles and responsibilities between 
it and the CIAT board.  The Dryland Systems CRP modified the structure and role of its 
Steering Committee. The Program Oversight Panel of the AAS CRP devoted a recent meeting 
to clarifying its role and developing a work plan based on it.   
RQ 1.3. The role of center boards 
FINDINGS: 
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• Lead center boards confront an increased potential for conflicts of interest between
their duty to centers and their accountability to the Consortium for CRPs.
• The reliance of center boards on DGs and CRP leaders to report on CRP performance
is at odds with the independent review that boards require for CRP financial
performance.
The new accountability of a lead center board for the programmatic performance and 
financial accountability of a CRP increases the potential for conflicts of interest on the part 
of the board.  This potential for conflict is inherent—the immediate interests of the center 
and those of a CRP with multiple partners will not always align; therefore, the board when 
these circumstances occur, will find itself with a clear conflict.   
For all but a handful of CRPs (CCAFS and AN4H are two examples), centers are heavily 
invested in the CRPs they lead, allocating substantial research capacity and bilateral 
resources to them.  As centers update their institutional strategic plans, they are also 
addressing the extent to which research and relationships will be pursued wholly within 
CRPs or fulfilled through initiatives that are pursued by a center as part of its institutional 
mandate or in response to opportunity.  Both these circumstances—which involve choices 
about the mobilization of resources—raise the potential for conflicts of interest.     
The potential for conflict is not an uncommon feature of center governance; center boards 
draw their members from host countries, from regional organizations, partners, and from 
influential networks.  Given the impact of conflicts of interest on stakeholder and donor 
confidence as well as the risk to reputation, long standing governance guidelines for center 
boards emphasize practices that protect against conflicts of interest.  These include the 
expectation that all board members act in their capacity as individuals and not as 
representatives, the adoption of conflict of interest policies, and rules for declaring interests 
or conflicts when they occur.  These policies were routinely monitored as part of the annual 
performance measurement index used prior to the CGIAR reform and continue to be part of 
the practices of center boards.  Features of these policies and practices have been 
incorporated into ground rules with respect to decision making within various CRP 
governance and management bodies.   
In the past, center boards needed to concern themselves primarily with conflicts 
experienced by individuals within the board or as part of senior management.  With CRPs, 
the conflicts are likely to be institutional in character.  For lead centers, these risks are 
compounded by the extent to which CRP governance and management are seen to be 
controlled or influenced by the center.  Boards routinely guard against the risk of staff 
influence in key areas of accountability—DGs, for instance, do not participate actively in 
annual audits or play a lead role in the board nomination process.  Center experience 
serving as fiduciaries for the Challenge Programs is also relevant in that institutional 
interests were acknowledged and the risk of conflicts of interest was mitigated through 
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independently composed program advisory boards that balanced center and partner 
interests. 
Presently, five CRPs (Humidtropics, AAS, GRiSP, WLE, CCAFS) have governance bodies with 
independent chairs that report directly to lead center boards on CRP performance and 
planning, enabling those boards to manage risks in this area.  Another five (GRiSP, PIM, 
A4NH, Maize, FTA, CCAFS) have as part of their structure representation of the lead center 
board on the CRP’s governance body.  The balance of lead center boards without these 
mechanisms in place are more reliant on the DG, alone or in combination with a CRP leader, 
and written reports to serve as the principal point of information on a program’s 
performance or priority setting. 
RQ 2: Independence and inclusiveness of CRP governance 
RQ 2.1. Independence 
FINDINGS: 
• Among the current array of CRP governance bodies, there is a substantial difference
in their degree of independence based on their ToR, composition and reporting lines.
• Independent CRP governance bodies, currently in place in certain CRPs, demonstrate
their value in providing active oversight to CRPs and supporting the lead center
boards’ accountability for CRPs.
In assessing whether independence was high, medium or low, the following criteria were 
used: 
• the governance body included a majority of members external to the centers and
CRPs or independent and serving in an individual, expert capacity
• the ToR included responsibilities for strategic oversight, including research
priorities, resource allocations and evaluation of results
• there was a direct reporting relationship to the lead center board
The graph below (Figure 3) maps the governance structures of the CRPs using the extent to 
which there is adequate inclusion of external members (inclusive) and the extent to which 
ToRs and the reporting relationship with the lead center board contribute to independence. 
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Figure 3: Mapping of Governance Structures according to Independence and Inclusiveness 
Source: Review team. 
Rated as having high independence: 
The AAS POP has six independent members and a single position for the lead and the 
participating center.   The POP is chaired by an external member and reports directly to the 
WorldFish board. 
The CCAFS ISP is independently composed, and has clear ToR and a strong relationship with 
the CIAT board. 
The GRiSP Oversight Committee’s external representation is significant and center 
representation draws on the boards of participating centers.  DGs of IRRI and AfricaRice are 
ex officio. The committee reports directly to the lead center board. 
The Humidtropics Independent Advisory Committee has eight independent members; the 
DG of IITA serves ex officio.  The committee reports directly to the lead center board.  
The role and composition of the WLE Steering Committee provides independent oversight 
of the program.  In a CRP with 11 participating centers and other, non-CG partners, the 
composition of the committee demonstrates the feasibility of achieving legitimacy and 
fairness in program governance without direct representation. 
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Rated as having medium independence: 
The A4NH Independent Advisory Committee comprises external members and includes a 
liaison from the lead center board.  The board meets annually and reports in writing to the 
IFPRI board.  
Grain Legumes and Dryland Cereals have identical governance mechanisms. The Steering 
Committee has a stronger role than the Independent Advisory Committee in that the 
reporting relationship to the board is clearly through the lead center DG, whereas the 
Independent Advisory Committee is intended to communicate its work in a written report to 
the board.  ToRs for the two bodies also contain overlapping functions. 
The Livestock and Fish Science and Partnership Advisory Committee is independently 
composed (though presently small), and has an effective oversight function in its ToR.  It 
does not have a direct report to the ILRI board, but is required to submit an annual report to 
the lead center board which is accompanied by a commentary from CRP management.   
The PIM Science and Policy Advisory Panel is smaller than mandated and reports to the lead 
center board in writing. The SPAP meets annually.  The IFPRI board has recently identified a 
liaison to serve on the panel. 
Rated as having low independence: 
Although the Dryland Systems Steering Committee includes representatives of partners and 
stakeholder organizations outside the CG, all of the members may send delegates in their 
stead, rendering participation representative in nature.  This reduces the committee’s 
potential effectiveness and balance of interests, and emphasizes the dominant role of the 
lead center. The independent Scientific Advisory Committee is primarily a panel of expert 
consultants under contract to provide advice and feedback to the program, which reports to 
the Steering Committee. 
The FTA Steering Committee is a small group primarily composted of lead and participating 
center leaders with significant decision-making and oversight authority. The CIFOR board 
relies on the Steering Committee for oversight of the CRP.  The CRP leader reports regularly 
to the CIFOR (lead center) board, and annually to the ICRAF board. The Scientific and 
Stakeholder Advisory Committee was not constituted, although the matter is under review. 
Leadership and reporting of the MAIZE Stakeholder Advisory Committee and Management 
Committee are consolidated within CIMMYT and duplicative.  The CIMMYT board has 
limited independent oversight of the program.  A CIMMYT board member is a member of 
the Management Committee but also represents one of the CRP’s major partners 
(SAGARPA).   The institutional overlap between the Stakeholder Advisory Committee and 
45 
Review of CRP Governance and Management 
Independent  
Evaluation 
Arrangement 
iea.cgiar.org 
the Management Committee is substantial; only four current SAC members are from 
institutions not represented on the Management Committee. The 10 member Management 
Committee, which is the executive committee for the program, includes 6 individuals from 
CIMMYT and 2 from IITA.  
The RTB Steering Committee initially held its membership to participating center DGs and 
only recently added a single partner representative.  Formation of the Program Advisory 
Committee was delayed, leaving the CIP board reliant on the Steering Committee for 
oversight of the CRP. 
Leadership and reporting of the WHEAT Stakeholder Committee and Management 
Committee are consolidated within CIMMYT management.  The CIMMYT board has no 
independent source of oversight for the program.  The Stakeholder Committee brings 
together individuals who can champion Wheat regionally and with donors (Fund Council), 
and is chaired by the CIMMYT DG.  The Management Committee, which is the executive 
committee for the program, includes 5 individuals from CIMMYT and 2 from ICARDA, and is 
co-chaired by the centers’ DDGs.  
Genebanks CRP 
The Genebanks CRP is not mapped in this analysis.  The CRP reports directly to the 
Consortium.  The allocation and distribution of resources to the center gene banks is well 
defined although still contingent on annual planning and performance.  There is a small 
committee of outside advisors who provide independent, peer reviewed assessments, and a 
Management Committee that as of late 2013 includes three representatives elected from 
among the gene bank managers.  Communications with gene bank managers and an annual 
general meeting brings managers together for planning purposes and to identify special 
initiatives.  Some conflicts of interest issues involving the Trust’s role as the CRP’s manager 
were raised in interviews with CRP leaders and DGs but this did not emerge as a widespread 
concern.    
RQ 2.3. Inclusiveness 
FINDINGS: 
• The lack of adequate participation by women and individuals from target regions in
CRP governance bodies reduces the legitimacy of these CRP governance bodies.
• There is a gap between the data on inclusiveness and the perceived level of effort on
the part of centers and CRPs to ensure adequate representation.
Figure 4 provides a visual representation of inclusiveness of CRP governance bodies based 
on three dimensions of inclusiveness:  external participation (non-center partners and 
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individuals), gender and representation of target regions. The figure draws on the data 
presented in Annex 8, which show 192 individuals participating in CRP governance bodies 
(excluding 12 ex officio members).  It needs to be noted that Annex 8 is based on updated 
information through February 24, 2014, and that the analysis of representation excludes the 
ex officio members.  
External participation 
On the whole, representation from outside centers or center partners was almost 60%; lead 
centers and participating centers are equally represented on CRP governance bodies overall 
(21% each of total). Of the 58% that was external, it was not possible to determine, based 
on the data requested from the CRPs, the percentage of individuals representing non-center 
partners and those who served on governance bodies in their individual capacities as 
outside experts.  Keeping in mind that most CRPs have multiple governing bodies, eight 
have a body wholly comprised of external members (Dryland Systems, Humidtropics, PIM, 
Grain Legumes, Dryland Cereals, L&F, A4NH and CCAFS).  In contrast, the RTB Management 
Committee, the L&F Program Planning & Management Committee and the FTA and RTB 
steering committees have little or no external participation. In the governance survey, the 
overwhelming majority of respondents of those not affiliated with the centers (41 of 46) 
considered representation of non-CGIAR partners on governance bodies to be adequate.        
Target regions 
Out of a total of 23 active governance bodies (also see Annex 8) an average of 24% of total 
members are from target regions.  Again, keeping in mind that most CRPs have multiple 
governing bodies, some governance bodies (within PIM, Wheat, Maize, Grain Legumes and 
Dryland Cereals) had more than 50% target region representation; seven had zero.  The 
latter were mostly steering committees and variants of PPMCs.  The limited composition of 
these committees, drawing as they do on the leadership in place at centers and frequently 
limiting the partners included in these bodies to those with levels of investment in the 
research portfolio comparable to the centers, self-limits the inclusion of participants from 
target regions.   
Gender 
In the same universe of governance bodies, women comprised only 24% of members.  Three 
bodies reported no women participation:  Dryland Systems Steering Committee and 
Independent Science Advisory Committee, and Grain Legumes Steering Committee. It is 
notable that, with the exception of the Dryland Systems Science Advisory Committee, these 
bodies draw heavily on center DGs and senior research staff for their composition. 
While the review found the representation of target regions and women to be lacking, the 
governance survey produced a different assessment.  Asked specifically about the efforts 
that have been made to ensure adequate representation of target regions and women, 
response rates were affirmative (regions: 70.2% or 52 respondents agreed or tended to 
agree, women: 73.0% or 51 respondents).  The contrast between the data in Annex 8 and 
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survey responses may reflect the difference between what is in place and survey 
respondents’ willingness to reward points for perceived effort.      
Figure 4: CRP governance bodies’ composition 
Source: Review team, based on total number of members (excluding ex-officio) and information of 
CRP governance bodies in ANNEX 8. 
RQ 3: Extent to which resource mobilization and resource allocation 
support effective CRP planning and implementation 
RQ 3.1. Windows 1&2 funding 
FINDINGS: 
• Uncertainty about the levels and timing of W1&2 allocations and the year-to-year
nature of funding is an impediment to CRP planning and to developing multi-year
strategies.
• The Consortium is working to dispel the perception among CRPs and centers that the
playing field is not level with respect to funding decisions as it prepares the
guidelines for the second call for proposals.
Despite growth in overall funding to the Fund and to the system as a whole, the first years 
of the new funding structure have presented centers and CRPs with challenges.   
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Eighty percent of the Fund’s current funding reflects annual rather than multi-year 
commitments, and, in both 2011 and 2012, disruptions in funding, delays in the release of 
funds, and shifts in Windows 1&2 allocations distracted from the ability of the CRPs to 
engage confidently with partners and plan effectively.  CRP leaders noted the perverse 
incentives that emerged with changes to allocations and delayed funding—success in 
attracting W2 support risked a reduction in the allocation of W1 funding, and the lack of a 
clear policy on carrying unexpended funds forward from one year into the next, encouraged 
short-term—“use it or lose it”—decision making versus decision making with a more 
strategic focus.  Overall, funding uncertainty and the shifts in W1 were considered by CRP 
leaders to make centers and CRPs cautious.    
For centers, the disruptions and uncertainties raised concerns about maintaining 
organizational stability through the ups and downs of CRP funding, putting in play concerns 
about maintaining cash reserves (Chapter 3.3.) and a protective posture with respect to 
resource mobilization.  Comments on the management survey echoed these concerns about 
the effect on centers as well as CRPs of unclear decision-making regarding commitments 
and carryovers, and perceived preference of centers’ to fundraise for their interests rather 
than for CRPs. 
While the Consortium addressed the element of year-to-year uncertainty by assuring each 
CRP of at least 90% of its 2012 W1&2 expenditures in 201310, and additional improvements 
to budgeting and financing are proposed for the next proposal cycle, the initial experiences 
left CRP leaders and senior managers generally frustrated with decision making by the Fund 
Council and the Consortium.  Additionally, for some CRPs as well as for centers with a major 
stake in particularly hard hit CRPs, there was a sense that the playing field was not level and 
some CRPs and centers were asked to make more significant adjustments to program 
planning and implementation than others.  The draft guidelines for the call for second 
proposals include greater clarity about how adjustments and decisions about W1 allocations 
will be made among CRPs in future. 
RQ 3.2. Impact of bilateral funding 
FINDINGS: 
• The scale and growth of W3 and center-raised bilateral funding have the potential to
distort priority setting within CRPs as well as their flexibility to allocate resources.
• The lack of an integrated system-wide resource mobilization strategy that leverages
the strengths of all parties to mobilize resources exacerbates the potential for
divergent priorities among centers, CRPs and the system as whole.
10 CGIAR Consortium 2012 Reflections and 2013 Outlook: Accountability for Performance through Partnerships 
(January 2013) 
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Figure 5: Percentage of CRP W3 and Bilateral Funding of Total CRP Funding (2012) 
Source: CGIAR Annual Report 2012, page 41. 
Even in an environment where overall funding has grown, the configuration of support is 
viewed as essential to programmatic success.   While the level of overall investment through 
the Fund (W1,2,3) represented 45% of 2012 CRP funding, when W3 funds are added to 
center-raised funds, bilateral support for CRPs totaled 63%.  For 5 of the 16 CRPs (including 
Genebanks), total bilateral funding was 70% or higher (Figure 5).11 On average, W3 and 
bilateral funding represented 63% of total funding in 2012.  
The review found that bilateral funding has the potential to impact CRP priority setting, 
slowing the change management process initiated with the CGIAR’s adoption of a 
programmatic strategy.     
To the extent that a CRP’s budget relies on substantial bilateral support, CRP planning and 
priority setting are subject to two different challenges—donor intent, and a center’s 
willingness to view the CRP’s priorities as identical to its own and mobilize resources on 
behalf of it.  While donor strategy and intent may align substantially with plans, the scale, 
timing and nature of a bilateral investment from outside the Fund is subject to more 
contingencies and restrictions than the resources available through the Fund.   
As an example, CCAFS, with close to 75% of its funds originating through W1&2, has greater 
latitude to allocate resources based on strategy and performance than a CRP like WLE that 
relies on 11 participating centers to raise 60% of its annual budget.  CCAFS’ ability to refine 
11 CGIAR Annual Report 2012 
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its strategy and, if indicated, change the allocation of resources to achieve results is also 
aided by access to an independent science panel.  Leaders of other CRPs found themselves 
with less flexibility, and anticipated that in an environment strongly reliant on center-raised 
bilateral funding, stronger monitoring and evaluation processes will be needed to support 
decision making that affects activities that may reflect center or donor priorities.  
The capacity of the centers to mobilize resources and the degree to which the system is 
reliant on that capacity to fully fund the CRPs slows the pace of system-level change.  W1&2 
funding and multi-year support provide the CGIAR and the CRPs with the most flexibility to 
leverage change and accelerate the implementation of research linked to the SRF.  W1&2 
funding also facilitates coherence across the CRPs and builds a sense of shared ownership of 
the SRF.  In interviews, center DGs were uniformly on board with pursuing a programmatic 
strategy that leveraged existing research capacity and offered the potential to create new 
capacity across the system and in conjunction with partners beyond the CG.  They were also 
alert to the levels of bilateral funding they were raising and their institutional prerogatives 
to develop strategies that fulfilled their duty to act in the best interests of their center. (This 
included re-evaluating the CRPs in which they participate as well as levels of participation.)   
The Phase 2 review of CGIAR governance found a lack of an overarching resource 
mobilization strategy for the CGIAR.  The CRP review found that the lack of an integrated 
and complementary strategy that acknowledges and leverages the capacity and intent of 
centers to continue to raise substantial bilateral support creates an environment in which 
the CGIAR’s priorities and the centers’ priorities become differentiated.    
RQ 3.3. Center reserves 
FINDING: 
• Without a clear system-level strategy for center financial reserves, centers see
significant risks to using reserves to maintain CRP cash flow or to finance short falls,
both of which raise fiduciary issues with center boards.
Maintaining an adequate operating reserve has been a long standing indicator of a center’s 
overall financial health and sustainability.  At one point, this indicator was part of a CGIAR 
performance monitoring system that factored into funding decisions by the World Bank and 
other donors, and reserves (and their management) continue to be considered important to 
center and system financial well-being.    
In the past, apart from investment earnings on the reserves themselves, reserves principally 
accrued from “saving” core, unrestricted support and from income-generating activities.  
Center reserves typically provided for three to six months of operating support, and were an 
important tool for meeting cash flow needs as well as maintaining research and business 
continuity in the event of adverse circumstances.  
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Today, although W1&2 are characterized by the Consortium Office as similar to the core, 
unrestricted support that centers once received, centers do not accept that definition. To a 
lesser extent, CRP leaders share that view.  W1&2 are considered to be restricted to CRPs; 
their use must reflect the approved budget for them; and there is no provision in any of the 
three Fund windows for the CRPs or the centers to develop or maintain reserves.   The 
reduction in center access to unrestricted support is illustrated by the 2009 aggregate total 
for unrestricted funding among centers ($168 million) and the 2012 aggregate ($28.7 
million).    
When the distribution of W1 & 2 funds was suspended in response to financial fraud at IITA, 
CRPs turned to centers to maintain the budgeted plans of work until payouts resumed.  
Center boards considered carefully the risk involved; most approved, assuming that they 
would eventually be made whole, but others did not. In 2012, when funding commitments 
came late in the year and allocations changed, those CRPs losing funds looked to 
participating centers for potential coverage with a less positive result.  IWMI, for example, 
as lead center for WLE, has twice committed substantial funds from its reserves to cover 
potential gaps or delays in funds for the CRP.  While IWMI was eventually made whole in 
both instances, these constituted significant risks for the center and slowed program 
implementation as a prudent response to the uncertainty. 
For centers, the reserve issue brings into focus the institutional risks associated with a 
programmatic funding structure that relies on institutional capacity but appears to have 
declined so far to contribute to building institutional stability. A number of center DGs refer 
to CRPs as a framework within which a center’s research mandate will be realized, 
emphasizing the discretionary nature of a center’s involvement as well as alluding to the 
duty of center boards to act in a center’s best interests.  The reserve issue was the subject of 
a recommendation in the Phase 2 review of CGIAR governance, which the Fund Council did 
not specifically address but which is under discussion at the Consortium. 
RQ 4: Efficiency of CRP governance structures and processes 
RQ 4.1. CRP governance costs and perceived value 
FINDINGS: 
• The numerous levels of CRP governance are inefficient and costly, with room for
streamlining.
• The cost of a governance body was considered justified by center DGs and CRP
leaders who perceived the body added value to the CRP or to lead center
accountability.
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As noted in Chapter 4 (Overview of CRP Governance and Management), a total of 23 active 
governance bodies, not counting lead center boards, are in place to provide the 15 CRPs 
with a combination of governance, oversight and advice.  The review found observations 
about the complexity and inefficiencies of creating and convening multiple bodies to be 
valid.  Some of those interviewed drew parallels with the centers’ experience with the 
relatively straightforward governance and management structures of the Challenge 
Programs, viewing these structures as more efficient than what has developed for CRPs.  
Many viewed the multiple bodies as contributing to high transaction costs for the centers.  
In part this may be attributable to representatives of participating centers serving on a 
governance body or management committee for more than one CRP or multiple 
committees linked to an individual CRP.     
The governance survey also explored the efficiency of CRP governance bodies. Asked for an 
opinion on whether the establishment of multiple CRP governance bodies is justified by 
higher quality and more effective oversight, of those respondents voicing an opinion, more 
were critical (30) than supportive (23). Of the critical voices, 63.6% were external to centers.  
One respondent noted:  “The total level of CRP governance—ranging from the Consortium 
to the lead center and the specific CRP governance bodies—far exceeds what is needed to 
manage the level of Window 1 and 2 funded annual activities.” 
In interviews, the additional costs of overall CRP governance would be estimated using as a 
rule of thumb the costs of convening center boards.  However, based on stakeholder 
estimations, the review found that the average cost of convening a CRP governance body 
was less costly than a center board.  More specifically, the review found the average annual 
costs for convening a typical CRP governance body for twice-a-year meetings to be 
approximately $120,000 per year.  The cost associated with center boards ranged between 
$300,000 to 380,000.  There are reasons for the difference—Center board members 
typically receive modest honorarium for board service, board meetings occur over longer 
periods of time, and travel expenses, which include staff travel, are high. That said, although 
the cost of convening a single governance body may be comparatively smaller, the cost of 
convening all the existing CRP governance bodies would be costly—more than $3 million a 
year. 
As noted above, although respondents to the governance survey did not consider that 
multiple governing bodies could be justified as making CRPs oversight more effective, on the 
question of value relative to cost, three-quarters of respondents (57 respondents), including 
31 external representatives, agreed or tended to agree that their time devoted to 
overseeing or advising a CRP was well spent.  Interviews confirmed the perceived value of 
specific bodies, particularly those that were viewed as bringing expertise together with clear 
ToR and relevant agendas.  
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6. MANAGEMENT FINDINGS
6.1. Introduction 
The review addressed the following three main questions with respect to the CRP 
management: 
RQ 1. To what extent do CRPs have adequate resources to manage for results? 
RQ 2. To what extent does CRP management have the authority to manage for results? 
RQ 3. Is CRP management efficient? 
To reflect on these questions, the review relied on the definition of management that 
appears in Chapter 3  (Review approach and methodology) related to general management 
responsibilities: 
• Program implementation
• Regulatory compliance
• Reviewing and reporting
• Administrative efficiency
• Communication and knowledge sharing
• Learning
• Performance assessment
To develop findings, conclusions and recommendations with respect to CRP management, 
management topics were explored in interviews with CRP leaders, center DGs and other 
senior managers.  Interviews were also conducted with lead center corporate services staff, 
staff with direct responsibilities for CRP budgeting and reporting, and senior staff in the 
Consortium Office.   
A survey was circulated to 243 CRP leaders, CRP management staff as well as focal points; 
146 responded (60.1%) (Annex 6).  Responses were received from 15 CRPs, with CCAFS and 
WLE providing the highest number of responses (19 and 18, respectively).  
The review attempted a comparative analysis of management and coordination costs across 
CRPs.  It drew from the program proposal descriptions of management and coordination 
arrangements, the initial budget projections for these expenses, and budget data for 
relevant fiscal years.  
The analysis of financial data focused on financial reports for 2012, a year in which the 
majority of CRPs were operational. In those cases where CRPs were not fully operational in 
2012 (Dryland Systems, Humidtropics, Dryland Cereals and Grains Legumes), 2013 budget 
information was used. The most useful findings arose from consideration of the 
assumptions about management costs and arrangements outlined in the program proposal 
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process, an analysis of individual CRP management arrangements and costs, and 
information developed from the management survey.  
RQ 5: Adequacy of resources to manage for results 
RQ 5.1. Adequacy of human and financial resources 
FINDINGS:   
• CRP resources for management purposes are considered adequate.
• The provision of administrative support by centers is considered to be efficient.
CRP Management Units 
CRP management units were designed to be intentionally small. The design relied on a 
complementary structure that drew on existing center capacity to meet the majority of the 
programs’ management needs.  CRP management requirements as they appeared in 
proposals tended to focus on new capacity or new expenses required to lead and manage 
them.  The projected staffing for program management ranged from relatively detailed to 
simply projecting management costs as a percentage of the CRP’s budget. 
Figure 6 shows the number of staff associated with CRP management units (see also Table 
9). The average is around 3.5 full-time equivalent staff members and one part-time staff. 
The standard management unit includes at a minimum, a CRP leader supported by 
administrative staff.  In some cases, a dedicated communications, gender or M&E person is 
part of the management unit.  Humidtropics, AAS and WLE also have operational managers 
who support the CRP leader in the management of the program.  CCAFS and WLE included a 
larger number of management staff in their units, including in CCAFS, students from the 
university where the CRP is currently hosted. It should be noted here, that 4.5 staff of CCAFS 
are paid by bilateral funding; however they are dedicated CRP management and 
coordination staff and thus have been included.  
The size and composition of the management units is discussed again in Chapter 7 as part of 
management efficiency.  
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Figure 6: Number of Full and Part Time Staff of CRP Management Units 
 Source: Information provided by CRP management. 
Adequacy of Management Resources 
Although the program management units are small, the number of staff involved in program 
management and coordination is significantly larger, and primarily available to the CRPs 
through arrangements with lead and participating centers.  117 respondents to the 
management survey (80.1%) and 11 CRP leaders considered CRPs to have adequate human 
resources with the skills and expertise to manage CRPs effectively. 
94 survey respondents (64.3%), including nine CRP leaders, “agreed” or “tended to agree” 
that sufficient financial resources are available to manage the CRP effectively.12   Asked to 
indicate where additional human resources could be added, respondents included 
communication specialists, gender experts, and administrative support.  Interviews with CRP 
leaders indicated that additional expertise was being recruited in these areas, adding 
partnership development and M&E to the list. 
In addition, the majority of respondents to the survey found it efficient to draw on centers 
for administrative services, particularly for finance administration, general administration 
and human resources. 
12 Please refer to chapter 7 on the efficiency of CRP management for an analysis of actual figures. 
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RQ 6: Authority of CRP management to manage for results 
FINDINGS: 
• A significant number of CRP leaders lack sufficient authority to manage for results.
• By placing the CRP leader directly in the “chain of command” within a lead center,
the relationship is supervisory in structure and, for some, supervisory in nature.
• CRP leaders do not have enough scope to recruit research managers and program
coordinators or a formal role in evaluating the performance of CRP management
staff employed by centers.
CRPs are time bound programs, and like a joint venture, bring partners and resources 
together for specific purposes.  For the CGIAR, they are intentionally programs and rely on 
existing legal entities to operate.  The management literature describing multi-stakeholder 
partners, including the Sourcebook, references the complexity of the relationship of the 
host or parent organization (or lead center) to the partners as well as the dilemma of the 
program leader with “two masters.”  Although lead centers are accountable under the PIAs 
for the performance of CRPs, the success of the overall strategy in creating CRPs relies on 
the capacity within the program to identify and refine strategy, mobilize partners, evaluate 
results, and target resources.  These tasks do not take place in a vacuum but their 
accomplishment is more certain when CRP leadership has an unambiguous relationship to 
program management, and the standing and authority to manage effectively and be 
accountable for results.  
The review looked at the existing structure and nature of the CRP management 
arrangements to determine if the role and authority of the CRP leader was sufficient to 
manage for results.  In particular, it considered: 
• Structural issues, principally the reporting relationship of the CRP leader within the
lead center, and 
• The degree to which the lead center or participating centers inhibit or limit the
authority of the CRP leader, principally by safeguarding established interests through 
their relative positions on decision-making bodies. 
The review also used interviews to explore the balance between the structural issues and 
the characteristics of effective working relationships between CRP leaders and centers, and 
in the management survey asked a series of questions relating to the management authority 
of CRP leaders. 
Table 10 provides an overview of the current reporting relationship of CRP leaders within 
the lead center, and the degree to which current CRP decision making bodies represent 
substantial vested interests in decision making.  These two factors were identified as 
potential constraints on a CRP leader’s authority.  In general, the reporting line is the 
greatest constraint, followed by the dominance of the lead center in governance and 
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management bodies.  The role of participating centers, in conjunction with these factors, 
adds to the obstacle course.  
Table 10:  Structure and Reporting Lines of CRP Management 
CRP CRP leader 
reporting line 
Center role in governance and 
management 
Notes 
Lead center Participating 
centers 
Dryland Systems LC DG High Medium 
Humidtropics LC DDG High High 
AAS Program Oversight Panel Medium Low LC DDG leads AAS 
PIM LC DG High Low 
Wheat Program manager reports to 
LC DDG 
High Low 
LC DDG leads both 
Wheat and Maize  Maize Program manager 
reports to LC DDG 
High Low 
GRiSP LC DG Medium Medium 
RTB LC DG High High 
Grain Legumes LC DG High Medium 
Dryland Cereals LC DG High Low 
L&F LC DG Medium Low 
A4NH LC DG Medium Medium 
WLE LC DG Low High 
FTA LC DG High High 
CCAFS LC DG Low Low 
Genebanks Assistant Executive Director 
of the Trust reports to ED of 
Trust and Consortium 
Medium Low Not included in the 
following analysis. 
Source: Review team. 
CRP leader reporting line  
In considering the authority of the CRP leader, the concept of a lead center versus a host 
organization creates multiple perspectives for evaluating authority and relative standing in a 
management hierarchy.  First is how the reporting relationship is viewed within the lead 
center—primarily as a supervisory or “command and control” function, or as an 
administrative strategy that may also possess the advantage of bringing program 
management in close proximity to resources committed by the host to the venture.  The 
descriptive language in program proposals, the ToR for CRP leaders, and the organizational 
charts that picture accountability emphasize reporting.  The second is where within a center 
the CRP leader reports. 
Most of the CRP leaders report to or through the DG.  The reporting relationship in AAS 
appears to be through the POP but since the current CRP leader is also a DDG in WorldFish, 
it is not clear that AAS is outside the norm.  In CCAFS, the CRP leader reports to the CIAT DG 
but performance evaluation involves the ISP.   
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Three of the CRP leaders report within the lead center at levels below the DG.  In the case of 
Humidtropics reporting is through IITA’s DDG.  Both of the CRPs for which CIMMYT is lead 
center have program managers who report to the DDG for Research and Partnerships.  
Although the working relationships between the CRP leaders and the lead center managers 
to whom they report are collegial, the reporting relationship makes the leadership of the 
CRP part of middle management in the center and places a limit on the CRP leader or 
manager’s authority.  In two of the three cases, the lead center is also dominant in the 
governance structure, adding to the challenge a leader might face in advancing a course of 
action that does not conform to the center’s interest.  
The issue of the collegiality of the relationship versus its structural definition is important to 
note.  Two-thirds (10) of the CRP leaders reported in the management survey that they 
agreed or tended to agree that their roles and responsibilities within their CRP and CGIAR 
center/organization are compatible.  Nine of the 15 CRPs leaders were employed in a center 
prior to recruitment to the position of CRP leader.  These leaders know the centers, know 
center leaders from earlier work together and are familiar with the research talent that 
comes together in the CRP.  These CRP leaders clearly represented a highly regarded, known 
quantity at the time they were selected to lead the start up of the programs.  In examining 
the structure, the review does not question or undercut the quality of the working 
relationships in place.  Instead, it looks past the immediate relationships to imagine 
different leaders in place, lacking the same professional history, exercising management 
authority in the structure that exists.  While one assumes that collegiality would continue to 
be the norm, the structures as they presently exist do not make clear the authority of the 
CRP leader to manage for results. 
Center role in governance and management   
Interviews with CRP leaders confirmed the complexity of managing for results when lead 
and participating centers dominate governance structures and when there is no intervening 
or intermediate body that is sufficiently balanced or independent to back stop management 
decision making.  
Comments included in the management survey pointed out the challenges of these 
arrangements, including the observation:  “the director [has to] tend to political 
considerations far too frequently…and has to worry about his own DG and the DGs of other 
centers before he can make decisions.”  Another respondent noted “the need to 
acknowledge the fine balance [of CRP and center management structures] and understand 
both as valid perspectives in a dialogue, not one dominating over the other.”   
According to management survey results, 5 of 15 CRP leaders agreed that they have 
adequate authority to manage and lead the CRP within the framework of its approved 
program plan and budget, and to recommend changes in research priorities to achieve 
desired results. An additional 3 CRP leaders tended to agree.   
59 
Review of CRP Governance and Management 
Independent  
Evaluation 
Arrangement 
iea.cgiar.org 
Three CRP leaders agreed and 5 tended to agree that they have adequate authority to: 
• Recruit program and research staff members
• Evaluate staff performance and determine changes in assignment or
employment
• Manage budgets and allocate resources
While one CRP leader indicated that it was too early to judge, the remaining six CRP leaders 
either disagreed or tended to disagree that they had adequate authority in these areas. 
The interviews reflected a similar span among CRP leaders—a few felt emphatically that 
they had the necessary authority, another group were positive but more tentative, and the 
balance did not express confidence in the scope of their authority.  
Recruitment and evaluation of management staff 
The process of identifying the recipients of the management survey highlighted the extent 
to which individuals play roles in more than one CRP and the degree to which CRP 
management has been drawn from centers (74%).  The latter is not surprising given the 
quality and depth of research experience in the CGIAR.  
The combination of factors presents management challenges.  Although 79 respondents to 
the management survey (54.9%), considered CRP leaders to be sufficiently involved in 
evaluating staff performance and determining the need for changes in assignments, as 
noted above a number of CRPs leaders had a different take on these questions.  In 
interviews, no CRP leader indicated a role in annual performance evaluation when 
management staff was less than full-time, was a long-time member of a center’s staff or if, 
within the management structure of the center, the staff member had a supervisor.  
Informal evaluation is the norm, but primarily when performance falls short.  (CCAFS is an 
exception.  The senior management team comprises full time positions, and though hosted 
by centers and partners, participates in an annual evaluation process involving the CRP 
director.)  One of the perceived benefits of the development of IDOs is the framework they 
will provide for a range of evaluation, not just of program performance but also 
management performance.  
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RQ 7: Efficiency of CRP management 
RQ 7.1. CRP management and coordination budgets 
FINDING: 
• CRP proposals included vague and inconsistent descriptions of management
structures and, to meet expectations about cost-efficiency, low or pro forma
estimates of CRP management costs.
At the time CRP proposals were drafted, there was limited guidance on what and how much 
to budget with regards to management and coordination. There was no guidance on how 
lead centers would charge overhead (indirect costs) to the CRPs they lead or what kind of 
management costs they should charge directly.  
The proposals reflected an assumption that management costs should reasonably be no 
more than 4-5 percent of the total budget and include very small management units.  Some 
of the proposals included a breakdown of budgeted management costs, indicating staffing 
and projected expenses for program management activities, such as partnership 
development, gender coordination or communications; others described little more than 
the position of CRP leader and the addition of a percentage calculation to cover unspecified 
management costs.  Annex 9 provides an overview of projected management costs included 
in proposals (calculated on the first year’s budget and the most conservative scenario in 
subsequent years if more than one scenario was presented).  
The Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) commented at that time on the 
“light” management arrangements presented in the proposals and expressed concern that 
the pressure to keep management costs low was more important than defining an adequate 
management model and then budgeting resources for it.  
RQ 7.2.  Comparison of CRP management costs 
FINDINGS: 
• On average, management and coordination costs are 4% of CRP budgets, which is
consistent with the estimates in the CRP proposals.
• CRP management positions are frequently incorporated in participating center
budgets.
• Administrative costs are treated inconsistently, some expensed directly and some
included in overhead charges.
• Because of the lack of uniformity in identifying CRP management costs, there is no
straightforward way to compare costs on a CRP-to-CRP basis.
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This section of the report provides an overview of CRP management costs and highlights 
inconsistencies in budgeting and reporting costs that make comparison of these costs 
difficult.  The following section compares the management budgets for four CPRs to 
illustrate in detail the range of underlying expenses that appear within this category.  
In 2012, CRP management and coordination costs in terms of total CRP expenditures ranged 
from as little as 1 percent (Grain Legumes and Dryland Cereals) to around 5-6 percent (AAS, 
RTB and CCAFS).   
Figure 7 illustrates the total 2012 actual management and coordination costs per CRP (as 
reported for 2012)13, and these costs as a percentage of total expenditures. (Figures for 
CRPs that were not fully operational in 2012 (Dryland Systems, Humidtropics, Grain 
Legumes, Dryland Cereals) are based on 2013 budgets.)  Excluding these CRPs, management 
costs in 2012 averaged 4 percent (depending on the CRP, between $1 million and $2 
million), which is in line (at the lower end) with what was presented in the CRP budget 
proposals. 
The outlier in Figure 7 is the CRP on Dryland Cereals, which shows a significantly higher 
percentage of its budget allocated to management.  Although the level of expenditure for 
the CRP is comparable to Grain Legumes, its 2013 budget was 60% less.  It is worth noting 
that ICRISAT as lead center drafted both proposals and there is a consistency to the 
management structures and costs presented for both CRPs.  These include the cost of the 
CRP director and management unit, product line coordinators, CRP steering committee, 
research management committee, and an independent advisory committee.  This suggests 
some basic features of CRP management are fixed and comparable, and that the cost of 
certain basic management structures is similarly fixed rather than a percentage of total 
budget. 
With the exception of these two CRPs and a handful of others, CRP management costs are 
also difficult to accurately assess and compare because not all corporate services (mostly 
administrative support services) provided to CRPs by the centers, especially lead centers, 
are accounted for.   Centers charge overhead to the CRPs as well as direct expenses for 
specific services and positions.  The way and the extent to which services are charged by the 
centers to the CRPs vary (as illustrated in Table 11). 
In several cases a CRP and a center are basically equivalent, the research program of the 
center is fully allocated to the CRP(s) they lead (IRRI with GRiSP, CIMMYT with WHEAT and 
MAIZE, CIFOR with FTA).  In these cases, differentiating the cost of CRP from center 
management is primarily a matter of highlighting new or different costs associated with the 
CRP (a CRP leader, governance and management committees, for instance).  
13 Source: CRP Themes Report, L131 of Lead Center Report to Consortium (2012) 
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Interviews with center DGs and financial staff highlighted costs incurred by centers that are 
more implicit and have not been charged to the CRPs, as part of overhead rates or direct 
costs. The issue is whether the increased reporting requirements, coordination demands 
and participation in CRP-level activities and meetings as well as system-level activities (like 
evaluations) are adequately reflected in the overhead rates, which are between 10 and 19%. 
Also, the lead center has higher indirect costs associated with responsibilities for a CRP than 
are reflected in the CRP budgets. However, there was no guidance at the time of the 
proposals as to what extent and how lead centers can charge different overhead rates. By 
choosing to charge a flat management fee, CIAT as lead center for CCAFS was an exception 
in that it is the only lead center that included in the CRP budget an overall “service charge” 
that captures the lead center resources needed for CCAFS management.    
Figure 7: CRP Management and Coordination Expenditures or Budgets 
(in $ million and % of total) 
Source: CRP Annual reports 2012 or budgets for 2013 (as received from CRP management) 
RQ 7.3. Composition of CRP management costs  
FINDING: 
• Although financial reports to the Consortium use standard classifications to capture
CRP management costs, the underlying expenses differ substantially for each CRP.
To develop findings on the question of CRP management efficiency, the review looked at 
budget information and financial statements for all CRPs and presents detailed information 
on four to further substantiate its findings.  
Table 11 provides an illustration of the varying composition of management expenses and 
highlights the challenge of developing review findings on the basis of totals and 
percentages. For each of the four selected CRPs, the underlying component elements of the 
2013 management budgets (expenditure 2012 for CCAFS) are shown as well as the 
aggregated costs reported to the Consortium.  
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“CRP Management and Coordination” for all CRPs is reported using a uniform, natural 
classification of expenditures (personnel, collaboration costs, supplies and services, 
operational travel, indirect costs).  The format does not reveal the management structures 
in place or the detail of their associated cost.  
As Table 11 makes clear, in the course of “rolling up” expenses to arrive at the natural 
classifications mentioned above, the CRPs include very different categories and attributed 
expenses, making simple comparisons based on the standard reports not meaningful.  
Some CRPs (GRiSP, RTB and WLE) include costs in their respective budgets that are not 
strictly management although the funds (e.g. a competitive grant program, capacity 
building) may be managed through the program management unit. There are CRPs that, in 
addition to the staff that comprise the program management unit, also report the salaries of 
a range of additional positions including theme leaders, regional coordinators, scientists and 
focal points. Also, CCAFS has 4.5 dedicated CRP management staff who are paid by bilateral 
funding.   By contrast, the AAS 2012 budget included only a portion of the CRP director’s 
salary. 
The table shows how little a single number and common set of classifications tell about the 
variety of underlying activities that are captured in management budgets:  
• 20% of GRiSP’s budget is related to science capacity building and thus scholarships
and trainings; 
• 40% of Dryland System’s budget is related to regional coordinators, reflecting a
regional strategic management function for that CRP 
• 13% of L&F budget is related to Theme Leaders and coordinators; a structure and
level of budget detailed observed with several CRPs. 
The table also shows the variety of ways lead centers charge CRPs for management services. 
On the one hand, IRRI charges GRiSP $0.263 million based on IRRI staff time spent on CRP 
issues but no overhead on GRiSP management budget. On the other hand, CIAT charges 
CCAFS fees that total of $1.7 million for management services. By comparison, ILRI charges 
17.5% overhead rate on L&F management costs.  
Table 11: Composition of CRP Management Budgets 
GRiSP 
2013 
Dryland Systems 
2013 
L&F 
2013 
CCAFS 
2012 (in line with 2013 
expected) 
Total expenditure 
(expected) in $ 
99 million 30 million 32 million 63 million 
Management in $ and  
% 
2.7 million 
2% 
1.6 million 
2% 
2.1 million 
7% 
3.4 million 
5% 
Reported as Programme 
Coordination and 
Director office 
and other 
CRP Management CIAT Coordinating Unit 
and CIAT Management 
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Capacity Building Governance Unit 
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT UNIT 
PMU staff Programme Director 
and small support 
group, 3 staff 
0.230 million 
8% 
0.325 million, 
3 staff 
20% 
Management 
office, 4 staff 
0.535 million 
30% 
CRP Director and 
coordinating unit staff, 7 
staff (4.5 staff paid by 
bilateral funding) 
0.890 million 
26% 
PMU operations 
(travel, office, Supplies 
and services) 
0.075 million 
3% 
0.187 million 
12% 
0.164 million 
9% 
0.630 million 
19% 
M&E M&E and Impact 
Assessment 
0.082 million 
3% 
Not included M&E and Impact 
Assessment 
0.250 
12% 
0.04 million for reviews 
Less than 1% 
GOVERNANCE AND PLANNING 
Governance 
committees 
Oversight Committee 
0.080 million 
3% 
SC 
ISAC 
RMC 
0.185 million 
12 % 
PPMC 
SPAC 
0.108 million 
5% 
ISP 
0.190 million 
6 % 
LEAD CENTER RESOURCES 
Lead center charges: General 
administrative 
support (based on 
time that IRRI staff 
spends on GRiSP) 
0.263 million 
10% 
ILRI overhead of 
17.5% applied, 
total of 0.310 
million 
15% overhead on 
coordinating unit and 
research carried out by 
CIAT for CCAFS 
Flat rate of 1.7 million, 
includes overhead for CIAT 
management on behalf of 
4 partner universities14 
OTHER BUDGET ITEMS 
Include…. Science Capacity 
Building 
0.551 million 
20% 
Regional 
Coordinators for 
5 Regions 
0.625 million 
40% 
Resource 
mobilization 
0.019 million 
Theme Leaders 
and VC 
Coordinators 
0.223 million 
13% 
 Source: Review team, based on information received from CRP/lead center finance staff. 
14 From 2014 onwards CIAT will charge a flat rate of $1 million. 
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RQ 7.6. Financial reporting 
FINDING: 
• While financial reporting is considered to be improving, it is still cumbersome and
current guidelines do not address new issues arising from CRPs.
The complexity of financial reporting for CRPs depends to a certain extent on the number of 
participating centers in any single CRP. Thus, CCAFS with 15 participating centers needs 
more coordination and consolidation than CRPs like WHEAT, MAIZE and Dryland Cereals 
with only two participating centers.  Financial reporting for the CRPs brings into relief the 
differences in timing and accounting systems among the centers.  The CGIAR One Common 
System (OCS) offers an eventual solution but currently depends on centers to elect to 
participate. 
Lead center boards are sensitive to the fiduciary responsibility they have for CRPs and the 
difficulty center auditors face in seeking assurance on financial figures from other centers.  
An additional problem is the lack of guidance with respect to CRP reporting and the fact that 
the existing guidelines do not clearly state what costs should be part of CRP management 
and coordination costs.     
Most of the reporting issues are under study and likely to show steady improvement.  
Implementation of the OCS is also anticipated to streamline reporting and build a more 
standard way to describe and capture CRPs’ financial realities. 
 RQ 7.7. Transaction costs 
FINDINGS: 
• CRPs have called on substantial commitments of time to operationalize the programs
and to put systems in place at the CRP and the system-levels and the level and
intensity of interaction have increased the cost of doing business.
• Collaborative programs that rely on substantive engagement with partners to build
relationships and align research activity have inherently higher transaction costs
than programs implemented by a single entity.
Excessive transaction costs were frequently cited in connection with the creation of CRPs, 
although the respondents to the management survey were almost evenly divided on the 
question.  The review kept the issue in mind when looking at the CRP governance costs, 
management budgets and center expenses and overhead.  One issue was whether 
transaction costs are excessive or unnecessary. 
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This section pulls together related data that appears in earlier sections that touch on the 
cost of doing business and where inefficiencies can be seen to exist.  It also looks at the 
“emotional” element of the subject, which surfaced in the interviews and in the surveys. 
To the emotional element, CRPs have called on substantial commitments of time to 
operationalize the programs and to put systems in place at the CRP and the system-levels.  
DGs and center board chairs, CRP leaders and management staff are engaged in a high level 
of interaction with their peers, with the Consortium, and partners.  The intensity of 
interaction, rather than specific examples of superfluous activity, factors into the sense that 
transaction costs associated with the CRPs and the start up of the Consortium are too high. 
Linked to the demands on the time and resources that planning and consultation require is 
the finding on the implicit costs of leading and participating in CRPs—what a DG described 
as the cost of being a good citizen—compounded with the front-end experience of CRP 
management that turns out not to have been budgeted or estimated correctly or 
consistently.  The current multiple levels of CRP governance are not viewed as efficient or 
effective.        
Financial and program reporting are agreed to have been burdensome and the 
requirements and timing inconsistent, and contracting processes were noted as 
cumbersome and an obstacle to working with non-CGIAR collaborators.  The creation of the 
CGIAR Fund did not eliminate bilateral funding and the reporting and potential evaluations 
associated with bilateral support continue, although reporting to bilateral donors was 
compared favorably by some center staff to reporting to the Consortium. There are efforts 
underway to streamline and rationalize CRP reporting of various kinds and the steady 
adoption of OCS will contribute to this process. 
A collaborative strategy that engages partners in meaningful and various ways has costs 
associated with it that are high and may be necessarily inefficient.  The review considers 
that the CRPs are too early in their development to assess what kinds of inefficiencies are to 
be expected and accepted, although partner engagement, consultation and consensus 
building are integral to the strategy.  Potentially more problematic are costs relative to the 
scale of a transaction.  CRP leaders discussed the challenges of disproportionate expenses or 
accountability mechanisms that attend smaller engagements with partners.  Centers 
themselves are reconsidering their engagement in specific CRPs as the cost of participation 
is weighed against the value of the research activities.  
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RQ 7.8. Management functions 
FINDINGS: 
• There is early evidence that indicates CRP management is functioning effectively to
build a sense of common purpose around goals and to increase research
collaboration across centers and with colleagues outside the CGIAR.
• The authority and ability to manage for results will be buttressed by the adoption of
a stronger and clearer results framework against which to plan and evaluate CRP
activity.
The interviews with center DGs, CRP leaders and research managers generated a steady 
acknowledgment that CRPs have brought research scientists across the CGIAR and 
colleagues from outside the CGIAR together in new and productive ways.  The management 
survey included a strong indicator that those involved in CRPs (82%) feel part of a CRP team 
working toward shared goals, and that roles and responsibilities for management within a 
CRP are clear (74.4%). 
Significant management challenges were noted earlier—the level and flow of funds from 
W1&2, navigating the process of managing for results in governance and management 
settings that involve too many layers of decision making or are dominated by lead centers or 
participating centers, and burdensome reporting.   
Although too early to assess, the CRP management budgets may not be the only area in 
which the requirements for effective management have been underestimated.  A comment 
in the survey, which was echoed in conversations, was “the amount of time spent on 
management has increased and the time for research has decreased.”  This may be a fair 
observation or it may indicate that CRPs require a set of management skills and a 
percentage of time on management tasks that may not be immediately available to 
managers.  The CRP leaders’ lack of participation in performance evaluation limits the ability 
to provide feedback and support that contributes to staff development in these areas.  As 
management teams begin to function, there is evidence that staff development is taking 
place.  A number of CRPs have invested in bringing management teams together to build 
skills and relationships.  AAS has begun to consider how to best structure its management 
team and improve communications.   
An important contribution to more effective management will be the development of 
system-level and program-level development outcomes.  CRP managers have collaborated 
with the Consortium on the development of a common framework that will support 
planning, partner engagement, resource allocation and evaluation.  The authority to 
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manage for results can be expected to be buttressed by a stronger and clearer results 
framework.        
7. CONCLUSIONS
From an organizational standpoint, the creation of a new CGIAR is a significant 
accomplishment, involving transformational change that has encompassed existing centers, 
donors, and partners, all levels of leadership and management, new programs, new 
partners, new donors and new expectations of performance.  Centers aligned thousands of 
activities along with their associated research expertise, financial resources and 
partnerships to 16 research programs.  Two new system-level pillars were created.  
Investment in the CGIAR has grown. 
The transformation reflected a consensus on a new strategic framework and the need for 
new ways of working.  CRPs are the principal vehicle for implementation of the new strategy 
and their effective and efficient governance and management will contribute to their 
looked-for success.    
However, change of the magnitude that has occurred within the CGIAR is deeply disruptive.  
Some of the disruption is by design, but much of it is attributable to unanticipated events 
(the suspension of W1&2 funding, slower than anticipated contributions to the Fund).  The 
Fund Council, the Consortium and the CRPs are actively moving past the start up phase and 
beginning to work as intended.  While the CRPs are designed to be time limited, they and 
the centers require some reasonable period of operational stability in which to implement 
plans, build partnerships, and measure results.  On the horizon is the second call for 
program proposals.  While this process is intended to incorporate lessons learned and allow 
for more coherence across the CRP portfolio, it will place demands on CRPs, centers, 
partners and other stakeholders at a time when the impact of other disruptions are just 
beginning to ebb. 
Three years into active implementation there is a body of experience that is informative 
about what is working and what is not, which issues involve small adjustments and which 
deserve a deeper look.  
Basis for Conclusions 
The CRP Governance and Management Review identified seven principal evaluation 
questions as well as criteria for the review. Table 1 (Chapter 3) shows the intersection of the 
criteria with the review questions.  In addition to accountability, efficiency and 
effectiveness, the review considered the extent to which the existing structures and 
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arrangements for CRP governance and management are transparent, legitimate, fair, and 
independent.   Independent in this context refers to the extent to which decision making 
and oversight remain unconstrained by conflicts of interest; it is not used in the review to 
designate an entity apart or separate from another body.   
Although the CRPs differ in research focus, scale, mix of funding, and the number of 
participating centers, the principal review questions and the criteria were considered to be 
broadly applicable to all of the CRPs.  Some of the review criteria are relevant for both 
governance and management, and in some areas, the conclusions in the review touch on 
more than one criterion.     
The review also sought to use a core set of definitions and a consistent set of terms to 
describe the governance and management structures associated with the CRPs.  The specific 
role and accountability of lead center boards for the performance of CRPs under 
agreements with the Consortium are acknowledged throughout the review, and reflected in 
the conclusions and the recommendations.  
The CGIAR and center boards have focused for many years on articulating the principles and 
practices of effective governance consistent with international standards for corporate 
governance.  The review relies on the CGIAR’s own guidelines in this area to frame the 
assessment of governance with respect to the CRPs, and references the CGIAR’s governance 
principles for Challenge Programs as informative to CRP governance bodies.     
Although the SRF provided guidance to centers in proposing CRP management and advisory 
structures, only a few of the CRPs strictly conform to the proposed structure.  The review 
was not intended to evaluate CRP governance and management structures for their 
compliance with the SRF.  As the ToR for the review makes clear the intent was to “take 
stock of experience so far, identify issues and provide lessons from existing CRPs and 
elsewhere which can be applicable in other CRPs.”  
Overall Conclusions 
CRP governance and management were intentionally designed to make use of existing 
structures and capacity rather than duplicate them unnecessarily.  The benefits of this 
strategy were evident for mobilizing research and management resources.  In general, the 
review found the basic accountability framework for CRPs to be functional.  The flow of 
accountability from the Fund Council to the Consortium to lead centers makes good use of 
the CGIAR’s corporate structure, allowing the research portfolio to change and evolve as 
results are achieved and new opportunities or challenges emerge.  The constellation of 
governance bodies closest to the CRPs is less functional. 
In addition to finding the basic accountability framework functional, the review also found 
the shortcomings of the current accountability structure, including the conflicts of interest 
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that currently exist for center boards with respect to the CRPs they lead, to be manageable.  
Rather than recommending a shift in accountability for CRP performance to the 
Consortium Board, which has fewer inherent conflicts than center boards, the review 
concluded that there exists within the present array of CRP governance structures 
examples of effective arrangements for minimizing these risks that can be adapted to 
meet the needs of both lead centers and CRPs for effective governance and oversight.   
This conclusion which leads to refining and strengthening CRP governance within the 
present accountability structure avoids the disruption that would accompany a shift in 
accountability directly to the Consortium Board; it also avoids upending existing 
agreements, which risks distracting from the ongoing management of CRPs and eroding the 
good will of the centers with respect to the Consortium.        
The review validated broad support for the underlying intent and strategy of the new 
CGIAR and a positive sense that new and more collaborative research was underway.  The 
Review highlighted though the need for clarifying and streamlining CRP governance and 
management functions to reduce the demands on human and financial resources as well as 
facilitate meaningful partner engagement. 
Although the review could see where the roles and relationships of the Fund Council, 
Consortium and CGIAR centers are evolving as the new CGIAR gathers speed, all three parts 
of the structure are integral to achieving the goals embodied in the SRF.  The Phase 2 
Review of CGIAR Governance considered the strengths and weaknesses of these 
relationships.  The Mid-Term review will look more closely at larger organizational issues; 
the CRP review considered the roles and relationships of the CGIAR’s principal institutional 
actors as the context within which CRPs operate.  Many people made the point that CRPs 
cannot be seen in isolation; they are programs being implemented by institutions to 
achieve institutional goals.  
Governance 
• The carefully delineated legal framework laying out accountability for CRPs and their
performance has given rise to an acute awareness of boundaries—between the Fund
Council and the Consortium, between the Consortium and lead centers, and
between lead centers and program participants.
• The shift in investment from centers to programs as well as uncertainty about the
levels and flow of W1&2 funds have heightened the sense of risk on the part of
centers and raised concerns about a loss of standing within the system as a whole.
• The establishment of the Fund and the growth in overall investment in the CGIAR is a
more positive narrative than the internal conversation about the relative roles of the
Fund Council, Fund Office, Consortium and the centers in mobilizing resources would
indicate.  While levels of W1&2 may continue to grow, bilateral funding will continue
to be an important part of overall funding for CRPs and the system.  There is an
opportunity to develop a better and more integrated strategy for resource
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mobilization that moves beyond current roles and boundaries, and builds on the 
evident capacity across the system and at all levels to mobilize resources.  
• The dominant role of centers, in particular lead centers, in CRP governance and
management may be attributable to the level of center resources committed to the 
CRPs, but it negatively affects the legitimacy of decision making.  In addition to 
raising issues of conflicts of interest, it risks creating imbalances in influence and 
authority among centers and partners, and contributes to the insufficient 
participation of women and the failure to include at meaningful levels the 
perspectives of key stakeholders, including partners and individuals from target 
regions.         
• Strategic oversight of CRPs could be effectively provided by a single CRP governance
body with a balanced, independent character that supports the accountability of the 
lead center board for the performance of the program.  A number of CRPs currently 
have such an arrangement in place and the review concluded these to be highly 
functional.  
Management 
• By drawing on existing center resources, CRPs have brought together the human and
administrative capacity to launch and manage the programs.  Even playing relatively
new and multiple roles, research staff reported the ability to navigate their
respective roles in centers and CRPs.
• As currently structured and reported, it is impossible to determine CRPs’ core
management and coordination costs or to make comparisons across CRPs.  The
inclusion of staff costs and the characterization of administrative expenses vary
widely, leaving even a comparison of management expenses based on percentages
of total budgets subject to doubt.
• The management accountability and reporting structures in place for CRP leaders do
not provide CRP management with the clarity and authority to manage for results.  If
CRPs are intended to build and leverage partnerships to achieve results, the CRP
leader should not be accountable to a single partner for performance.  The scope of
authority and accountability for performance would be clearer if the reporting line
for the CRP leader flowed through a balanced and independent CRP governance
body responsible only for the performance of the CRP.
Conclusions:  CRP Governance 
CRP governance should be simplified to clarify roles and increase effectiveness and 
efficiency.  The multiple bodies that have developed in connection with CRPs have 
overlapping roles and frequently consolidate decision making with respect to priority setting 
and resource allocation within lead and participating centers.   
Too few of the CRP governance bodies bring independence and legitimacy to the 
governance function.  The dominance of lead and participating centers in CRP governance 
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bodies presents conflicts of interest as well as the potential for bias in favor of maintaining 
the status quo.  It was surprising to see the data on the lack of inclusiveness of CRP 
governing bodies, and then to have survey respondents indicate substantial satisfaction with 
the efforts to include women and individuals from target regions on these bodies.  Given 
the focus and intent of the SRF, a CRP governance body with no women or a very small 
minority of women cannot be said to have legitimacy; similarly, a CRP governance body 
that lacks the inclusion of individuals from target regions also fails in this regard.  
CRP governance bodies must balance their capacity to engage in effective oversight and 
decision making with the need to bring balance and perspective to their work.  The 
standards that guide center boards, which emphasize the need to incorporate these 
features, provided a touchstone for the review. 
One of the benefits of a balanced CRP governance body is the assurance it provides to 
partners and other stakeholders that the playing field is level and that priority setting, 
resource allocation, and evaluation are focused on the CRP and its purposes and not on 
other interests.    
The review also considered the challenges that a center board faces in balancing the 
interests of the center with those of the CRP and found most lead center boards lacked an 
adequate mechanism within the CRP governance bodies that would preserve their 
accountability and also manage the risk of real or potential conflicts of interest.  
Particularly for programs that are intended to engage partners at every level, governance 
bodies must protect the confidence of partners in the legitimacy and fairness of decision-
making.  This is particularly true when governance bodies cannot reasonably bring all 
stakeholders and interested parties to the table.  The composition of governing bodies 
needs to convey a balance of perspectives and also a balance of interests.  In the same way 
that a board relies on outside auditors as an important mechanism for assuring financial 
accountability, lead center boards would benefit from a CRP governance mechanism that 
both balances the legitimate interests of centers, partners and stakeholders, and supports 
independent decision making.  These goals are not in conflict with maintaining the lead 
center boards’ fiduciary responsibilities with respect to program performance.  
In assessing the current array of governance bodies surrounding CRPs, it was clear that it 
was possible to put an independent, balanced governance body in place and to have it 
function effectively.  Humidtropics, CCAFS, GRiSP, WLE and AAS, for example, have 
balanced and independent bodies in place, and the structures forming at other CRPs have 
the potential to play this role if composed and authorized to do so.  There was evidence 
that these structures can bring value to a range of CRPs, and that the composition of the 
CRP governance body did not need to be rigidly fixed in order for it to be balanced, nor 
exclude center representation to be independent.  Most of these bodies include a role for 
the lead center and partners.     
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Conclusions:  CRP Management 
If CRPs are intended to build and leverage partnerships to achieve results, the CRP leader 
should not be accountable to a single partner for performance.  Similarly, if partnership is 
a critical element in the successful realization of the SRF, clear accountability for an 
effective partnership strategy, that includes centers as well as other partners, should rest 
with CRP leadership and management.   
The role of CRP leaders also needs to be clarified to distinguish it from the hierarchy and 
reporting lines of center management.  CRP leaders need the authority and independence 
to manage for results.  Management authority and independence are difficult to achieve 
when the lead center DG or center senior management construes the relationship with the 
CRP leader to be supervisory.  CRPs would benefit from a management structure 
comparable to the Challenge Program model in which management accountability flows 
through an independent governance body to the lead center. 
The review does not discount or fail to appreciate the collaborative and collegial working 
relationships that currently exist between CRP and center leaders.  Nevertheless, the review 
considers the current reporting line for CRP leaders to be a structural weakness worth 
remedying. Even with positive working relationships in place, most of the CRP leaders had 
experienced a moment when their authority was tested, or could envision the 
circumstances.   
At present, each CRP incorporates different expenses into its management budget and 
covers other management costs through center overhead and within program agreements.  
The lack of transparency for management costs is a challenge to accountability.  It makes 
it impossible to benchmark these costs or to make reasonable comparisons across CRPs on 
their relative efficiency.  It also inhibits the ability to learn across CRPs about how different 
structures and their costs can add to overall performance.  Efforts should be made to 
harmonize the core features of a CRP management structure, capture the cost of CRP 
management and coordination more fully, and report these costs consistently.   
The current accounting of management costs also preserves an illusion of efficiency.  It 
presents as reasonable that holding expenses at a modest percentage of the total budget 
signals efficiency.  In reality, management costs do not always rise or fall in step with 
changes to the total budget.  As it now stands, some CRP budgets incorporate a core group 
of positions in the management structure; others recognize very few.  A number of CRPs 
include in their management budgets program funding that is administered directly from 
within the program management unit.  For CRPs like GRiSP, Wheat and Maize, there is close 
to a one-to-one relationship between the CRPs and the centers’ existing research programs.  
While the research programs are now within the CRPs, the management of those activities 
is accounted for elsewhere. None of these variations seems to result in management 
budgets that exceed 3-4% or fall much below that percentage. 
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The good news coming from the review is that despite the difficulty of capturing the costs of 
management, there is a consensus that the research and administrative resources available 
to the CRPs are sufficient.  There is also evidence that CRPs have generated more 
collaborative research work across the centers and with colleagues from partner 
organizations than in the past.  Although evaluations of the CRPs by IEA will look at priority 
setting and research results, the review surfaced positive feedback from CRP managers that 
they feel a part of teams contributing to common goals, although stretched by reporting 
and other management tasks that limit their direct involvement in research activities.  
Efforts to harmonize budgeting, research structures and reporting are underway and should 
continue to build coherence and a common vocabulary for doing business.  While 
economies may be achieved through these efforts and accountability improved, 
collaborative programs that rely on substantive engagement with partners to build 
relationships and align research activity have inherently higher transaction costs than 
programs implemented by a single entity.  The nature of the CRPs may inherently increase 
transaction costs compared to the former CGIAR because of the investments needed to 
engage partners, build capacity, and achieve development outcomes.  The value and cost of 
managing for these results should be acknowledged, measurable, and susceptible to 
comparison.  
Conclusions:  Crosscutting issues 
Resource mobilization 
Resource mobilization and resource allocation featured in the review in multiple contexts: 
• As a constraint on CRP priority setting and resource allocation,
• As a strategic issue that needs to leverage the potential for more complementary
and collaborative work between the Fund Council and centers, and
• As an element in the institutional resilience and sustainability of centers
The review considered the question of whether resource mobilization and resource 
allocation support effective planning and implementation.  In general, the current level of 
bilateral funding, and the extent to which CRPs still rely upon it, is a constraint on 
effective planning and implementation but one that most centers and CRPs continue to 
accommodate.  There is a legitimate concern that centers’ priorities for fund raising are not 
always aligned with particular CRPs.  And, there was a broader concern with the way in 
which W1 funds are allocated and a lack of clarity about the basis for the allocations.  In 
combination, these factors influenced planning for the CRPs, making it difficult to pursue 
multi-year strategies and also to commit to partners when the uncertainty about the timing, 
levels and sources of funding combine as they have as the CRPs begin.  This is at least 
partially addressed by the new 2014-2015 Financing Plan.   
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CRP funding is likely to continue to include a combination of W1&2 and bilateral support, 
but the balance of that support will be critical to the success of the SRF.  W1&2 funding and 
multi-year support provide the CGIAR and the CRPs with the most flexibility to leverage 
change and accelerate the implementation of research linked to the SRF.  W1&2 funding 
also facilitates coherence across the CRPs and builds a sense of shared ownership of the 
SRF.  These are compelling reasons to assure that all CRPs enjoy a minimum level of W1&2 
funding.  Trying to accelerate implementation of the SRF and build coherence across the 
portfolio will be more difficult if bilateral funding continues to be 70 percent or higher of a 
CRP’s budgeted resources. 
Resource mobilization and allocation also enter into the relationship of the centers with the 
Fund Council and the Consortium.  While overall resources have doubled over the last five 
years and the Fund Council annually increases the funds available through the Fund, there 
is an inordinate level of internal strife and dissatisfaction over resource mobilization.  The 
thinking at the beginning of the reform process about who would take the lead in mobilizing 
resources and who would step back has not turned out exactly as planned, and yet 
investments in the CGIAR have climbed.  
The review considers that there is an opportunity to rethink how investment in the CGIAR 
is viewed and to reframe the resource mobilization strategy in support of the SRF in a 
more complementary and strategic way.  The current tenor of the conversation about 
resource mobilization, the allocation of Windows 1&2 and bilateral funding risks becoming 
entrenched and divisive. 
Challenges to Centers 
While the CRPs are often referred to as joint ventures, the review considers the new 
structure of the CGIAR, involving the Fund Council, the Consortium, the centers and 
partners, as something comparable and that parallels the development of CRPs in many 
respects.  In addition to the resolution of how resource mobilization will be “parsed” in 
terms of roles and relationships, the partners need to consider issues of fairness.  The Fund 
Council, Consortium and centers share a commitment to a common set of ambitious and 
urgent goals, but their roles are not entirely complementary or in equilibrium at this stage 
of the new CGIAR’s development. 
The review accepts the view, articulated with some consistency by the centers that the 
success of the CRPs relies on a stable network of institutions.  The role of the centers in 
relationship to the CRPs is not just as fiduciaries or as fiscal agents.  The centers bring 
reputation, a critical mass of research capacity (human and physical), global and regional 
relationships and the corporate structures necessary to the implementation of a 
programmatic strategy.  While it may be true that other research organizations may at some 
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point be eligible for support from the Fund, those institutions will have the same need the 
centers have to maintain their organizational stability and currency.     
The financial stability of centers is in the vital interests of CRPs and the success of the 
CGIAR strategy.  If the Fund chooses not to be the investor of choice for this kind of funding, 
centers need the flexibility to raise bilateral funding outside the CRPs.  
The Genebanks CRP 
The review included the Genebanks CRP and noted relevant findings on particular review 
questions.   The review considered the Genebanks CRP to be effectively managed and for 
the current governance and accountability structure to be adequate.  In late 2013, three 
representatives, elected by the 11 gene bank managers, were added to the CRP 
Management Committee, which improves stakeholder engagement at that level.    
More generally, the Genebanks CRP is an example of an investment in system-wide assets, 
such as research databases and potential high value investments in research facilities or 
capacities that enable world-class research to continue to be conducted through the CRPs. 
The review recommends that a more comprehensive effort be undertaken to determine 
relevant lessons learned from the Genebanks CRP. 
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
The review offers eight recommendations that relate to CRP governance and management, 
and center and system-level issues that relate to the overall success of the CGIAR’s 
programmatic strategy.  (A recommendation in an earlier draft of the review with respect to 
the composition of the Genebanks CRP’s management committee was made redundant by 
changes adopted by the CRP in late 2013.)   
The review noted earlier in the report the dynamic nature of this period in the CGIAR 
system. Even as the review was underway, issues identified as relevant to it were the focus 
of ongoing efforts at problem solving and continuous improvement.  The challenges of 
financial accountability with multiple partners and new reporting systems are being steadily 
addressed in a cooperative fashion between the centers and the Consortium, including 
clearer, more consistent reporting and improvements to audit processes.   On the program 
side, the ongoing development of system-level outcomes linked to the SRF and aligned with 
a common framework for program-level outcomes should lead to clearer accountability for 
performance between the Consortium, the centers and the CRPs.  The Phase 2 Review of 
CGIAR Governance, which overlapped with this review, included findings and 
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recommendations of relevance to it.  Finally, the efforts to develop guidelines for the 
second round of program proposals reflect substantial lessons learned that coincide with 
findings in this review. 
With this in mind, the recommendations focus on matters of CRP governance and 
management that remain outstanding and where the review can offer value to the 
programs as they currently operate and as planning begins for the next program cycle.   
Basis for the recommendations 
The recommendations are informed by the need to: 
• streamline structures,
• strengthen the legitimacy of decision making,
• provide CRP leaders with the authority to manage for results,
• strengthen accountability and transparency, and
• recognize the need to sustain the institutional capacity of centers.
The review also looked at the underlying diversity of the CRPs and how this diversity should 
inform governance and management structures.  The recommendations are intended to 
highlight a core group of principles that support good governance and effective 
management rather than a rigid set of structures. 
Governance Recommendations 
1. Create a single, balanced governing body for each CRP that reports directly to the
lead center board on the performance of the program.  The CRP governance body
should bring together appropriate expertise, include a majority of independent
expert members, and accommodate lead center and partner representation.
The recommendation creates a more effective and efficient structure for providing
immediate accountability and support for priority setting, resource allocation and
evaluation of the CRPs.  A CRP leader would be directly accountable to this body for
performance.  A single, balanced, expert and independent body assures donors,
partners and stakeholders that no interests but the best interests of the program will
shape deliberations.  It assures lead center boards of an independent mechanism for
assuring program performance and maintains their accountability function in the
current program agreements.   Five CRPs have such CRP governance bodies in place
(Humidtropics, AAS, GRiSP, WLE, CCAFS); one (RTB) is in formation.  These comprise
a broad variety of CRPs in terms of their focus (commodity, system, NRM) and the
complexity of their underlying partnerships.  Other CRPs have an existing governance
body that can adjust its composition, leadership, or reporting process to meet this
recommendation.  The recommendation eliminates duplicative structures and
contributes to more efficient decision making.  It does not mandate a size or a
78 
Review of CRP Governance and Management 
Independent  
Evaluation 
Arrangement 
iea.cgiar.org 
formula for composition in order to assure that, although there is a common 
structure, there is the flexibility to tailor the body to the needs of individual CRPs, 
lead centers and partners.  A suggested structure and terms of reference for the 
recommended CRP governance body are outlined in Table 12 at the end of the 
document.  
Responsibility for action:  Consortium Board 
Timing:  2015 renewal of program plans  
2. Assure transparency in the work of CRP governance bodies by making available on
CRP websites the names of members and their qualifications, posting meeting
agendas and minutes, and otherwise sharing information that builds confidence in
the basis and quality of decision making.
Because a balanced and independent governing body cannot reasonably include the
full representation of partners and stakeholders, it is important to conduct business
in a transparent fashion in order to maintain confidence in the legitimacy and
fairness of decision making.  A number of CRPs currently include this information on
their websites.
Responsibility for action:  Governing body chairs, CRP leaders 
Timing:  Immediately with endorsement of the recommendation 
3. Institute policy and decision-making mechanisms for managing conflicts of interest
at the governance and management levels of CRPs.
Such mechanisms are considered good practice and reflected in the guidelines and
policies of center boards.  CRP governance and management bodies should adopt
practices comparable to those that guide center boards in these areas.  For CRP
management teams, which draw heavily on center research and management staff,
these practices should also facilitate more efficient decision making.  A number of
CRPs have adopted policies and decision-making mechanisms of this kind.  Broader
implementation offers the opportunity for CRPs to compare their policies and
practices in this area and identify which have been effective and workable.
Responsibility for action:  Consortium Board
Timing:  2015 renewal of program plans
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Management Recommendations 
4. Strengthen the authority of the CRP leader to manage for results:
• place the reporting line and accountability for performance with the CRP
governing body included in Recommendation 1,
• give CRP leaders the authority to establish appropriate management and
program advisory arrangements,
• institute a formal role in the performance evaluation of CRP program
managers and coordinators employed by centers.
The recommendation creates a line of authority for a CRP starting with the lead 
center board and continuing through the CRP governance body to the CRP’s 
leadership.  It strengthens and clarifies the role of the CRP leader and the authority 
needed to manage for results.  CRP leaders would have the flexibility to put 
management and program advisory structures in place that are responsive to 
program and partnership needs.   A component of the authority to manage for 
results is a role in the evaluation of management team members.   
The recommendation has been revised from the initial draft to reflect the current 
diversity of senior research leaders involved in CRP management, principally DDGs, 
and the accountability for hiring and staff performance that rests with a center DG to 
whom these positions are direct reports.  (An equivalent situation occurs when CRP 
research managers are employed by organizations outside the CGIAR.)  The revised 
recommendation includes the CRP leader as an important input to performance 
evaluation in these circumstances as this input supports the overall quality of 
management for which the CRP leader is accountable.  
Shifting the line of accountability from the lead center DG (or DDG) to a CRP 
governance body is not at odds with the employment arrangements in place for the 
CRPs.  Research and program staff hired for CRPs are now “hosted” by centers (not 
always the lead center) for employment purposes and are considered managed by 
and accountable to CRP leaders for their performance.  The recommendation is also 
not at odds with the lead center’s accountability for program performance.  This 
particular accountability mechanism does not need to extend to the CRP leader’s 
performance if there is clear accountability for performance through a CRP 
governance body.   
Responsibility for action:  Consortium Board 
Timing: Guidance for CRP Second Call (2015) 
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5. Establish uniform guidelines that harmonize CRP management budgets, including
staff costs attributed to program administration, coordination of key functions,
and research management, to reflect the legitimate costs of program management
and to better assess management efficiency and effectiveness.
The CRP proposal process contained limited instructions for preparation of
management budgets.  Consequently, some CRPs outlined comprehensive staffing
plans with associated costs, and others relied on a percentage calculation of the total
projected CRP budget to estimate the cost of managing the programs.  Budget
development and accounting systems should provide sufficient uniformity to make
useful comparisons across CRPs and centers, and to benchmark CGIAR expenses
against comparable research or multi-stakeholder programs.
Responsibility for action:  Consortium Board
Timing: Guidance for CRP Second Call (2015)
Center and CGIAR System 
6. Resolve the outstanding issue of maintaining center financial reserves through a
prudent and equitable system-level agreement between the Fund Council and the
Consortium on the use of W1&2 funds with respect to reserves.
It is in the long-term interests of the CGIAR to assure that the centers as the
institutional framework for the CRPs have the resiliency and financial stability to
deliver results at the level and within the timeframes projected.  Although the
uncertainty about the levels and timing of W1&2 funding are being resolved, this
does not wholly address the broader need for the CGIAR’s own funding to play a role
in assuring the financial stability of the institutional framework that underlies the
CRPs.  The recommendation does not address the issue of a CRP reserve for W1
funds or relate in any way to the idea of centralizing the management of existing
center reserves.
Responsibility for action:  Fund Council/Consortium Board
Timing:  Coincident with the renewal of CRPs through 2017
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7. Create guidelines that increase transparency and encourage the alignment of
resource mobilization on the part of centers for activities that strengthen centers’
capacity to achieve the SRF, or for purposes consistent with center mandates but
outside CRPs.
While there remains a strong rationale and motivation to bring as many donors as
possible into the Fund, there are likely to be limits to the resources available to the
centers through the Fund as well as donors who elect to fund centers directly.  Some
centers currently pursue bilateral support for the purposes included in the
recommendation; others do not.  The recommendation brings forward the idea that
centers can be partners and major investors in CRPs and committed to achieving the
SRF, while also maintaining their institutional stability, and the flexibility to invest in
and renew facilities and infrastructure as part of long term planning.  Similarly,
centers, consistent with their mandates, should be able to contribute to regional
priorities outside the SRF as well as center-specific opportunities or needs.  To avoid
conflicts between these activities and broader efforts to increase the size of the
CGIAR Fund and the number of donors to it, clear guidelines as well as transparency
about these transactions are needed.
Responsibility for action:  Fund Council/Consortium Board
Timing: immediately, with endorsement of the recommendation
8. Evaluate the Genebanks CRP for lessons learned on investing in system-wide
research assets.
The review generated limited findings, conclusions and a recommendation for the
governance and management of the Genebanks CRP, noting its differences from the
research CRPs.  Over the course of the review, the CRP was consistently viewed by
stakeholders as an example of a critical system-level investment.  The
recommendation is intended to generate lessons learned about the value of such
investments, and how best to structure them.
Responsibility for action:  Fund Council/Consortium Board
Timing: 2016, prior to the CGIAR system-level evaluation
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Table 12: Suggested structure for CRP governance body 
The CRP governing body’s responsibilities should include: 
• strategic oversight of the program, including priority setting and the evaluation of
results 
• overseeing external evaluations of CRP programs and activities
• maintaining awareness of stakeholder perspectives and needs
• serving as the direct report for the CRP leader and conducting an annual performance
review (and overseeing the selection process when necessary)
• reporting at least annually to the lead center’s board through the lead center board
chair or the chair of the board’s program committee
• serving as an expert resource to the CRP and the senior management team
The CRP governing body’s composition should include: 
• a majority of external members
• individuals known and respected for their professional expertise
• a balance in gender
• geographic balance with representation from CRP target regions
• participating center, partner and stakeholder representation
• ex officio representation of the lead center DG and CRP leader
The size of the governing body should be functional, enabling participation and making 
management and support of the body reasonable for CRP management. 
The CRP governing body’s members appointment should be as follows: 
• Members should be appointed by the lead center board for a fixed term, with a single
option for renewal at the recommendation of the governing body 
• the chair should be an independent member elected by members of the governing body
for a fixed term 
• The basis for including partners or stakeholder representatives should be clearly
articulated with the expectation that representative members will participate in their 
individual capacity and minimize both conflicts of interest and the appearance of 
conflicts of interest 
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TERMS OF REFERENCE 
FOR 
THE REVIEW OF CRP GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 
1. Background
The Context: In December 2009, the CGIAR adopted a new institutional model designed to improve 
delivery of appropriate research for development results in a changing global environment. The core 
institutional elements of the new CGIAR are the CGIAR Fund and the CGIAR Consortium each with 
their own decision making boards and secretariats. The Independent Science and Partnership Council 
(ISPC) provides advice to the Fund Council through appraisal of the CRP Proposals and of strategies 
and plans for the CGIAR as a whole and individual programs. The Independent Evaluation 
Arrangement (IEA) has been established, with the mandate of leading the implementation of the 
CGIAR Policy for Independent External Evaluation. There are also arrangements for coordinated 
internal audit. 
The new CGIAR emphasizes a more results-oriented research agenda, clearer accountability across the 
CGIAR, partnerships and a strengthened programmatic approach through mega programs called 
CGIAR Research programs (CRPs). The Strategy and Results Framework (SRF) agreed in 2011 
provides the overall framework for the design of the CRPs. Restructuring CGIAR research work in 
CRPs is intended to ensure CGIAR research and capacity building is concentrated in areas of CGIAR 
comparative advantage and enhance collaborative research among the Centers and with partners, 
(recognising the need for innovative collaborative arrangements and multi-disciplinarity in tackling 
the ever growing issues in agricultural development in G77 countries, particularly the poorest 
countries).  
15 CRPs have been developed as the main organizational mechanism for planning and conducting 
research within the following themes:  
• Improve yields and profits of crops, fish, and livestock
• improve sustainability and environmental integrity, adapt to and mitigate climate change
• improve the productivity, profitability, sustainability, and resilience of entire farming systems
• improve policies and markets
• improve nutrition and diets.
In addition, a Research program for all CGIAR Centers has been specifically established for 
“Managing and Sustaining Crop Collections” which is managed by the Crop Diversity Trust Fund. 
"A Strategy and Results Framework for the CGIAR" (SRF) outlines a set of principles for the design 
of CRPs and identifies the main governance and management arrangements for each CRP. The Joint 
Agreement which is signed by the Fund Council and the CGIAR Consortium gives the framework for 
the submission and approval of CRP proposals and the transfer and use of funds from the CGIAR 
Fund for implementation of CRPs. The CGIAR Consortium and the Fund Council enter into 
Consortium Performance Agreements (CPA) for the delivery of research through the portfolio of 
CRPs. The CGIAR Consortium in turn enters into Program Implementation Agreements (PIAs) with 
the Lead Centers of CRPs to implement the CRPs. These contractual arrangements are meant to 
strengthen accountability and the delivery of research results. Not all Centers are Lead Centers and 
most Centers are involved in several CRPs to varying degrees.  
1 
The Issues: Each CRP has developed its own governance and management model, with structures and 
mechanisms covering all or partially oversight and strategic functions, scientific advice and 
management. All CRPs are “led” by a CRP leader whose time is mostly or entirely dedicated to CRP 
management. The initial budget of each CRP allotted by the Fund Council to the Consortium, is then 
allocated by the Consortium to the Lead Centers. The role of Centers’ governance and management 
structures, in particular those of the Lead Center, in the governance and management of the CRP vary 
greatly among the CRPs, in part due to the limited guidance with regards to governance and 
management in the SRF.  
In the overall CGIAR architecture, the CRP governance and management structures run in parallel 
with Centers’ governance and management structures in a way that forms a complex governance and 
management matrix framework. The composition of governance bodies, the role of the Lead Center 
management in CRP management, size of management teams, management arrangements at country 
and regional levels all vary between CRPs and to some extent need to, given the diverse characteristics 
of the CRPs with respect to typology of research, number of Centers involved, geographical spread 
and extent of the budget for work in the area of the CRP which is covered from central CGIAR 
funding (Windows 1&2).  
While it needs to be recognized that the CGIAR institutional arrangements, including the CRPs, are 
only now settling into full functionality, a number of issues in CRP management and governance have 
begun to emerge partly due to the often complex governance and management structures of the CRPs 
and the large distribution of decision making authority among the different stakeholders. These issues 
can have negative results for: unity of strategic direction; managerial, research and governance 
efficiency; both financial and research risk management; accountability and the extent of donor and 
beneficiary confidence; and for the image which the CGIAR communicates to a larger world.  
Perceived issues which have emerged but remain to be verified, include those related to: 
• Problems for both management and external governance resulting from lack of definition of roles
and overlapping of roles at the level of the Consortium, the CRP, Lead Center and the
managements and Boards of other participating Centers;
• Meaningful involvement of a wider group of stakeholders beyond the CGIAR in oversight and
external governance;
• Clarity on management responsibility, including budget allocation, particularly the allocation of
Window 1 funding and HR selection and performance assessment, between Center managements
and CRP managements;
• In both overall oversight and governance, overlaps in execution of their mandates by the Fund
Council and Consortium with respect to CRPs, including on budget allocation;
• System difficulties for both managers and oversight functions in accounting for expenditures
against individual research objectives as distinct from organizational units and categories of
expenditure (e.g. personnel and travel);
• Lack of financial, partnership and research risk identification and management frameworks;
• Managing the interface between CRP budgets and those for maintenance of infrastructure and
reserve funds;
• Managing the interface and/or input to CRPs of project funds mobilized bilaterally by Centers for
specific purposes;
• Managing the boundaries amongst the CRPs
• Current capacity of internal and external oversight functions (RBM, Monitoring, Evaluation,
Audit).
Ongoing and Completed Studies in CGIAR Governance and Management: Recognizing the need 
for overall improvements in governance and senior management functions for the CGIAR as a whole a 
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number of initiatives have been undertaken and are at present underway. These include: 
 
• A Governance review has been commissioned jointly between the Fund Council and Consortium. 
It is supported by a Governance Reference Group with joint membership between the Fund 
Council and Consortium. The report of Phase 1 which covered most aspects of governance and 
senior management functions was completed in February 2013. A series of inputs and workshops 
were provided for this by the Consortium and Centers, the Fund Council Secretariat and by the 
ISPC. Phase 1 identified the governance and management of CRPs as an issue. Phase 2 has been 
contracted to Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) and is intended be concluded in July 2013. It is 
compliance oriented and concentrates on:" 
 
o Determining to what extent the CGIAR governance bodies (the Consortium board, Center 
Boards and Fund Council are following the requirements imposed by the CGIAR System 
agreements, i.e. are in compliance, and the effectiveness of their internal governance) 
o Reviewing whether the CGIAR governance bodies have made Board and executive 
management decisions with respect to governance and internal controls that were not 
consistent with the CGIAR System requirements and internal policies and review the 
impact of such decisions; 
o Determining any areas in which these CGIAR governance bodies are not meeting 
accepted best practices in corporate governance and internal controls including 
nomination and appointment of Center Board members, segregation of duties and roles 
within Board Committee members, performance appraisal of Center Heads by Boards, 
Risk Management Strategies; 
o Reviewing the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the CGIAR governance bodies 
(priority setting, approach to risk including financial risk); 
o Reviewing the efficiency and effectiveness of the training provided to the members of the 
Consortium board and Center Boards; 
o Evaluating the collective competencies of members of the Consortium Board, Center 
Boards and Fund Council"1. 
 
• Audit committee working group functioning under the auspices of the Consortium and is 
prioritizing issues including the internal audit arrangements for CRPs; 
• The Governance Risk and Compliance Committee which is an ad-hoc sub-committee of the 
Consortium Board and comprises Consortium Board members, the CEO and Center Board Chairs; 
• A Governance and Management Review of the CRP Climate Change Agriculture and Food 
Security2. This CRP which grew out of a Challenge Program, which had a well developed 
governance and management structure was found by the reviewers to have valuable lessons for 
application in other CRPs. 
• The audits of implementation and management of the CRPs which are conducted by the CGIAR 
Internal Audit Unit (IAU), for example the one of CRP 3.3. (Global Rice Science Partnership) 
which is currently undertaken with a report expected for beginning of July 2013 
 
2. Purpose of the Review 
 
The Review of CRP Governance and Management was requested by the Consortium and approved by 
the Fund Council as part of the IEA workplan for 2013.  
 
Building on existing studies and inputs, the Review will take stock of experience so far, identify issues 
and provide lessons from existing CRPs and elsewhere which can be applicable in other CRPs. 
Recommendations will include the definition of common basic principles and good practices for CRP 
1 Request for proposal for Phase 2 of the CGIAR Governance Review Commissioned by the CGIAR Consortium 
and the Fund Council 17 December 2012 
2 Maureen K Robinson and Brian P Flood May 1 2013 
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governance and management. The Review will provide an early informative assessment to be used in 
the preparation in 2014 for the next CRP programming cycle. 
 
Timing of the Review means that it will be able to draw on Phase 2 findings of the wider Governance 
Review referred to above and due for completion in July 2013. The CRP governance and management 
review will be specific to CRPs and by addressing financial and human resource management, will 
deepen the insights with particular emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness of governance and 
executive management for efficient delivery of appropriate research and capacity development 
outputs. 
 Noting, however that the effectiveness of research clearly lies beyond the mandate of the Review.    
 
The primary stakeholders in the Review are the CGIAR Consortium and Fund Council, the CRPs 
and Centers and other partners which are involved in the CRPs.  
 
3. Scope of the Review 
The Review will cover governance and executive management structures and functions of all 16 CRPs 
including the Genebanks Research Program. It will document and assess for each CRP: 
• how clearly the roles and responsibilities in decision making are articulated and carried out 
in practice (including gaps, overlaps, ambiguities and healthy complementarities) with respect to: 
(i) Scientific direction and management; (ii) Resource mobilization; (iii) Budget and financial 
management; and (iv) Human Resource Management by: 
• The Fund Council and Consortium Board and their respective secretariats; 
• The Lead Center Board, Trustees and senior management; 
• The Boards and senior managements of participating Centers in addition to the Lead Centers; 
• Other participating partners; 
• The CRP management, any internal CRP committee and any external CRP governing, 
guidance or advisory body; 
• Oversight functions internal and external (Audit, RBM, Monitoring, Evaluation). 
• positive and negative features of existing arrangements particularly as they affect: 
• The strategic direction and coherence of the CRP; 
• The efficiency, relevance and effectiveness of research; 
• Effective external communication and resource mobilization; 
• Inclusiveness of stakeholders; 
• Conflict avoidance and resolution; 
• The minimization of risks and transparency on (scientific, financial and human resources) 
consistent with efficient and effective functioning; 
• Transparency on, and minimization of, conflict of interest; 
• Consistency with recognized good practice. 
 
A preliminary checklist of issue areas is provided as Annex 1 to the ToRs. A detailed matrix of 
questions will be developed in Phase 1 of the Review. 
 
4. Approach and methodology3  
 
The Review references the criteria of: legitimacy; accountability; responsibility; fairness; 
transparency; and efficiency4. In doing so the Review adopts a results-based standpoint, i.e. to what 
3 The definitions and criteria contained in  “Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional Partnership 
Programs – Indicative Principles and Standards” (2007) IEG World Bank and DAC Network on Development 
Evaluation and DAC Network on Development Evaluation and “Principles of Corporate Governance” (2004) 
OECD will be applied.  
4 Sources see footnote 4 
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extent are the governance and management practices put in place for CRPs contributing to the 
effective and efficient delivery of appropriate research and capacity development outputs, while 
meeting international good standards of practice, including fiduciary and risk minimization standards.  
 
Phase 1 of the Review (June to mid-July) will produce a report covering: 
• An overview of the Governance and Executive Management structures and functions in the 
CRPs, looking at: 
 
o The structures and arrangements which have been developed and put in place 
for the CRPs  
o The role and responsibilities within these structures.  
This phase will include telephone interviews with primary stakeholders but will be 
principally based on written materials, including the report in final or in draft of Phase 
2 of the Governance Review (the present Review will deepen the findings from the 
Governance Review). It will result in a preliminary summary of the new arrangements 
for CRPs and their correspondence to recognized good practice.  
• A detailed matrix of priority issues, specific questions and the methods to develop the 
findings, lessons and recommendations to be covered in Phase 2.  
 
The Phase 1 report will be peer reviewed by external senior evaluators.  
 
Phase 2 of the Review (mid-July to mid-October) will address the priority questions developed 
during Phase 1 and will triangulate evidence, with application of the above reference criteria on 
implementation in practice and what are the implications for delivery and effectiveness. 
Methods for this stage are likely to include, structured questionnaires and extensive telephone 
interviews against check lists shared with the interviewees beforehand. It may include mini-case 
studies of practices which contain lessons (positive or negative). Particular questions may also be 
posed to the evaluation team conducting the evaluation of CRP6 to both avoid duplication and 
gain insights from their in-depth work on that CRP. As this stage, the work is concentrated on 
what actually happens in practice, much of its findings will be based on perceptions. These will 
be vigorously triangulated for a number of sources in each interest (stakeholder) group and 
differences of perception between these groups will be identified. 
 
Phase 2 of the Review will result in a comprehensive Draft Report.  
 
Phase 3 of the Review (mid-October to mid-November) will include discussion of the draft 
report, in particular its main findings, lessons and recommendations in a workshop with 
representatives of all primary stakeholders. This workshop will serve to:  
• ground-truth the report findings; 
• begin thinking on and dissemination of lessons and recommendations; 
• consider desirable follow-up steps 
There will also be the possibility for written comments from all primary stakeholders and these 
may be followed-up with telephone consultations. 
 
Following the workshop the report of the Review will be finalized, including suggestions on the 
modalities and need for a considered formal response by the various primary stakeholder fora 
(Consortium - Board, CRPs and Centers - and FC) and any further requirements to disseminate 
and/or further develop the lessons. 
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5. Roles and Responsibilities 
 
a. Review Team 
The Review will be carried out by a Senior Expert with solid experience in evaluation and 
international experience and recognition on non-profit governance and management systems. The 
Senior Expert will work under the supervision of the CGIAR-IEA Head and will have final 
responsibility for the report and all findings and recommendations, subject to adherence to the IEA  
Evaluation Standards. 
 
Senior Expert will be supported throughout the review by the IEA Head and by a junior research 
assistant (IEA) who will provide support to search, facilitate and coordinate information requirements, 
prepare synthesis of information, conduct preliminary analysis and arrange schedules. 
 
b. IEA 
The IEA will be responsible for: 
• Planning, and managing the Review, including appointment of the Senior Expert; 
• Provision of administrative and logistic support; 
• Quality control of the evaluation process and outputs. In this it will receive inputs from a 
small group of peer reviewers; 
• Organizing the workshop; 
• Making the report and intermediate outputs publically available; 
• Supporting such follow-up processes as may be agreed. 
 
6. Consultation and participation of stakeholders 
While maintaining independence, the Review will be carried out with a highly consultative approach, 
which seeks the views and assessments of all stakeholders. The methodology, in particular for Phase 2 
builds this in as an integral part of the information gathering methodology and an essential role is 
played in Phase 3 by the workshop. 
 
7. Work Schedule and Responsibilities 
 
Activity  Main 
Responsibility 
Deliverables Estimated 
deadline 
Preparatory phase IEA Assembly of reference material 
Final ToRs 
Recruitment of Senior consultant 
Identification of peer reviewers 
End May 2013 
Phase 1 - Desk 
assessment and 
development of 
detailed approach  
Senior Consultant Phase 1 Report including: 
• detailed matrix  for 
issues/questions and means of 
evidence assembly and 
verification 
• Plan for completion of Review 
Mid-July 2013 
Phase 2 - Survey and 
Analysis 
Senior Consultant Draft Report of the Review Mid October 
2013 
Phase 3 - 
Consultations 
including Workshop 
and Final Report 
Senior Consultant Workshop summary 
Summary of other consultations on 
Draft Report 
Final Report of the Review 
Mid November 
Follow-up  IEA  To be 
determined 
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Annex 1 Check List of Potential Issue Areas 
It is envisaged that Phase 1 of the Review will allow identification of issue areas for greater 
concentration, while retaining a comprehensive perspective. 
External Governance (Governance Bodies and their secretariats) 
Strategic direction: 
To what extent do the governance arrangements: 
- provide the necessary leadership that optimizes the use of financial, human social and 
technological resources of the program? 
- provide a clear vision for the CRP, including reviewing and approving strategic 
documents? 
- foster efficient and independent decision-making and oversight5 concerning scientific 
directions, including seeking up-to-date scientific and technical advice?  
- allow for transparent procedures with regards to resource allocation among CRPs 
- ensure program coherence among the participating Centers and other partners? 
- foster a focus on impacts for ultimate beneficiaries. 
 
Oversight of Management 
To what extent do the governance arrangements provide for adequate monitoring of: 
- program implementation throughout the participating Centers’ partnerships? 
- managerial performance and promote high performance and efficient processes? 
- compliance with all applicable rules and regulations of the Consortium as well as the Lead 
Center and internationally recognized good practice? 
 
Stakeholder participation 
To what extent do the governance arrangements: 
- reflect a fair and equitable representation of participating Centers and other partners in 
governance? 
- effectively involve partners and country-level stakeholders in the formulation of the 
research agenda?  
- ensure adequate consultation, communication, transparency and disclosure in relation to 
CRP stakeholders that do not take part in governance? 
 
Efficiency 
To what extent do governance arrangements: 
- impose disproportionate direct costs on CGIAR bodies and/or participants in the organs of 
governance? 
- contain duplication of responsibilities? 
- lack clarity on responsibilities? 
- have gaps in competencies? 
- have clarity on the division of responsibilities between governance bodies and executive 
management? 
- reflect an appropriate division of responsibilities between governance bodies and 
executive management, including for oversight, for policy and strategic direction and for 
advice? 
Risk management 
To what extent do the governance arrangements: 
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- provide for a clear policy for identifying and managing all forms of risk including 
scientific, reputational, human resource and efficiency risk? 
- provide adequate financial oversight and risk assessment for CRP activities? 
- ensure that work-plans and budgets are commensurate with available financial and human 
resources? 
- support resource mobilization to complement funding from W1 and W2? 
Conflict management 
To what extent do the governance arrangements: 
- monitor and manage the potential conflicts of interest of members of the CRP governing 
bodies and management staff? 
- identify and address perceived or real conflicts of interest among the participating centers 
and between CRP Management and Centers’ management and boards? 
Competence of governance bodies 
To what extent do the governance arrangements: 
- have an appropriate mix of competencies among members? 
- sufficiently represent stakeholders? 
- have the necessary levels of competency among members? 
CRP Appraisal, RBM-monitoring, Audit and Evaluation 
Do (or can they be expected to as they develop) - the internal and external appraisal, RBM monitoring 
evaluation and audit functions: 
- provide adequate assurance to governing bodies? 
- foster efficiency and effectiveness? 
- themselves have clarity on roles and functions which minimize duplication and maximize 
synergies? ? 
Executive Management 
Program planning 
- to what extent are arrangements, strategic, efficient, transparent and inclusive?  
- provide adequate basis for external governance? 
 
Program implementation and administrative efficiency 
- well-functioning planning and coordination among the participating Centers, partners and 
CRP teams? 
- flexible and transparent process for budget allocation within CRP and adjusting to 
program priorities and availability of funding?  
- To what extent have the management structures introduced in the CRP ensure and 
maintain a lean administrative cost structure? 
- Minimised transaction costs recognizing that costs tend to be higher during the launch 
period of collaborative program? 
- Have clarity on paper and in practice of executive management roles? 
 
Monitoring, Reporting internal review (including science review) and audit  
Do systems and processes provide or can they be expected to provide:  
- adequate basis for executive decision making, including in the areas discussed above of 
ensuring scientific excellence, risk management, avoidance and resolution of conflict, 
response to emerging challenges and uncertainties, etc?  
- adequate basis for reporting to governing bodies? 
- minimize transaction costs, including streamlining reporting requirements, and duplication 
and maximize synergies? 
- foster a strategic results based perspective? 
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 ANNEX 2: REVIEW FRAMEWORK (STATUS 25 SEPTEMBER 2013) 
Key evaluation questions Sub-questions  Sources of Information Data Collection Methods 
1. To what extent are 
roles, responsibilities and 
accountabilities for CRP 
governance clearly 
defined and exercised? 
[E.g. development and 
approval of program and 
financial plans, resource 
mobilization and 
allocation, priority setting, 
monitoring and evaluation 
of results, risk 
management (e.g. audit), 
reporting.] 
1.1. How well defined are the respective roles and responsibilities 
across governance and management bodies (including gaps, 
overlaps, ambiguities and healthy complementarities)? 
Documentation 
CRP leaders 
Consortium Office Executive Director 
Fund Office Executive Director 
Center Corporate Services 
Heads/Officers 
Center DGs  
CRP governance/oversight body 
members, incl. chairs 
Desk review 
Interviews 
Interview 
Interview 
Interviews 
 
Interviews 
Online governance/oversight body survey 
1.2. To what extent do defined roles and responsibilities reflect 
current good practice? 
1.3. What are the weaknesses and strengths of the current 
assignment and exercise of roles and responsibilities? 
2. To what extent is 
governance/oversight of 
CRPs sufficiently 
independent, inclusive 
and transparent? 
2.1. How balanced is the representation of Lead Centers, 
participating Centers and non-CG partners in CRP 
governance/oversight bodies? 
Documentation 
CRP governance/oversight body 
members, incl. chairs 
CRP program/research management 
staff and focal points, incl. CRP leaders 
(2.7.) 
Desk review 
Online governance/oversight body survey 
 
Online management survey (2.7.) 
2.2. If necessary, how could the involvement of non-CG partners be 
improved? 
 2.3. To what extent are concerned regions represented?  
 2.4. To what extent is there an adequate mix of expertise in 
governance/oversight? 
 2.5. To what extent are women represented? 
 2.6. Are policies and practices in place to address conflicts of 
interest and conflicts? Are they being applied successfully? 
 2.7. To what extent are communications concerning policy 
development, planning and decision-making disseminated in a 
transparent, clear and timely fashion? What are frequently-faced 
communication challenges? What are lessons learned? 
 3. To what extent do 
resource mobilization and 
resource allocation 
support effective planning 
and implementation? 
3.1. How successfully are resources mobilized for CRPs? Documentation 
Financial reports 
CRP leaders 
Consortium Office Executive Director 
Fund Office Executive Director 
Center Corporate Services 
Heads/Officers 
Center DGs  
 
Desk review 
Desk review 
Interviews 
Interview 
Interview 
Interviews 
 
Interviews 
 
3.2. How are resources allocated to different CRPs (e.g. criteria, 
level, and timing)?  
3.3. To what extent does the process support effective planning and 
implementation? 
3.4. How are funding risks mitigated? 
4. Are CRP governance 
and oversight structures 
and processes efficient? 
4.1. To what extent do current structures result in higher than 
necessary costs for achieving results? If so, why? 
Documentation 
CRP leaders 
Center Corporate Services 
Heads/Officers 
Center DGs  
CRP governance/oversight body 
members, incl. chairs 
Desk review 
Interviews 
Interviews 
 
Interviews 
Online governance/oversight body survey 
4.2. To what extent do current processes result in higher than 
necessary costs for achieving results?  If so, why?  
 4.3. Are there opportunities for streamlining CRP 
governance/oversight structures and processes? 
5. To what extent do 
CRPs have adequate 
resources to manage for 
results? 
5.1. Do CRPs have adequate human resources for management and 
coordination? 
Documentation 
CRP leaders 
Center Corporate Services 
Heads/Officers 
CRP program/research management 
staff and focal points, incl. CRP leaders 
Desk review 
Interviews 
Interviews 
 
Online management survey 
 
5.2. To what extent do women hold management/coordination roles 
in CRPs? 
5.3. Do CRP leaders, program/research managers and focal points 
have clear ToR? 
5.4. Are there good management practices that build a sense of 
common purpose and internal accountability among CRP 
managers? 
5.5. Do CRPs have the necessary financial resources for 
management and coordination? 
6. To what extent does 6.1. What is the CRP leader’s role with respect to Lead Center Documentation Desk review 
 CRP management have 
the authority to manage 
for results? 
management and governance/oversight? 
CRP leaders 
Consortium Office Executive Director 
Fund Office Executive Director 
Center DGs 
CRP program/research management 
staff and focal points, incl. CRP leaders 
Interviews 
Interview 
Interview  
Interviews 
Online management survey 
 
6.2. What is the CRP leader’s role in the recruitment of key 
managers and evaluation of their performance? 
 6.3. What is CRP management’s role in priority setting and 
monitoring of research performance? 
 6.4. What is CRP management’s role in budgeting & resource 
allocation? 
7. Is CRP management 
efficient? 
7.1. Is there a common definition of management costs? Documentation 
CRP leaders 
CRP program/research management 
staff and focal points, incl. CRP leaders 
Desk review 
Interviews 
Online management survey 
 
7.2. Are the full costs of CRP management evident and 
comparable across CRPs? 
7.3. To what extent does CRP management draw on existing 
Lead Center administrative services and to what extent is this 
efficient? 
7.4. What is the scope for improving the efficiency of CRP 
management arrangements and processes? 
 
ANNEX 3: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 
CGIAR Consortium documents 
Overarching documents 
 CGIAR Common Operational Framework
 CGIAR Monitoring Principles
 CGIAR Strategy and Results Framework (2011)
 CGIAR Performance and Funding Agreements
CGIAR Reporting: 
 CGIAR Annual Reports (2012, 2011, 2010)
 CRP Portfolio Annual Progress Report (2012)
 Consortium Program of Work and Budget 2012
 Interim 2013 CGIAR Financing Plan
CGIAR meetings 
 CGIAR Board Orientation Programme presentations (Jun 2013)
 CGIAR Donor meetings background documentation (Jun 2013)
Governance and management 
 CGIAR Guidelines on Center Governance: Roles, Responsibilities and Accountability of
Center Board (2007)
 CGIAR Consortium 2012 Reflections and 2013 Outlook: Accountability for
Performance through Partnerships, prepared by Frank Rijsberman (Jan 2013)
 January 2013 Brief on Governance of CRPs, prepared by Ruben (Feb 2012)
 CGIAR Governance Workshop Summary (Dec 2012)
 Consultancy Service to Support Shared Location Services Strategy: Key Findings and
Recommendations (2013)
 Consultancy on Common Administrative, Financial and Research Support Services in
the new Consortium of the CGIAR Centres: Key Findings and Recommendations,
Alliance Draft v7.0 (2009)
Financial reporting 
 Draft recommendations from CRP Working Group on CRP annual financial reports
 Advisory Notes on FG2 application in Center (2013, 2012, 2011)
 FG 1: CGIAR Financial Management
 FG 2: CGIAR Accounting Policies and Reporting Practices Manual
 FG 4: Guidelines for preparing the 2010-2012 Medium-Term plans and the 2010 
Financing Plans  
 FG 5: CGIAR Cost Allocation Guidelines 
Governance Review: 
 CGIAR Governance Review Phase 2 Final Report: findings and recommendations 
(2013) 
 CGIAR Governance Review, Phase 1 (2013) 
 
CRP documents 
CPR Proposal Process 
 Guidance for CRP Second Call  Version 2.1. (Sep 2013) 
 CRP Proposal Documents (for all CRPs) 
 ISPC Commentaries on Proposals (for all CRPs) 
 A cross-CRP synthesis of the ISPC’s observations on Management and Governance 
arrangements of CRP proposals (2011) 
CRP reporting 
 CRP Annual Reports (2012, 2010) 
 CRP Financial Reports (mid2013, 2012) 
  
CRP Governance and management  
 Terms of Reference of governance and management committees (for all CRPs) 
 Terms of Reference of CRP leaders (for all CRPs) 
 Governance and Management Review of CGIAR Research Program Climate Change, 
Agriculture and Food Security (2013) 
 
Center documents: 
 Annual Reports (2012, 2011, 2010, 2009) (for all centers) 
 
Challenge Programmes: 
 Cross-Cutting observations based on the review of three CGIAR Challenge Programs 
(2008) 
 The CGIAR.’s Challenge Program Experiences: A Critical Analysis. A contribution to 
Consortium and Mega-program design (2009) 
 
Other references 
 CGD Policy Paper 014: Governance of New Global Partnerships. Challenges, 
Weaknesses, and Lessons (2012) 
 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 
 IEG/World Bank: Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional Partnership 
Programs: Indicative Principles and Standards (2007) 
ANNEX 4: LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED/MET 
Surname, Name Org. Position By 
Consortium leadership team (5 interviewees) 
Bocock, Piers CGIAR Director of Knowledge Management 
and Communication 
MR 
Ellul, Phillipe CGIAR Senior Science Officer MR 
Izac, Anne-Marie CGIAR Chief Science Officer MR 
Rijbsman, Frank CGIAR Chief Executive Officer MR 
Porcari, Enrica CGIAR Head of Shared Services SZ 
Fund Council Office (1 interviewee) 
Wadsworth, Jonathan CGIAR Executive Secretary MR 
Donors/Fund Council members (8 interviewees) 
Althofer, Juergen EIARD Executive Secretary MR 
Chiverton, Philip EIARD CGIAR Fund Council Member for 
Sweden  
MR 
Dixon, John ACIAR Principal regional coordinator, South 
Asia & Africa 
MR 
Lantin, Manny World Bank CGIAR Secretariat MR 
Robertson, Susan IDRC Program Officer MR 
Rumbaitis del Rio, Cristina Rockefeller Associate Director MR 
Van Gilst, Daniel EIRAD CGIAR Fund Council Member for 
Norway 
MR 
Witte, Eric USAID Senior International Affairs Specialist MR 
Center level 
Center DGs and designates (15 interviewees) 
Anderson, Pamela CIP Director General MR 
Bird, Jeremy IMWI Director General MR 
Dar, William D. ICRISAT Director General MR 
Echeverria , Ruben CIAT Director General MR 
Fan, Shenggen IFPRI Director General MR 
Frison, Emilie Bioversity Director General MR 
Hall, Stephen World Fish Director General MR 
Hillber, Ylva ITTA Deputy Director General MR 
Holmgren, Peter CIFOR Director General MR 
Lumpkin , Thomas CIMMYT Director General MR 
Solh, Mahmoud ICARDA Director General MR 
Simons, Tony ICRAF Director General MR 
Smith, Jimmy ILRI Director General MR 
Wopereis, Marco AfricaRice Deputy Director General 
Zeigler, Robert IRRI Director General MR 
Center finance staff (20 interviewees) 
Abeysekera, Laksiri ICRAF Deputy Director General Finance and 
Corporate Services 
SZ 
Agrawal, Rajesh ICRISAT Assistant Director General SZ 
Alonso, Carlos World Fish Chief Financial Officer  SZ 
Bansal, Supriya ICRISAT Financial Controller / Head SZ 
Fields, James IFPRI Controller. Division: Finance & 
Administration 
SZ 
Gatoru, Ernest ICRAF Head of Budgets, Reporting and 
Regions 
SZ 
Gavino, German IFPRI Chief Accountant. Division: Finance & 
Administration 
SZ 
Gerber, Michael CIP  SZ 
Governey, David IFPRI Director of Finance and Administration SZ 
Herremans, Anna CIMMYT International Finance Director SZ 
Hubscher, Albin CIAT Deputy Director General, Corporate 
Services 
SZ 
Jhunjhunwala, Sunil IRRI Controller SZ 
Khisty, Amol IWMI Director of Finance & Administration SZ 
Lopez, Erwin ICARDA Director of Finance SZ 
Malari, Sally CIMMYT Programme Administrator, Finance 
Officer for CRPs 
SZ 
Medina, Richard  CIMMYT Director of Internal Audit SZ 
Sholola, Shalewa IITA Director of Finance SZ 
Tovar, Jose Ramiro CIMMYT Reporting and Analysis Manager SZ 
Tumuluru, Kumar CIFOR Director of Finance and Administration SZ 
Van Waadenburg, Martin ILRI Director, Corporate Services SZ 
Center Board Chairs1 (4 interviewees) 
Collins,Wanda  CIAT Chair of CIAT Board of Trustees MR 
Coulman, Bruce  IITA Chair of IITA Board of Trustees MR 
Poole, Nigel ICRISAT Chair of ICRISAT Board of Trustees MR 
Sibanda, Lindiwe Majele  ILRI Chair of ILRI Board of Trustees MR 
CRP level    
CRP Leaders (18 interviewees) 
Atta Krah , Kwesi  Humidtropics Director MR 
Banziger, Marianne Maize, Wheat 
DDG Research and Patnerships, 
CIMMYT 
MR 
Bouman, Bas GRiSP Director MR 
Bramel, Paula Genebanks 
Deputy Executive Director, Global Crop 
Diversity Trust 
MR 
Brooks, Karen  PIM Director MR 
Campbell, Bruce CCAFS Director MR 
Dugan, Patrick  AAS Director MR 
Ellis, Noel Dryland Cereals Director MR 
Hoisington , David  
Grain Legumes 
Dryland Cereals 
Acting Director MR 
Kommerell , Victor  WHEAT Program Manager MR 
1 Three of the Center Board Chairs were interviewed after the first draft report was circulated in Feb 2014.  
                                                 
McDermott, John  A4NH Director MR 
Nasi, Robert  FTA Director MR 
Noble, Andrew  WLE Director MR 
Payne, William  Dryland Systems Director MR 
Randolph, Thomas  L&F Director MR 
Sivasankar, Shoba  Dryland Cereals Director MR 
Thiele, Graham  RTB Director MR 
Watson, Dave  MAIZE Program Manager MR 
Source: Review team.    
 
ANNEX 5: GOVERNANCE SURVEY RESULTS 
A. Introduction 
Responses were collected during the month of October 2013 from individuals identified by the review team with the help of CRPs as members of CRP 
governance bodies. 
B. Survey participation 
Out of a total of 185 individuals identified as CRP governance body members, a total of 157 individuals were successfully invited to participate in the survey, 
76 of which responded. In total, a response rate of 48.4% was achieved. 
Q4: Of the 76 survey participants, 29 respondents indicated that they represented “CGIAR Center management”, thus creating the largest group of 
respondents (38.2% of respondents). 12 respondents completed the survey as “university or other academic institution” (15.8%); 11 responded as 
“research organization” (14.5%). The remaining 24 respondents (31.6%) represent CGIAR Center Boards (3), national governments (1), the private sector 
(4), donor agencies (3), NGO/civil society organizations (2), international organizations (3) or simply themselves (8). 
  
Q4: What type of organization do you represent? 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
CGIAR Center management 38.2% 29 
CGIAR Center Board 3.9% 3 
Research organization 14.5% 11 
National government 1.3% 1 
Q4: What type of organization do you represent? 
CGIAR Center
management
CGIAR Center Board
Research
organization
National government
University or other
academic institution
Private sector
Donor agency
NGO/civil society
organization
International
organization
None (personal
capacity/expertise)
1 
University or other academic institution 15.8% 12 
Private sector 5.3% 4 
Donor agency 3.9% 3 
NGO/civil society organization 2.6% 2 
International organization 3.9% 3 
None (personal capacity/expertise) 10.5% 8 
answered question 76 
 
 
 
Q6: Three quarters (75%) of all respondents are male. Of the 19 women respondents, 8 represent the category “CGIAR Center management”.  
Q6: What is your gender? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Female 25.0% 19 
Male 75.0% 57 
answered question 76 
 
 
C. Survey coverage 
Responses to the survey were received concerning all 15 CRPs, with the highest counts for Livestock and Fish (14 responses) and Aquatic Agricultural 
Systems (10 responses). Only one response each was received for Roots, Tubers and Bananas; Nutrition and Health; and Forests, Trees and Agroforestry. 
Others range somewhere in between. 
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D. Roles, responsibilities and accountabilities1 
 
Findings: 
• CRP governance bodies are mostly experienced as advisory to CRP management. 
• With few exceptions, respondents consider their respective CRP governance bodies to play a role in different aspects of CRP governance. 
• According to respondents, the importance of roles played differs considerably, but tends to be less than a leading role. 
• Comments received indicate that a lack of agreement on and unclear roles, responsibilities, relationships and accountability have the potential to 
negatively affect efficiency and effectiveness of CRP governance. 
 
 
Q7: Some three quarters of respondents (74.3%) representing 14/15 CRPs indicated that “their” CRP governance body was principally advisory to CRP 
management. The remainder, partly representing the same CRPs, has different perceptions. 
Q7: The CRP governance body is principally: 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Advisory to CRP management 74.3% 55 
Advisory to the Lead Center’s Director-General 10.8% 8 
Advisory to the Lead Center board 14.9% 11 
answered question 74 
 
 
1 Key evaluation question 1: To what extent are roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for CRP governance clearly defined and exercised? 
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Q8: CRP governance body members consider themselves to play a role in program and financial planning, setting research priorities, mobilizing and 
allocating financial resources, monitoring and evaluation, and managing risks, albeit to different extents. Depending on the sub-question, most responses 
either describe the role of CRP governance bodies as “active, but not leading” or “limited to a consultative role”. 
This, however, does not allow for findings regarding the roles of individual or groups of CRPs. For instance, in the case of Livestock and Fish (14 responses), 
half or the majority of respondents consider their governance body to play a leading role in managing risks on the one hand and program and financial 
planning on the other, and otherwise to play an active role. In the case of Aquatic Agricultural Systems (10 responses), respondents generally found their 
governance body to play a limited to consultative role. 
9 respondents from 6 CRPs are of the view that their respective CRP governance bodies play no role in mobilizing and allocating financial resources. 8 
respondents from 4 CRPs think it too early to judge whether their respective CRP governance bodies play a role in monitoring & evaluation; 9 respondents 
from 6 CRPs say the same about managing risks. 
Q8: The CRP governance body plays a role in.... 
Answer Options Leading role Active role (but not leading) 
Limited to 
consultative 
role 
Not 
applicable/no 
role 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
program and financial planning 23 (31.5%) 15 (20.5%) 25 (34.2%) 3 (4.1%) 6 (8.2%) 1 (1.4%) 73 
 
setting research priorities 17 (23.6%) 27 (37.5%) 24 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (5.6%) 0 (0.0%) 72 
 
mobilizing and allocating financial resources 11 (15.3%) 19 (26.4%) 26 (36.1%) 9 (12.5%) 6 (8.3%) 1 (1.4%) 72 
 
monitoring and evaluation 12 (16.2%) 27 (37.5%) 25 (34.2%) 1 (1.4%) 8 (10.8%) 1 (1.4%) 74 
 
managing risks 13 (18.3%) 17 (23.6%) 25 (34.2%) 5 (7.0%) 9 (12.5%) 2 (2.8%) 71 
 
answered question 74  
 
Open-ended: A number of respondents commented on the need for agreement and more clarity on individual and structural roles, responsibilities, 
relationships and accountability for improving the efficiency/effectiveness of CRP governance. Concrete suggestions to this effect include: i) developing 
“contracts” between different bodies; ii) developing “Responsibility Assignment Matrices”2; iii) crafting clear ToR; iv) holding briefings/induction programs 
for new members of governance bodies; and vi) setting up a virtual space for exchange between board members.  
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_assignment_matrix. 
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E. Independence and inclusiveness3 
 
Finding: 
• Overall, CRP governance is sufficiently independent and inclusive of essential skills, CRP target regions and women. 
 
 
Q9: A vast majority of respondents (83.8%) representing all CRPs “agree” or “tend to agree” that efforts have been made to ensure adequate 
representation of non-CGIAR partners in CRP governance. Of the three largest respondent groups, 75% of CGIAR Center management, 72.7% of research 
organization and 91.6% of academic institution representatives were of this opinion. Excluding CGIAR Center management representatives, the largest 
group of respondents, a similar high percentage of the remaining respondents (89.2%) “agrees” or “tends to agree” that non-CGIAR partners are adequately 
represented. 
Q9: Efforts have been made to ensure an adequate representation of non-CGIAR partners in CRP governance 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  44 (59.5%) 18 (24.3%) 6 (8.1%) 0 (0.0%) 5 (6.8%) 1 (1.4%) 74 
 
Without CGIAR Center management 28 (60.9%) 13 (28.3%) 2 (4.3%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (4.3%) 1 (2.2%) 46  
 
 
Q10: A majority of respondents (70.2%) representing 13/15 CRPs “agree” or “tend to agree” that efforts have been made to ensure an adequate 
representation of CRP target regions in CRP governance. Excluding CGIAR Center management representatives, a similarly high percentage (71.9%) “agrees” 
or “tends to agree” that CRP target regions are adequately represented. 
Q10: Efforts have been made to ensure an adequate representation of CRP target regions in CRP governance. 
3 Key evaluation question 2: To what extent is governance of CRPs sufficiently independent, inclusive and transparent? 
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Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  32 (43.2%) 20 (27.0%) 9 (12.2%) 5 (6.8%) 4 (5.4%) 4 (5.4%) 74 
 
Without CGIAR Center management 20 (43.5%) 13 (28.3%) 5 (10.9%) 2 (4.3%) 3 (6.5%) 3 (6.5%) 46  
 
 
Q11: A vast majority of respondents (89.2%) representing 14/15 CRPs “agree” or “tend to agree” that efforts have been made to ensure an adequate mix of 
expertise in CRP governance. Excluding CGIAR Center management representatives, a similarly high percentage (89.1%) “agrees” or “tends to agree” that 
CRP governance benefits from adequate mix of expertise. 
Q11: Efforts have been made to ensure an adequate mix of expertise in CRP governance. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  43 (58.1%) 23 (31.1%) 2 (2.7%) 1 (1.4%) 2 (2.7%) 3 (4.1%) 74 
 
Without CGIAR Center management 26 (56.5%) 15 (32.6%) 1 (2.2%) 1 (2.2%) 2 (4.3%) 1 (2.2%) 46  
 
 
Q12: Almost three-quarters of respondents (73.0%) representing 14/15 CRPs “agree” or “tend to agree” that efforts have been made to ensure adequate 
representation of women in CRP governance. 14/18 female respondents representing 10 CRPs were also of this opinion. Excluding CGIAR Center 
management representatives, a similarly high percentage (71.8%) “agrees” or “tends to agree” that women are adequately represented in CRP governance. 
Q12: Efforts have been made to ensure an adequate representation of women in CRP governance. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  33 (44.6%) 21 (28.4%) 7 (9.5%) 4 (5.4%) 3 (4.1%) 6 (8.1%) 74 
 
Without CGIAR Center management 24 (52.2%) 9 (19.6%) 4 (8.7%) 2 (4.3%) 2 (4.3%) 5 (10.9%) 46  
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F. Transparency4 
 
Findings: 
• Disputes/conflicts, including conflicts of interest, are not a major issue for CRP governance body members. 
• Where already possible to say, communication to and from CRP governance bodies and their members functions smoothly with minor hiccups. 
 
 
Q13-Q16: Almost half of the respondents (47.3%) are not aware of a policy or practices that address potential conflicts of interest within their respective 
CRP governance bodies. Almost two-thirds (64.9%), representing 13 CRPs, are not aware of having been asked to advise on or resolve a dispute or conflict 
with respect to a decision within the CRP. Only 11 respondents (14.9%), partly representing the same CRPs, confirm having been involved in solving in at 
least one dispute/conflict. Of these 11 personal experiences, 5 concerned dispute over research priorities and 6 over CRP financial matters. 5 respondents 
consider the dispute/conflict in question successfully resolved; another 5 consider it too early to judge. 
Q13: Are you aware of a policy or practices that address potential conflicts of interest 
within the CRP governance body? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes 36.5% 27 
No 47.3% 35 
Not sure 16.2% 12 
answered question 74 
Q14: Has the CRP governance body ever been asked to advise on or resolve a dispute 
or conflict with respect to a decision within the CRP? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
4 Key evaluation question 2: To what extent is governance of CRPs sufficiently independent, inclusive and transparent? 
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Yes, one or more 14.9% 11 
No, never 64.9% 48 
Not sure 20.3% 15 
answered question 74 
Q15: Please think about the most severe dispute/conflict. What kind of dispute/conflict 
was it? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Dispute over research priorities 45.5% 5 
Dispute over CRP financial matters 54.5% 6 
Dispute over conflicts of interest 0.0% 0 
answered question 11 
Q16: The dispute/conflict was resolved successfully. 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes 45.5% 5 
No 0.0% 0 
Not sure 9.1% 1 
Too early to judge 45.5% 5 
answered question 11 
 
 
Q17: Three-quarters of respondents (75.7%) representing 14 CRPs “usually” receive clear and timely information and communications on matters relevant 
to their task. 71.8% of non-CGIAR Center management representatives “usually” receive clear and timely information/communications. 11 individuals from 
6 CRPs find it too early to judge, 10 of which from outside the CGIAR system. 
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Q17: CRP governance body members receive clear and timely information and 
communications on matters relevant to their task. 
 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Without 
CGIAR Center 
management 
Usually 75.7% 56 33 (71.8%) 
Only sometimes 5.4% 4 1 (2.2%) 
Unfortunately not 4.1% 3 2 (4.3%) 
Too early to judge 14.9% 11 10 (21.8%) 
answered question 74 46 
 
 
Q18: At the same time, two-thirds of respondents (66.2%) representing 14 CRPs are of the opinion that outcomes of their deliberations are “usually” 
communicated in a clear and timely manner. 14 individuals from 6 CRPs find it too early to judge. 
Q18: Outcomes of deliberations within the CRP governance body are communicated in 
a clear and timely manner. 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Usually 66.2% 49 
Only sometimes 10.8% 8 
Unfortunately not 2.7% 2 
Too early to judge 18.9% 14 
No opinion 1.4% 1 
answered question 74 
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G. Efficiency of CRP governance and oversight5 
 
Findings:  
• Based on experience to date, respondents, and particularly from outside the CGIAR system, tend to question the advantages of multiple CRP 
governance bodies. 
• Comments received also point to inefficiencies due to the numerous levels of CGIAR governance. 
• Where already possible to judge, the size of individual CRP governance bodies is considered adequate. 
• Time devoted to CRP governance is considered well spent; non-CGIAR respondents are somewhat more cautious in their statements. 
• Comments received indicate that CRP governance body meetings and exchanges among members could be better organized.  
 
Q19: Of those survey respondents voicing an opinion on the justification of multiple CRP governance bodies, more are critical (30) than supportive (23). Of 
the critical voices, 36.7% stem from within the CGIAR system and 63.6% from partners. 
Q19: Where applicable, the establishment of more than one CRP governance body is justified by higher quality and more effective oversight. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  8 (11.0%) 15 (20.5%) 13 (17.8%) 17 (23.3%) 10 (13.7%) 10 (13.7%) 73 
 
Without CGIAR Center management 3 (6.5%) 8 (17.4%) 11 (23.9%) 8 (17.4%) 8 (17.4%) 8 (17.4%) 46  
 
Open-ended: Several respondents refer to the overall CGIAR governance structure as the reason for inefficiencies. As one respondent wrote: “The total 
level of CRP governance - ranging from the Consortium, the lead Center and the specific CRP governance bodies - far exceeds what is needed to manage the 
level of Window 1/2 funded annual activities. Surely there is a simpler structure that avoids the current level of duplication and wasted resources”. 
 
Q20: Two-thirds of all respondents (67.1%) representing 14 CRPs are clearly the opinion that the size of their respective CRP governance bodies adequately 
balances efficiency with the need to be sufficiently representative and inclusive. 17 respondents (23.3%), 13 of which from outside the CGIAR system, find it 
5 Key evaluation question 4: Are CRP governance and oversight structures and processes efficient? 
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too early to judge. Excluding CGIAR Center management representatives, a similarly percentage (67.4%) of respondents is happy with the size of CRP 
governance bodies. 
Q20: The size of the CRP governance body adequately balances efficiency with the 
need to be sufficiently representative and inclusive. 
 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Without CGIAR Center 
management 
Yes 67.1% 49 31 (67.4%) 
No, the CRP governance body should be smaller 5.5% 4 0 (0.0%) 
No, the CRP governance body should be bigger 4.1% 3 2 (4.3%) 
Too early to judge 23.3% 17 13 (28.3%) 
answered question 73 46 
 
Q21: Over three-quarters of respondents (78.1%) representing all CRPs “agree” or “tend to agree” that their time devoted to overseeing and/or advising the 
CRP is well spent. Excluding CGIAR Center management representatives, a somewhat lower percentage of the remaining respondents (67.4%) “agrees” or 
“tends to agree” that their time is well spent. 12 respondents, all of which from outside the CGIAR system, feel it too early to judge. 
Q21: My time devoted to overseeing and/or advising the CRP is well spent. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  31 (42.5%) 26 (35.6%) 2 (2.7%) 1 (1.4%) 12 (16.4%) 1 (1.4%) 73 
 
Without CGIAR Center management 18 (39.1%) 13 (28.3%) 2 (4.3%) 0 (0.0%) 12 (26.1%) 1 (2.2%) 46  
 
Open-ended: A number of survey participants refer to how meetings are organized as a way to improve the efficiency/effectiveness of CRP governance. 
Suggestions include: i) restricting the number of face-to-face meetings; ii) making good use of virtual information and communication technologies, e.g. 
Dropbox, intranet, Skype, and audio-/videoconferencing; iii) organizing meetings back-to-back with other internal/external events; iv) joint sessions with 
management committees; v) organizing meetings in program countries; and vi) better planning, preparation (incl. documentation) and chairing of meetings. 
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ANNEX 6: MANAGEMENT SURVEY RESULTS 
A. Introduction 
Responses were collected during the month of October 2013 from individuals identified by the review team with the help of CRPs as CRP leaders, CRP 
programme/management staff and CRP focal points. 
B. Survey participation 
Out of a total of 313 individuals identified, a total of 243 CRP leaders, CRP programme/management staff and CRP focal points were successfully invited to 
participate in the survey, 146 of which responded. In total, a response rate of 60.1% was achieved. 
Q3: 70 respondents indicated their belonging to the category “CRP programme/management staff”, thus creating the largest group of respondents (47.9% 
of respondents). 39 respondents completed the survey as “CRP focal points” (26.7%). 15 responded as “CRP leaders” (10.3%). 22 respondents considered 
themselves as “other” (15.1%). 
Q3: What is your position within the selected CRP? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
CRP leader 10.3% 15 
CRP program/management staff 47.9% 70 
Focal point 26.7% 39 
Other 15.1% 22 
answered question 146 
1 
Q4: The percentage of time spent on CRP management/coordination varies greatly amongst respondents with around one fourth of respondents spending 
up to 20%, another fourth between 21 and 40%, and yet another fourth between 81 and 100% of their time. 12/15 CRP leaders belong to the latter group. 
Q4: On average, what percentage of your time do you spend on 
management/coordination within the selected CRP? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
0-20% 27.4% 40 
21-40% 23.3% 34 
41-60% 16.4% 24 
61-80% 6.2% 9 
81-100% 26.7% 39 
answered question 146 
 
Q5: Three quarters of the survey respondents (74.0%) were employed by a CGIAR Center at the time of their recruitment. 9/15 CRP leaders were CGIAR 
Center staff. 
Q5: Were you employed by a CGIAR Center at the time of your recruitment? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes 74.0% 108 
No 26.0% 38 
answered question 146 
 
Q6: Two thirds of all respondents to the survey (65.8%) were male. Of the 50 women respondents, 30 belong to the category “programme/management 
staff”, 8 are “focal points”, 9 “others”, and 3 belong to the category CRP leaders.  
Q6: What is your gender? 
2 
 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Female 34.2% 50 
Male 65.8% 96 
answered question 146 
 
 
C. Survey coverage 
Responses to the survey were received concerning all 15 CRPs, with the highest counts for Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (19 responses) 
and Water, Land and Ecosystems (18 responses); the lowest counts for the Global Rice Science Partnership (1 response), Wheat (4 responses) and Maize (5 
responses). 
 
 
D. Resources for managing for results1 
 
Findings:  
• Overall, CRPs benefit from adequate human resources; the availability of sufficient financing is more critical. 
• The process for allocating W1 and W2 funds has considerable flaws that affect CRP management. 
  
 
Q7: A vast majority of respondents (80.1%) “agree” or “tend to agree” that adequate skills and expertise are available to manage the CRP effectively. 11/15 
CRP leaders belong to this group. 
Q7: Adequate skills and expertise are available to manage the CRP effectively. 
1 Key evaluation question 5: To what extent do CRPs have adequate resources to manage for results? 
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Answer 
Options 
I agree I tend to agree I tend to 
disagree 
I disagree Too early to 
judge 
No opinion Response 
Count 
 60 (41.1%) 57 (39.0%) 15 (10.3%) 5 (3.4%) 9 (6.2%) 0 (0.0%) 146 
Open-ended: If respondents were to be given the possibility to access additional human resources, choices would include communication specialists, 
gender experts, a deputy CRP leader, “thematic leaders”, administrative support, and more researchers on the ground. 
 
 
Q11: A majority of respondents (64.3%) “agree” or “tend to agree” that sufficient financial resources are available to manage the CRP effectively. 9/15 CRP 
leaders belong to this group. 
Q11: Sufficient financial resources are available to manage the CRP effectively. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  44 (30.1%) 50 (34.2%) 24 (16.4%) 13 (8.9%) 8 (5.5%) 7 (4.8%) 146  
Open-ended: In this context and in terms of improving the efficiency/effectiveness of CRP management, respondents commented on the disadvantages of i) 
the short notice of calls for new proposals; ii) unclear decision-making regarding funding commitments and carryovers; iii) the annual funding cycle and late 
funding allocations; iv) unpredictable and fluctuating W1 and W2 funding; v) and CGIAR centers’ perceived preference to fundraise for themselves rather 
than for CRPs. 
 
 
E. Roles, responsibilities and accountability2 
 
Findings:  
2 Key evaluation question 1: To what extent are roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for CRP governance clearly defined and exercised? 
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• On the whole, CRP management staff are essentially clear about each others’ roles and responsibilities; they feel part of CRP teams. 
• Multiple accountabilities to CRPs and host CGIAR Centers/organizations are largely considered unproblematic. 
 
 
Q8: Three quarters of the respondents (75.4%) “agree” or “tend to agree” that they are clear about the distribution of roles and responsibilities within CRP 
management, including their own. 11/15 CRP leaders belong to this group. 
Q8: I am clear about the distribution of roles and responsibilities within CRP management, including my own. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  56 (38.4%) 54 (37.0%) 20 (13.7%) 12 (8.2%) 3 (2.1%) 1 (0.7%) 146  
 
 
Q9: A vast majority of respondents (82.2%) “agree” or “tend to agree” that they feel part of a CRP team working towards shared goals. 12/15 CRP leaders 
belong to this group. Just below 10% of respondents feel more part of a CGIAR Center team. 
Q9: I feel part of a CRP team working toward shared goals. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree 
I feel more 
part of a 
CGIAR center 
team 
I do not feel 
part of any 
team 
Too early to 
judge 
Response 
Count  
  75 (51.4%) 45 (30.8%) 14 (9.6%) 5 (3.4%) 7 (4.8%) 146  
 
 
Q10: A vast majority of respondents (86.3%) “agree” or “tend to agree” that their roles and responsibilities within their CRP and CGIAR center/organization 
are compatible. 10/15 CRP leaders belong to this group. 
Q10: My roles and responsibilities within the CRP and within my CGIAR center/organization are compatible. 
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Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree disagree 
Too early to 
judge 
Response 
Count  
  79 (54.1%) 47 (32.2%) 12 (8.2%) 0 (0.0%) 8 (5.5%) 146  
 
 
F. Authority for managing for results3 
 
Findings:  
• Overall, CRP management staff pronouncing a view perceive CRP leaders to have sufficient authority for managing for results. 
• Within the group of CPR leaders there is mixed experience, with around half being more or less satisfied, depending on the particular management 
function.  
 
 
Q12: A majority of respondents (75.7%) “agree” or “tend to agree” that the CRP leader has sufficient authority to manage and lead the CRP within the 
framework of its approved program plan and budget. 8 CRP leaders (53.3%) are also of this opinion. 
Q12: The CRP leader has sufficient authority to manage and lead the CRP within the framework of its approved program plan and budget. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  74 (51.4%) 35 (24.3%) 20 (13.9%) 7 (4.9%) 6 (4.2%) 2 (1.4%) 144  
CRP leaders 5 (33.3%) 3 (20.0%) 4 (26.7%) 2 (13.3%) 1 (6.7%) 0 (0.0%) 15  
Open-ended: Without differentiating between management functions, a number of respondents remarked upon the dominance of lead center 
management in decision making, cumbersome decision-making structures/processes (“too many players”), and the plethora of (conflicting) interests as 
3 Key evaluation question 6: To what extent does CRP management have the authority to manage for results? 
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important factors affecting the efficiency/effectiveness of CRPs. One respondent noted that the lack of authority for CRP leaders to take decisions 
ultimately results in the entrenchment of old views and ideas, the reinforcement of business as usual and upholding the status quo.  
 
Q13: A majority of respondents (61.2%) “agree” or “tend to agree” that the CRP leader has sufficient discretion to recruit CRP program and research staff 
members. CRP leaders are somewhat less convinced: 8 CRP leaders belong to this group. Overall, around 10% of respondents lack an opinion. 
Q13: The CRP leader has sufficient discretion to recruit CRP program and research staff members. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  44 (30.6%) 44 (30.6%) 21 (14.6%) 9 (6.3%) 11 (7.6%) 15 (10.4%) 144 
 
CRP leaders 3 (20.0%) 5 (33.3%) 3 (20.0%) 3 (20.0%) 1 (6.7%) 0 (0.0%) 15 
 
 
 
Q14: A narrow majority of respondents (54.9%) “agree” or “tend to agree” that the CRP leader is sufficiently involved in evaluating staff performance and 
determining any need for changes in assignment/employment. Similarly, only 8 CRP leaders (53.3%) are more or less agreeable. Overall, around 10% of 
respondents lack an opinion; a further 12.5% feel it too early to judge. 
Q14: The CRP leader is sufficiently involved in evaluating staff performance and determining any need for changes in assignment/employment. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  39 (27.1%) 40 (27.8%) 20 (13.9%) 12 (8.3%) 18 (12.5%) 15 (10.4%) 144 
 
CRP leaders 3 (20.0%) 5 (33.3%) 3 (20.0%) 3 (20.0%) 1 (6.7%) 0 (0.0%) 15 
 
 
 
Q15: A majority of respondents (63.2%) “agree” or “tend to agree” that CRP management is adequately empowered to recommend changes of research 
priorities in order to achieve desired results. 10 CRP leaders (66.6%) belong to this group. Overall, 13.2% feel it too early to judge. 
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Q15: CRP management is adequately empowered to recommend changes of research priorities in order to achieve desired results. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  45 (31.3%) 46 (31.9%) 22 (15.3%) 6 (4.2%) 19 (13.2%) 6 (4.2%) 144 
 
CRP leaders 5 (33.3%) 5 (33.3%) 3 (20.0%) 1 (6.7%) 1 (6.7%) 0 (0.0%) 15 
 
 
 
Q16: A majority of respondents (63.2%) “agree” or “tend to agree” that CRP management is adequately empowered to manage budgets and allocate funds 
in order to achieve desired results. CRP leaders are somewhat less convinced: 8 CRP leaders (53.3%) belong to this group. 
Q16: CRP management is adequately empowered to manage budgets and allocate funds in order to achieve desired results. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  41 (28.5%) 50 (34.7%) 27 (18.8%) 12 (8.3%) 12 (8.3%) 2 (1.4%) 144 
 
CRP leaders 3 (20.0%) 5 (33.3%) 3 (20.0%) 3 (20.0%) 1 (6.7%) 0 (0.0%) 15 
 
 
 
Q17: A narrow majority of respondents (59.8%) “agree” or “tend to agree” that CRP management arrangements provide for adequate monitoring of 
research performance and progress. 9 CRP leaders (60.0%) belong to this group. Some 18% of all respondents and a quarter of all CRP leaders find it too 
early to judge. 
Q17: CRP management arrangements provide for adequate monitoring of research performance and progress. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  27 (18.8%) 59 (41.0%) 23 (16.0%) 4 (2.8%) 26 (18.1%) 5 (3.5%) 144 
 
CRP leaders 3 (20.0%) 6 (40.0%) 2 (13.3%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (26.7%) 0 (0.0%) 15 
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G. Efficiency of management arrangements4 
 
Findings: 
• Making use of lead centers’ administrative services helps to economize costs and time.  
• Efforts to streamline and standardize reporting to CRPs/lead centers on the one hand and the Consortium on the other are recognized, but 
room for improvement is seen. 
• Disproportionate transaction costs are an issue for many CRP management staff. Perceived reasons are meetings management; geographical 
dispersion; number of management layers; short planning, budgeting and reporting cycles; fund allocation process; and relationship between 
CRP and center managements. 
• An emerging theme in connection with the efficiency and effectiveness of CRP management is collaboration between centers on the one hand 
and between CRPs on the other. 
 
 
Q18: To the extent applicable, more than half of the respondents find it efficient to a “large” or to “some” extent to draw on Lead Centers’ administrative 
services, and especially so for finance administration (76.4%) and general administrative services (73.6%). In the case of resource mobilization, some 11% 
find it too early to judge. 
Q18: To what extent is drawing on the lead center's administrative services efficient for.....? 
Answer Options To a large extent 
To some 
extent Not much Not at all 
Too early to 
judge Not applicable   
Finance administration 73 (50.7%) 37 (25.7%) 14 (9.7%) 5 (3.5%) 11 (7.6%) 4 (2.8%)   
General administration services  67 (46.5%) 39 (27.1%) 13 (9.0%) 4 (2.8%) 9 (6.3%) 12 (8.3%)   
Human resources management 59 (41.0%) 35 (24.3%) 16 (11.1%) 9 (6.3%) 11 (7.6%) 14 (9.7%)   
Research support 50 (34.7%) 39 (27.1%) 16 (11.1%) 10 (6.9%) 10 (6.9%) 19 (13.2%)   
4 Key evaluation question 7: Is CRP management efficient? 
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Resource mobilization 42 (29.2%) 43 (29.9%) 22 (15.3%) 10 (6.9%) 16 (11.1%) 11 (7.6%)   
Communications 54 (37.5%) 57 (39.6%) 10 (6.9%) 4 (2.8%) 10 (6.9%) 9 (6.3%)   
answered question  
 
 
Q19 & Q20: A majority of respondents “agree” or “tend to agree” that efforts to streamline and standardize CRP reporting are evident: 75.0% of 
respondents in the case of reporting to the CRP and lead centers and 68.1% in the case of reporting to the Consortium. 
Q19: Efforts to streamline and standardize reporting to the CRP and lead center are evident. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  44 (30.6%) 64 (44.4%) 11 (7.6%) 7 (4.9%) 13 (9.0%) 5 (3.5%) 144 
 
Q20: Efforts to streamline and standardize reporting to the Consortium are evident. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  40 (27.8%) 58 (40.3%) 15 (10.4%) 10 (6.9%) 6 (4.2%) 15 (10.4%) 144 
 
Open-ended: A number of respondents commented on reporting as a cause of inefficiencies. They see the need to “minimize”, “reduce”, “streamline”, 
“standardize” and “automate” reporting, ensure consistency over time, simplify reporting guidelines, clarify reporting procedures, and extend reporting 
cycles. One respondent suggests consolidating templates for performance reporting and work plans and setting deadlines for providing feedback on 
reports. Another suggests compiling an annual calendar of reporting demands from the Consortium. 
 
 
Q21: Views on transaction costs differ. Of those voicing an opinion (119 respondents), just over half (53.0%) “agree” or “tend to agree” that they are 
reasonable; the remainder (47.0%) “disagree” or “tend to disagree”. Some 10% of all respondents find it too early to judge. 
Q21: Transaction costs incurred for managing the CRP are reasonable in relation to the CRP’s research outputs. 
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Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
  17 (11.8%) 46 (31.9%) 29 (20.1%) 27 (18.8%) 15 (10.4%) 10 (6.9%) 144 
 
Open-ended: Reasons provided by respondents for disproportionate transaction costs and ineffective CRP management include: i) number/spacing of 
meetings and insufficient use of information and communication technologies; ii) geographic dispersion of team members; iii) short-term nature of 
planning, budgeting and reporting; iv) issues around funding (see above); vii) uncoordinated planning; viii) too many management layers and large/too 
many management committees/teams; and ix) tensions, insufficient interaction and unclear delineation of roles between CRP and center management. 
One respondent comments that “the amount of time spent on management has increased and the time for research has decreased”. 
Open-ended: Another theme emerging in connection with the efficiency/effectiveness of CRP management arrangements is collaboration between Centers 
on the one hand and between CRPs on the other. Suggestions made include: i) appoint theme leaders to ensure thematic coherence across participating 
Centers; ii) align management approaches across CRPs; iii) regional rather than global collaboration; iv) establish an inter-center technical committee to 
provide oversight for R4D activities; v) reinforce an outcome orientation; vi) provide incentives such as funds for cross-center/cross-CRP collaboration and 
information sharing; vii) develop funding strategy that reduces competition between Centers and CRPs; vii) more involvement of participating centers in 
management; viii) more exchange of best practices; and ix) map common goals and regions of operation in view of creating synergies. Taking rather 
extreme positions, one respondent suggested reducing the number of CRPs and another clustering CRPs with similar mandates; yet another put forward the 
idea to merge Centers in order to achieve efficiency and effectiveness gains. 
 
 
H. Transparency of governance/oversight bodies5 
 
Finding:  
• Communications coming from CRPs are largely satisfactory, while communications from lead centers and the Consortium are less satisfying.  
 
 
5 Key evaluation question 2: To what extent is governance/oversight of CRPs sufficiently independent, inclusive and transparent? 
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Q22: Communications coming from CRPs regarding policy development, planning and decision-making seem most transparent, clear and timely: 78.5% of 
respondents “agree” or “tend to agree” with the statement; this is followed by communications from lead centers where 59.2% of respondents “agree” or 
“tend to agree”. Responses regarding communications from the Consortium are less clear: A narrow majority of respondents (50.4%) either “tend to agree” 
or “tend to disagree”. More respondents “disagree” than “agree”. 
Q22: Communications regarding policy development, planning and decision-making are transparent, clear and timely. 
Answer Options I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree I disagree 
Too early to 
judge No opinion 
Response 
Count  
from the CRP 56 (38.9%) 57 (39.6%) 14 (9.7%) 9 (6.3%) 5 (3.5%) 3 (2.1%) 144 
 
from the lead center 42 (29.6%) 42 (29.6%) 22 (15.5%) 13 (9.2%) 6 (4.2%) 17 (12.0%) 142 
 
from the Consortium 14 (9.8%) 43 (30.1%) 29 (20.3%) 32 (22.4%) 6 (4.2%) 19 (13.3%) 143 
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ANNEX 7:  OVERVIEW OF CRP GOVERNANCE BODIES: 
STRUCTURE AND INDEPENDENCE 
Table 1 below provides an overview of these structures and assesses the extent to which a CRP 
has a governance structure in place that supports the CRP’s need for balanced oversight as well 
as the lead center’s board for its accountability for program performance. 
In assessing whether independence was high, medium or low, the following criteria were used: 
• the governance body included a majority of external or independent members
• the ToR included responsibilities for strategic oversight, including research priorities,
resource allocations and evaluation of results
• there was a direct reporting relationship to the lead center board
It should be noted that the name of a committee was not a predictor of its role, and that some 
CRPs have multiple entities that were considered to play a governing role in a CRP.  
CRP Governance and advisory 
bodies 
Reports to: Rating of 
Independence: 
Dryland Systems Steering Committee 
Chair: DG, ICARDA 
13 members, 1 DG LC, 3 DG 
PC 
Option to add LC board 
member 
CRP Director (ex-officio) 
Lead center board 
through DG 
Low 
Institutional  
representatives to the 
Steering Committee 
may change from 
meeting to meeting.  
Arrangements 
emphasize the 
superior position of 
the lead center. 
Independent Scientific 
Advisory Committee 
Chair: appointed from among 
committee members 
4 external members, under 
contract (30-45 days per year) 
Steering Committee 
Research Management 
Committee  
(not active at time of review) 
Humidtropics Independent Advisory 
Committee 
Chair:  External member 
8 members,  
DG of LC and PC (ex officio) 
Lead center board High 
AAS Program Oversight Panel  
Chair: External member 
8 members 
One seat for LC rep (DG or 
board member), one for a PC 
Lead center board High 
PIM Science and Policy Advisory 
Panel 
Chair: External member 
7 external members 
Lead center board 
(written reports). 
Medium 
SPAP is smaller than 
mandated.  Member 
1 
 (authorized to 10) 
LC board liaison  
of  lead center board 
recently added.  
WHEAT Stakeholder Committee 
Chair: DG, CIMMYT 
10 members, incl. DG ICARDA, 
DG CIMMYT, DDG CIMMYT 
Lead center board 
through DG 
Low 
Leadership and 
reporting structure of 
each body is 
consolidated within 
CIMMYT.  The 
CIMMYT board has no 
independent source of 
oversight for the 
program. 
 
Other indications: 
Management 
structure:  The 
program is led by the 
CIMMYT DDG-RP with 
a program manager to 
coordinate program 
activity. 
Management Committee 
Chair: CIMMYT DDG-RP   
Co-chair: ICARDA DDG 
 
10 selected partners and 
program leaders 
 
MAIZE Stakeholder Advisory 
Committee 
Chair:  DG, CIMMYT 
9 members, incl. CIMMYT DG, 
IITA DG  
Lead center board 
through DG 
Low 
 
Leadership and 
reporting structure of 
each body is 
consolidated within 
CIMMYT.  The 
CIMMYT board has 
limited independent 
oversight of the 
program.  A CIMMYT 
board member is a 
member of the 
Management 
Committee.  
 
Other indications: 
Management 
structure:  The 
program is led by the 
CIMMYT DDG-RP with 
a program manager to 
coordinate program 
activity. 
Management Committee 
Chair: DDG-RP, CIMMYT 
10 members or fewer, co-
chaired by CIMMYT and IITA 
DDGA 
 
GRiSP Oversight Committee 
Chair:  external member 
11 members, 4 external, 2 
board members from IRRI, 2 
from AfricaRice, and 1 from 
CIAT 
DGs of IRRI and AfricaRice (ex-
Participating center 
boards through board 
representatives 
High 
 
External 
representation is 
significant and center 
representation draws 
on the boards of 
 2 
officio) participating centers.  
DGs of IRRI and 
AfricaRice are ex 
officio. 
RTB Steering Committee 
Chair: DG, CIP 
4 DGs of PCs, 1 member from 
CIRAD  
RTB program director (ex 
officio)  
Lead center board 
through DG 
Low 
Steering Committee 
initially held its 
membership to 
participating DGs.  In 
absence of PAC, Lead 
Center board has had 
no independent 
source of oversight.  
(PAC is now forming.) 
Program Advisory Committee 
(in progress) 
6 members, chair designated 
by CIP BoT 
Lead center board 
Management Committee 
15 members 
4 DDGs, equivalent from 
CIRAD (extended to include 8 
CRP theme leaders) 
The core Management 
Committee comprises 
the DDGs, which 
duplicates 
representation on the 
Steering Committee.  
Grain Legumes Steering Committee 
Chair: Rotate among 
members 
9 members, incl. DGs of PCs, 
key partners, 1 donor rep 
Lead center board 
through DG 
Medium 
Steering Committee 
has stronger role than 
Independent Advisory 
Committee. 
Independent Advisory 
Committee 
communicates to the 
LC board in writing.   
Independent Advisory 
Committee 
Chair:  external member 
8 independent research 
experts, plus reps of sub-
regional organizations 
Lead center board 
(written reports) 
Dryland Cereals Steering Committee 
Chair: Rotate among 
members 
6 members, incl. DGs of PCs, 
key partners, 1 donor rep 
Lead center board 
through DG 
Medium 
Steering Committee 
has stronger role than 
Independent Advisory 
Committee. 
Independent Advisory 
Committee 
communicates to LC 
board in writing.   
Independent Advisory 
Committee 
Chair: external member 
7 independent research 
experts, reps of sub-regional 
organizations 
Lead center board 
(written reports) 
L&F Science and Partnership 
Advisory Committee 
Chair:  external 
4 external members 
Lead center board 
(written report)  Medium 
SPAC has independent 
composition and an 
3 
Program Planning and 
Management Committee 
Chair:  CRP leader 
11 members 
4 PC representatives, three 
science leaders, members of 
CRP management unit  
effective oversight 
function in its ToR. 
Present annual report 
with management 
response to the LC 
board in writing. 
The PPMC functions in 
equivalent fashion to 
a Steering Committee.  
A4NH Independent Advisory 
Committee 
Chair: External member 
6, three scientists, two 
development partners, a 
representative of the 
HarvestPlus program advisory 
committee 
LC board liaison  
Lead center board 
(written report) 
Medium 
IAC comprises 
external members 
plus a LC board 
member.  Meets 
annually.  
WLE Steering Committee 
Chair: external  
11 members, 8 external,  
1 PC DG and 
LC DG and CRP Director (ex 
officio) 
Lead Center Board High 
Steering Committee 
provides independent 
oversight of the 
program.   
FTA Steering Committee  
7 members, 4 reps from each 
PC, 1 partner 
Maximum 8 members 
CRP Director (ex officio) 
Participating center 
boards through center 
representatives. 
Low 
Small, center-
dominated group with 
significant decision-
making and oversight 
authority. The CIFOR 
board has no source 
of independent 
reporting or oversight 
for the CRP. 
Scientific and Stakeholder 
Advisory Committee 
(under review) 
CCAFS Independent Scientific Panel 
Chair: external member 
12 members, and 2 ex officio 
members including a member 
of the lead center board, a 
global partner and the CRP 
leader  
Lead center board High 
Independent 
composition, clear 
ToR , direct report to 
LC board.  No Steering 
Committee, PPMC or 
equivalent in the 
CCAFS structure  
Genebanks Executive Director, Global 
Crop Diversity Trust 
Trust Program Management 
Team, Assistant Executive 
Director 
Consortium 
Board/Office 
Medium 
Accountability for 
performance is to the 
Consortium board. 
Management 
4 
Committee includes 
outside advisors and 
gene bank 
representatives. PC: participating CGIAR centers, LC: lead center, DG: Director General 
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ANNEX 8: TABLE OF CRP GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT BODIES MEMBERSHIP 
INFORMATION 
Overview of 23 active CRP governance bodies1
Title Name TOT Ex officio 
excl. ex 
officio Lead Part. Ext. in% M F % 
TARG 
REG. %
Dryland 
Systems 
Independent Science Advisory Committee 4 0 4 0 0 4 100% 4 0 0% 1 25% 
Steering Committee 14 1 13 1 3 9 69% 13 0 0% 3 23% 
Humidtropics Independent Advisory Committee 10 2 8 0 0 8 100% 6 2 25% 3 38% 
AAS Program Oversight Panel 8 0 8 1 1 6 75% 4 4 50% 1 13% 
PIM Science and Policy Advisory Panel 7 0 7 1 0 6 86% 6 1 14% 4 57% 
WHEAT Stakeholder Committee 10 0 10 2 1 7 70% 6 4 40% 5 50% 
Management Committee 10 10 5 2 3 30% 9 1 10% 2 20% 
MAIZE Stakeholder Advisory Committee 9 0 9 1 1 7 78% 7 2 22% 6 67% 
Management Committee 10 10 7 1 2 20% 8 2 20% 2 20% 
GRISP Oversight committee 11 2 9 2 3 4 44% 6 3 33% 4 44% 
RTB Steering Committee 6 1 5 1 3 1 20% 3 2 40% 0 0% 
Management Committee 15 15 4 10 1 7% 13 2 13% 0 0% 
Grain Legumes Steering Committee 9 0 9 1 3 5 56% 9 0 0% 3 33% 
Independent Advisory Committee 8 0 8 0 0 8 100% 5 3 38% 5 63% 
Dryland 
Cereals 
Steering Committee 6 0 6 1 1 4 67% 5 1 17% 2 33% 
Independent Advisory Committee 7 0 7 0 0 7 100% 6 1 14% 4 57% 
1 The calculations are done using the members excluding the ex-officio members. Those members representing an organization that operates in a region or country where 
the CRPs intend to achieve results were classified as coming from “target regions”. Those members who represent a center board of either a lead center or participating 
center are included as lead or participating center members respectively.  
L&F Science & Partnership Advisory Committee 4 0 4 0 0 4 100% 2.5 1.5 38% 0 0% 
Program Planning & Management Committee 11 1 10 6 4 0 0% 7 3 30% 0 0% 
A4NH Independent Advisory Committee 6 0 6 1 0 5 83% 4 2 33% 1 17% 
Planning and Management Committee 9 9 4 3 2 22% 5 4 44% 0 0% 
WLE Steering Committee 11 2 9 0 1 8 89% 6 3 33% 2 22% 
FTA Steering Committee 7 1 6 1 3 2 33% 5 1 17% 1 17% 
CCAFS Independent Science Panel (ISP) 12 2 10 1 0 9 90% 7 3 30% 2 20% 
TOTAL 204 12 192 40 40 112 58% 146.5 45.5 24% 47 24% 
Overview of CPR Management Committees 
Title Name TOT Lead Part. Ext. M F % 
Dryland Systems Research Management Committee 5 2 3 0 4 1 20% 
Humidtropics Management Committee 9 3 5 1 9 0 0% 
AAS Program Leadership Team 17 12 3 2 11 6 35% 
PIM Management Committeee 7 4 2 1 2 5 71% 
GRiSP Program Planning and Management Team 6 1 2 3 5 0 0% 
Grain Legumes Research Management Committee 11 4 4 3 11 0 0% 
Dryland Cereals Research Management Committee 10 6 1 3 9 1 10% 
WLE Management Committee 12 6 6 0 8 4 33% 
FTA Senior management team 10 5 5 0 6 4 40% 
CCAFS Programme Management Committee 7 2 3 2 5 2 29% 
TOTAL/AVERAGE 94 45 34 15 70 23 24% 
ANNEX 9: CRP MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION COSTS AS PROVIDED IN CRP 
PROPOSAL DOCS 
 
COSTS BY NATURAL CLASSIFICATION
1.1 1.2 1.3 2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 4 5 6 7
Dryland SysHumid Tropics AAS PIM Wheat Maize GRiSP RTB Grain Leg Dryland Cer L&F A4NH WLE FTA CCAFS
Personnel 12.786 15.432 5.515 29.783 11.118 14.102 32.950 18.400 14.186 8.199 10.869 14.218 26.743 23.745 18.700
Supplies and services 10.519 11.091 24.960 6.594 3.401
Travel 2.058 2.433 1.507 4.710 1.872 2.359 6.000 2.900 2.567 1.435 0.922 1.944 2.915 4.071 2.600
Operating expenses 8.316 8.370 1.308 13.587 12.400 7.882 8.748 9.770 10.855 8.700
Training/workshop 1.446 1.260 0.898 2.331 0.982 1.518 0.800 0.796 0.723 0.352 1.074 2.750 1.800
Partners/Collaboratr/Cons  4.537 9.286 4.244 18.453 4.878 11.067 12.910 9.400 6.269 3.840 4.508 25.527 21.907 16.282 18.900
Capital and other equipme  1.496 1.581 1.064 0.727 1.148 1.609 7.610 2.600 1.107 0.598 0.043 0.347 1.443 0.678 1.100
Contingency 0.562 0.399 0.476 0.268 0.112 0.859 0.600
Consortium Board/Fund 0.723 1.028
31.201 38.362 14.935 70.067 31.240 42.774 84.430 46.500 31.519 18.196 24.844 51.970 66.387 55.630 52.400
Institutional overhead (%o   6.226 7.251 2.366 11.876 4.887 6.555 10.310 9.100 5.860 4.214 4.885 6.829 9.756 12.212 10.000
SUBTOTAL 37.427 45.613 17.301 81.943 36.127 49.329 94.740 55.600 37.379 22.410 29.729 58.799 76.143 67.842 62.400
Lead center/CRP management Costs 0.731 2.800 1.474 1.376
CGIAR system costs 0.690 0.800
TOTAL 37.427 46.344 17.301 81.943 36.127 49.329 95.430 58.400 38.853 23.786 29.729 58.799 76.143 67.842 63.200
BY THEMES incl overhead
1.1 1.2 1.3 2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 4 5 6 7
Dryland Sys Humidtropics AAS PIM Wheat Maize GRiSP RTB Grain Leg Dryland Cer L&F A4NH WLE FTA CCAFS
Research no breakdow  no breakdow  15.010 75.251 33.959 46.246 85.830 46.400 35.867 21.039 no breakdow  57.469 no breakdow  65.506 57.800
Gender 1.381 3.862 1.512 1.371 0.830
Consortium Board/Fund 0.723 1.028 0.690 0.800
CRP Management 0.731 0.910 2.830 1.445 2.055 3.850 2.800 1.474 1.376 1.330 1.444 1.206 4.600
Institutional capacity 5.050
Communications
Overhead 9.100
TOTAL 17.301 81.943 36.127 49.329 95.420 58.300 38.853 23.786 58.799 67.842 63.200
percentage 2% 5% 3% 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 6% 2% 2% 7%
